--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STUDY MANUAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROLOGUELN324-91
The purpose of this booklet is to present
basic information on the
mission and
activities of Counter Intelligence. But, with the understanding
that the
primary mission is to support the commanders of the armed forces.
This
booklet is dedicated to the concepts of Counter Intelligence in relation
with its
functional areas, the application of these functions, and a specific
dedication
and instructions on how to apply these functions. The terms
"special
agent of Counter Intelligence" (SA) refers to all those persons who
conduct and
contribute to the handling and gathering of information of the
multi-disciplinary
intelligence of the hostile services. This booklet is
primarily
oriented at those persons involved in the control and execution of
the
operations of CI. In like manner, this booklet has a very significant
value for
other members of the armed forces that function in the areas and
services of
security and other departments of intelligence.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Prologue
Chapter
1 Introduction to Counter Intelligence
Chapter
2 Operations Security (OP SEC)
Chapter
3 General OP SEC
Chapter
4 Document Security
Chapter
5 Liaison
Chapter
6 Operation of Report on Contact of
Liaison
Chapter
7 Introduction - Investigation of
Personal Security
Chapter
8 Interrogatory/Technical Phase of
Questioning
Chapter
9 Investigation and Interviews of
Personal Security
Chapter
10 How to Obtain a Sworn Statement
Chapter
11 Unexpected Interviews
Chapter
12 Witness Interview
Chapter
13 Subject Interview (personal)
Chapter
14 Introduction to Subversion and
Espionage
Chapter
15 Interviews of Subversion and
Espionage
Chapter
16 Espionage Investigation
Chapter
17 Sabotage Investigation
Chapter
18 Preparing Agent Reports
Chapter
19 Reports/Information for
Investigation
Chapter
20 Preparing Summary Information
Chapter
21 Scrutiny of CI of Interrogation
Chapter
22 Interrogation of CI Suspects
Chapter
23 Abstracting Information of CI
Chapter
24 Protecting Targets of CI
Chapter
25 Neutralizing Targets of CI
Chapter
26 Observation and description
Chapter
27 Planning and conduct of a mobile
(PIE),
Chapter
28 Terrorism
Chapter
29 Counter-terrorism
Chapter
30 Physical Security
Annex
A Prepare Report on Physical
Security
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER
1 LN324-91
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER
INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a circle representing the effort
of a total intelligence
conducted
by all the agencies of the Armed Forces. Inside this overall field,
we find
that counterintelligence is an integral part of the total intelligence
effort.
DEVELOPMENT
DEFINITION
OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:
Counterintelligence is defined as the
activity or activities
collectively
organized by an intelligence service dedicated to obstruct the
enemy's
source of information by means of concealment, codes, crypto,
censorship
and other measures to deceive the enemy by using disinformation,
trickery,
etc.
The two measures used by
Counterintelligence are DEFENSIVE or OFFENSIVE:
Defensive measures vary normally with the
mission of the unit. An
example of
these measures are:
Counter-espionage
Counter-sabotage
Counter-subversion
Antiterrorism
Counter-terrorism
Intelligence consists of collection,
transmission and dissemination of
military
data referring to possible or real enemy and/or to an area of
operations.
The military commander uses this intelligence in order to
formulate
his possible course of action and to select a course of action in
particular
in order to achieve the mission. Thus, the intelligence obtained is
of vital
importance to the commander and for the conduct of his mission.
Intelligence is also essential for the
enemy as it is for us. The enemy
also uses
all sorts of measures at its disposal to become informed about our
capabilities,
vulnerabilities and probable cause of action, and also
information
about the meteorological conditions of the terrain.
Military Counter Intelligence is that part
of Intelligence intended to
deprive the
enemy of this knowledge, and in this manner prevent the enemy
activities
of espionage, sabotage and subversion, as well as discover possible
5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
acts of an
adverse nature, treason, or sedition among our own military forces.
Counter
Intelligence is a significant aspect in both the strategic
intelligence
and combat, and is essential for the favorable application of two
of the nine
basic principles of war: security and surprise. The principles of
war are:
Mass
Objective
Security
Surprise
Command
Offensive
Maneuver
Force economy
Simplicity.
Effective Counter Intelligence enhances
the security and helps achieve
surprise.
Surprise depends not only on the intelligence obtained and the speed
of
movement, but also on the effective counter intelligence. Effort to prevent
the enemy
from obtaining data, reducing the risk that the command can suffer,
provided it
diminishes the enemy's capability of utilizing effectively its
potential
of combat against our Armed Forces. Thus, effective counter
intelligence
allows security of the unit.
DECEPTION:
Deception in combat is a military
operation designed to conceal our
dispositions,
capabilities and intentions and deceive the enemy in such a way
that it
would be to his disadvantage and to our advantage.
Deception is designed to derail or deceive
the enemy through
manipulation,
disinformation, or falsifying of evidence in order to induce a
reaction in
a way that is detrimental to his own interest.
In order for a deception operation to be
successful, the enemy has to
have the
capability of collecting information that we would like him to get,
so that we
can react according to the information.
The enemy is given the opportunity to
obtain information, and thus
creating a
deceptive picture. At the same time, counter intelligence goes into
action in
order to prevent the enemy from discovering the true purpose of the
operation
of deception and to avoid recognition of the true technical
operation
or the principle one, which is being supported by the deceptive
operation
mainly security.
QUESTION: Why can we consider a soldier as
a counter intelligence
agency?
6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
ANSWER: An individual solder is an agent
of the CI, since he can provide
information
on the activities of the intelligence of the enemy, including
subversion.
Much of the CI operations depends on the individual soldiers
ability to
adequately fulfill the security procedures, camouflage, observation
and
information system.
As a prisoner of war, the individual
soldier is a soldier of operational
information
of the enemy. Therefore, the individual soldier receives training
in the
measures of escape and invasion, in case he is taken prisoner or that
he finds
himself behind enemy lines. Also he receives training to resist the
interrogations
of the enemy and adhere to his rights as a prisoner of war
under the
Geneva Convention.
All the units are agents of the CI and
they too take measures of CI in
order to
deprive the enemy intelligence on our activities, operations and
locations
of this positions.
Every officer of the high command and
every subordinate command in
effect acts
as a Counter Intelligence officer of the Joint High Command. For
example,
the transport officer aids the command with the Counter Intelligence
aspects
regarding the movement of transport; the health chief accesses the
Counter
Intelligence aspect regarding the location of the health
installations.
Some units, such as the units of the
censure, have special function of
CI because
of the nature of their assigned missions. The CI agent of the Army
has the
personal training as specialist in CI and is available for providing
support in
all the military operations.
Other government agencies, such as the
agencies of intelligence of the
Navy, the
Air Force and the Defense Ministry, also use certain functions of CI
that
support the CI operations of the Army.
Keep in mind that kind of intelligence is
necessary in both times of
peace and
war, since espionage, subversion and occasion sabotage are not only
limited to
conditions of time of war. All foreign countries, both enemy and
friends,
wish to obtain information regarding the Armed Forces, their assets,
disposition,
weapons, level of training and future plans for operations peace
time as
well as in time of war.
The range of the CI operation extends in
proportion to the level of
command.
At the division level the measure of CI
generally have to do with
military
security.
CI operations at higher levels are similar
to those of the inferior
levels.
Nevertheless, the operations have a broader range thanks to the
greater
number of units in the scope of their areas with a great volume of
7
__________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
advance
planning. The CI operations at superior levels include:
MILITARY SECURITY
SECURITY OF PORTS, BORDERS AND TRAVEL
CENSORSHIP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CIVILIAN SECURITY
Generally speaking, Counter Intelligence
is a main part of the
intelligence
operation in the theater of operations.
Depriving the enemy of information
regarding supplies, installations,
nuclear
weapon systems, means of transport, communications is vital in
fulfillment
of the mission in the zone of the theater of operations. The great
territorial
responsibility of this zone require extensive operation of the CI
of all
types.
COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES:
QUESTION: IN THE MILITARY UNIT, WHAT ARE
THE THINGS THAT INTEREST THE
ENEMY?
ANSWER: Military information.
Personnel.
Equipment
and installations.
As in all aspects of the military unit,
the commanders are responsible
for the
implementation and execution of all the measures of military Counter
Intelligence
to protect military information, personnel, material and
installation
within the unit.
The commander has his high command which
can delegate the authority to
carry out
these functions; nevertheless, the responsibility rests with the
commander.
The Counter
Intelligence officer:
The auxiliary chief of the high command,
C-2, is the officer of the high
command responsible
for the military information which also includes Counter
Intelligence.
This delegation of authority is given to the auxiliary chief of
8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
the high
command, C-2, who has under his charge and responsibility of the high
command
regarding Central Intelligence and CI. The C-2 is responsible for the
implementation
and direction of all the measures of CI inside the command.
The planning of military Counter
Intelligence is based on ability or
capability
of the enemy to obtain information regarding friendly activities.
This
planning includes adequate CI countermeasures to prevent the enemy from
discovering
the dispositions and activities that can reveal the intentions of
the command
or, if interrupted, could endanger the accomplishment of the
mission.
According to the organization and the size
of the command, there may be
a CI
official of the high command of the C-2. At the division or brigade
level, the
official of the CI normally is the chief of the section of security
or the
detachment of military intelligence that supports the division of the
brigade. In
other words, he wears two hats, as chief of the security section,
and as the
CI officer of the joint high command of the C-2.
CATEGORIES OF CI OPERATION
Generally, there are five categories of
operations of CI conducted
inside the
theater of operation at which the C-2 is responsible or has direct
interest.
The categories are:
MILITARY SECURITY
CIVILIAN SECURITY
HARBOR, BORDER AND TRAVEL SECURITY
CENSORSHIP
SPECIAL OPERATION
MILITARY SECURITY
The military security encompasses measures
taken by the command to
protect
itself from espionage, enemy civilians, supervision and sabotage and
surprise. These include passive CI measures and active ones
inside the Armed
Forces and directly pertaining to the same and for specific
military
operations. Examples of military securities are:
SECRECY
DISCIPLINE: This is the indoctrination/training on a continuous
basis of all personnel against divulging of classified
information that is not
authorized or unclassified regarding military activities,
and the use of
9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
patrol of security in areas frequented by military
personnel.
SPECIAL PROTECTION OF
CLASSIFIED MILITARY AND EQUIPMENT INFORMATION:
This is the observation of the security measures, such as
the security
necessary inside the areas that contain information and
classified equipment;
introduction of a system of passes for entering critical
areas; the conduct of
studies in inspection of security to determine the strict
observation of
prescribed security measures.
SECURITY OF TROOP
MOVEMENT: This keeps a certain connection with the
secrecy discipline, preventing inappropriate comments by
personnel in the unit
given an order for movement; in returning mail dispatches of
the unit in a
certain period of time before the departure of the troops,
and restricting all
personnel in the area of the unit.
COUNTER
SUBVERSION INSIDE THE ARMED FORCES: This is the overcoming of
suppression of rumors and propaganda and the apprehension of
subversive
agents.
THE TECHNICAL
MEASURES AS REQUIRED IN THE COMBAT ZONES: This is the use
of the technical troops for the apprehension of the
resistance groups, to help
reduce the intelligence subjective and the mop up operations
of the guerilla
units.
TRANSMISSION
SECURITY: Listening to the administration communication
networks, command operation of intelligence.
SPECIAL HANDLING
OF ESCAPEES AND EVADERS: This type of person needs to
be debriefed to obtain the immediate intelligence
information. It is of great
importance to make sure that the escapee or evader is not an
enemy agent.
CIVILIAN SECURITY: In all cases the mission of the military
forces has
priority over the well being of the civilians in the area.
Examples of the
civilian security measures are:
Systematic
registering of the civilian personnel, including the neutral
foreigners and enemies: This is done by the civilian affairs
agency and
includes the distribution of rationing cards, work permits,
travel permits and
permits for crossing borders.
Control of the
circulation of the civilian personnel and refugees: This
is a very important matter: All civilian personnel must be
kept away from the
advance combat zones, which will help prevent their easily
finding out about
our forces and inform enemy agents of espionage or sabotage.
Also, all
civilian personnel is to be kept at a distance from the
major route of supply
to make it easier for the military transport and prevent
enemy agents from
infiltrating the military zone.
10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Curfew: Keeping the public away from the streets and routes
after certain
hours, thus restricting the movements of enemy agents.
Surveillance of
suspect political groups: One should find out whether
other groups are sympathetic to enemy cause. Such groups
must always be
considered potential agents.
Investigation of
workers security: Local workers employed by the Armed
Forces should be investigated to avoid infiltration of enemy
agents in areas
and military units. This include the service personnel of
the countryside,
truck drivers and current workers, and interpreters,
translators, etc.
Distribution of
passes and permits. Passes and permits should be
strictly controlled and reviewed frequently to avoid
forgery. Passes and
permits for travel are normally distributed to government
functionaries,
political agencies, doctors and workers of public services.
Control of
international commerce: Control of commerce in neutral
states. Experience has proven that many commercial companies
are in effect spy
agencies that use the company as a cover or front of their
operation. The
profits from the trade of these companies can be and is used
to pay for the
expenses of espionage operations.
Surveillance of
consuls and neutral/high command diplomats: It is
possible that people of this category are using their
diplomatic immunity to
act as couriers for an enemy country.
SECURITY OF
HARBORS, BORDERS AND TRAVEL: Consists of special
applications of both the neutral security measures as well
as civilians for
the control of Counter Intelligence in entry ports and ports
of departure for
borders and international lines; all movements of. a
non-military character,
of entry and departure in the theater of operations.
SECURITY CONTROL
OF MARITIME HARBORS: This is the responsibility of the
Navy and control should be coordinated with the Navy.
SECURITY CONTROL
OF AIRPORTS: This is the responsibility of the Air
Force and control should be coordinated with the Air Force.
ESTABLISHMENT OF
CROSSING POINTS ON THE BORDER: Normal routes of
movement should be directed to points of crossing located
strategically. These
points of crossing should be controlled by military
personnel with the help of
local and national agencies as necessary.
SECURITY CONTROL
OF THE MERCHANT MARINE AND THE CREWS OF COMMERCIAL
AIRCRAFT: This is important due to such individuals who by
virtue of their
occupation can enter and depart legally and frequently from
the country and
such individuals can be used as pretext for carrying out
fraud operations
(diplomatic pouch).
11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
INVESTIGATION OF
SECURITY AND CONTROL OF PERSONS WHO LIVE AT THE
BORDERS: Personnel in this category, for example, the
farmers who live at the
border and the entire front can be on the border, personnel
living on one side
of the border and working on the other side.
CONTROL OF
DISEMBARKATION PASSES AND PASSES FOR LANDING, AND FISHING
PERMITS: The fishing boats and small craft of a similar
nature that operate in
very shallow water and thus have the capability of landing
enemy agents at any
point on the coast of the country where the military
operations take place.
CENSORSHIP:
Censorship is the control and elimination of communication
with a double purposes: First, to avoid the transmission of
information that
can be of interest in helping the enemy; and secondly, to
collect and
propagate valuable information in the service of
intelligence that helps the
war effort. The term communication includes all types of
postal material,
regardless of class;, means of electrical communication and
any other tangible
form of communication that can be carried by a person,
carried in luggage, or
among personal effects or in any other way can be
transmitted from the area
where the censorship is taking place.
THERE ARE FOUR
TYPES OF CENSORSHIP IMPLEMENTED DURING WAR CONDITIONS
WHICH ARE:
Censorship of the
Armed Forces: This censorship is the control and
examination of all communications sent and received by
personnel under the
jurisdiction of the Armed Forces, which include assigned
military personnel,
the civilians that can be employed and added to the same.
This includes all
war correspondents, representatives of the Red Cross and
technical
representatives of the factories.
Civilian
Censorship: The civilian censorship is the control and
examination of all communication of the national and
civilian population of
the common goal and transit or circulate in a territory
which cannot be
liberated, occupied or controlled by the Armed Forces.
Press Censorship:
Press censorship is a division of the security of the
news material and other media that are used, including
maintenance of
security. This applies primarily to the work that is done by
the war
correspondents, radio commentators and press photographers,
and also includes
any material prepared on a possible location by the
personnel under the
jurisdiction of the Armed Forces.
Censorship of Prisoners
or War: Censorship of prisoners of war is
control and examination of the political communication of
the prisoners of war
and the civilian detainees under the jurisdiction of the
Armed Forces.
SPECIAL
OPERATIONS: The final category is the special operations.
Operations that come under this category will be discussed
and planned
Back to Top 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 2
LN324-91
according to the specifications of the commander in keeping
with the planning
within the SOP of CI.
OPERATIONS SECURITY [OPSEC]
INTRODUCTION
Operations
security is one of the keys for achieving the two war
principles: surprise and security. A military force has the
advantage when he
can surprise the enemy. In order to achieve this goal, those
military forces
must protect their operations and activities with a
continuous implementation
of a security plan that is healthy and effective. The
purpose of OPSEC is to
protect the military operations and their activities by
negating the
indicators military forces plans and their intentions
vis-a-vis the enemy
forces. In other words, the enemy commander should not know
or recognize how,
when, where, why and what operations our forces are about to
undertake, until
it is too late for the enemy to react effectively against
our operations.
OPSEC is the duty
of the commander, together with each individual at all
levels of command. The commander determines which are the
measures of OPSEC
which should be implemented and the duration of each event.
Equally, they
should determine the level of risk that they should be
willing to accept. The
elements of intelligence (SD) provide information about
enemy threat. The
operation elements (S3) direct the program of OPSEC and
recommend measures for
OPSEC. The units of each individual implement those OPSEC
procedures. In order
to attain a good OPSEC program, commanders and the members
of the joint
command, and each individual should be trained in the proper
use of the
procedures and techniques of OPSEC.
This teaching
plan provides a guide for the procedures to be used by the
technical units in the OPSEC program. Described OPSEC and
provides doctrinaire
direction for the future instructors and trainers.
What is OPSEC?
GENERAL
In order for our
military forces to be successful against enemy forces,
information about the activities of our units or plans and
operations should
be denied to the enemy until it is too late for him to react
effectively.
OPSEC does not
occur by itself. Our military forces have to create the
right condition for a good OPSEC program since OPSEC is an
integral part of
all the operations and activities. The OPSEC program can be
good because it
was implemented effectively in each unit; or it can be a
program without
13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
effectiveness because the members of the unit did not know
the importance of
the program and does not know what it requires.
OPSEC IS
ALL ACTION TAKEN BY THE COMMAND TO
DENY
INFORMATION TO THE ENEMY ON OUR ACTIVITIES
OR MILITARY OPERATIONS
Generally, OPSEC
includes coordination of various techniques and
procedures that deny information to the enemy. It is the
common sense applied
systematically to the situation of a unit or a mission. The
result is the
security of the military forces. This requires a total
effort of integration
by all commanders, and the members of the team, and the
units and each
individual. Under the umbrella of OPSEC, there exist
basically three types of
action.
COUNTER
SURVEILLANCE - These activities are taken to protect the true
purpose of our operations and activities.
COUNTER MEASURES
- Those actions taken to eliminate and reduce the enemy
threat and its capability of intelligence and electronic
warfare against our
military forces.
DECEPTION - Those
actions taken to create the false image of our
activities and operations.
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
SIGNAL SECURITY (SIGSEC)
The signal
security includes communication security (COMSEC) and
electronic security (ELESEC).
COMSEC includes those measures taken to deny the enemy
information on our
telecommunications. This includes the cryptographic
security, transmissions
security, physical security of COMSEC information, and
measures to assure the
authenticity of the communications.
ELESEC is the
protection of the electromagnetic transmission, which
includes the communication apparatus. This includes such
measures as standard
operations procedures which have been approved, appropriate
search,
maintenance procedures, and training programs.
ELECTRONIC COUNTER COUNTERMEASURES
Electronic
counter countermeasures (ECCM) are various measures taken to
14
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
protect the electronic transmissions of our military forces
and the detection
capacity, recognizing and identifying the enemy. This
includes the proper use
of the command post of the motor, situating the antennas,
concealing and
distancing the antennas, a check of the equipment to secure
and make sure that
there is no radioactive radiation, and training.
A good electronic
counter countermeasure program must ensure the
effective use of the electromagnetic systems of our military
forces.
INFORMATION SECURITY (DOCUMENTS)
Information
security INFSEC is the protection of information of value
for the enemy forces. This includes two types of
information, classified and
unclassified. Some examples are the dispatch documents,
requisitions (orders),
plans, orders (directives), reports, charts (maps), map
covering material, and
dissemination of verbal information, and the press that may
have an adverse
effect on national security and the operation of friendly
military forces.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Physical security
(PHYSEC) is the protection of the installations,
command post and their activities, etc., by the members of
the Armed Forces,
dogs, and other necessary measures for the restriction and
protection of the
area. Some measures include barriers of the perimeters,
detective lights,
marked copies of the keys or combinations, bolting
mechanism, alarm systems
for the control of intrusion, personal identification,
controlled access, and
controlled movement. The PHYSEC also allows the protection
against espionage,
sabotage and robbery.
STANDARD OPERATION PROCEDURES (SOP)
As a general
rule, the countersurveillance procedures such as
camouflage, concealing and the use of color, light and
noise, are concealment
measures discussed in the SOP. The SOP also covers the
manner in which the
unit utilizes buildings, roofs, highways and its equipment.
COUNTER MEASURES
Counter measures
are selected, recommended and planned in order to
overcome the specific aspects for the operation of
intelligence of the enemy.
Once a vulnerability has been identified and the risk is
determined to exist,
a counter measure is designed specifically for this threat
in order to avoid
exploitation of said vulnerability by the enemy. The counter
measures can be
anything from deception to the destruction of the capability
of the enemy's
means. The counter measures also include appropriate
measures to discover the
vulnerability of the friendly force. For example, the use of
smoke, or the
15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
use of flak in critical moments. The deception operation
also can be planned.
DECEPTION OPERATIONS
Deception
operations (DECOP) are carried out in order to deceive the
enemy. These operations include:
Handling of
Electronic signatures
Distortion of the
friendly activities in order not to make the real
objective known.
Falsifying material,
and placed wherever it can be captured or
photographed by the enemy.
Simulated
maneuvers
Demonstrations
Simulated
equipment
Deception
operations can be conducted when the commander sees an
opportunity to deceive the enemy.
? 2
Also, deception can be required when the countersurvei1lance
operations are
not sufficient to disorient the enemy so that the operation
may be successful.
In any case, knowledge of the friendly military forces
provided by security
analysis is necessary in order to create a credible
deception plan.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security analysis
is done in order to support the countersurveillance
and counter measures. OPSEC depends on the commander and his
personnel being
informed of a threat that they will confront, in the
patterns, weaknesses and
profiles of the friendly force. Intelligence analysts
provides information on
the enemy; the analyst assigned to OPSEC section determine
which unit or
activity of the friendly forces are vulnerable, and why. The
OPSEC analyst
provides the commander and the operators with a risk
estimate; this is based
on the efforts of the aggregate of intelligence of the enemy
and the
activities of the friendly forces that are known. They can
recommend
procedures or procedures of countersurveillance and counter
measures.
OPSEC is a
condition.
Generally, OPSEC
is a condition that seeks to attain security or safety
of the friendly forces. It involves a variety of activities
for concealing the
friendly units, or to deceive the capabilities of the enemy
analyst and
commander in regard to intelligence gathering. These
activities (under the
16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
category of countersurveillance, counter measures and
deception) can be
accomplished independently by members of each unit. But it
is the integration
of these activities by the commanders and the operation
officer, which
transforms the OPSEC program for a unit and provides
security for the
operations. The elements of security such as SIGSEC, counter
intelligence,
military police, and the personnel of each unit, provide the
necessary support
to create good conditions for OPSEC in the installations.
THE THREAT
COLLECTIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY
HUMAN RESOURCES
ELECTRONIC RESOURCES
IMAGE RESOURCES
Agents
INTELSEN/GE Photography
Infiltrators
-- Radio interception
Infrared (close and
distant)
Reconnaissance Unit
--Radar interception
Night vision
equipment
Combat Unit
--Interference equipment
Image
amplifiers
Patrol
--Radar surveillance
Visual
Prisoners of war--Telesensors SLAR
Refugees
--Acoustics
Figure 1
The intelligence
threat against our Armed Forces vary from place to
place, according to operations, missions, contingency plan
and the level of
sophistication of the enemy. Therefore, the units to receive
information about
the threat in specific situations in the local sections of
intelligence. It is
expected that the enemy units will utilize all of their
capabilities of
collecting information, as is shown in Figure 1, when they
confront our
forces.
The enemy is
particularly interested in the different echelons of our
military forces: which are the capabilities of the unit;
such as, their fire
17
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
power, communications, detection capabilities, logistic
support, but in the
same way are interested in the location, movements, and
intentions of our
military forces. The capability of the threat that is
discussed in the
classrooms and the practical exercises of the units should
be based on the
capabilities of the enemy and the ones that can have be a
fundamental threat
in the operation activities of the unit involved. In other
words, the OPSEC
program was developed in order to counteract the specific
threats against the
military unit involved.
OPERATIONAL GUIDE
GENERAL
The OPSEC program
is conducted by the commander and led by the
operations officer as part of the operations of each unit.
Each unit can have
an effective OPSEC program with only the coordinated forces
of the commander,
members of the task force and the troops, and the use of
various activities of
security and intelligence.
NUCLEUS OF THE OPSEC OPERATIONS
Operations Officer
G1/S1
G3/S3
SIGSEC Commander Troops
Counter
espionage
G3/S3
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
The OPSEC program
is designed to function with the characteristics of
the technical operations, and the requirements of each
organization. Each unit
takes the necessary steps to provide the security and
maintain the surprise -
keep the enemy without knowledge of what our military forces
are doing. For
this reason, OPSEC should be taught in all the military
schools at all levels,
and established in the doctrinaire literature of each
organization and its
operations. Each manual should describe how military forces
can improve the
security of their operations.
In order for the
OPSEC program to be effective, the tactical units
should:
Be established by
the commander, and led by the operations officer of
the support of the local intelligence officer.
Be based on the
operational requirements of the unit.
Be imaginative
and adaptable for certain changes.
Be designed to
deny valuable information to the enemy regarding
activities and operation.
Be compelled at
all levels by the commander in the plans and training,
so that the program can function in operations situations.
OPSEC SUPPORT
The OPSEC support
is provided by the unit or sections of the OPSEC which
are found in the organizations of military intelligence. The
OPSEC teams are
specialists in security signals in the counter intelligence
and should be put
in direct support of the combat brigade, support division
commands and the
artillery units. These teams support the unit determining
the vulnerability of
each unit, to assist the subordinate units and maintaining
the most current
data regarding enemy threats and evaluation of
vulnerabilities of such
threats. The support units of OPSEC participate in the
conduct of evaluation
of OPSEC. They also recommend certain ways of protecting the
procedures which
could provide indicators to the enemy.
The security
specialists help in the development of the plans and
procedures of OPSEC, maintaining the archives of OPSEC, and
recommending the
deception measures. Commanders can also obtain the support
of the units of
OPSEC at the highest echelons of the high command of the
Armed Forces. This
support includes services such as the signal security,
computerization
security, counter measures of technical surveillance,
counter intelligence
investigations and inspection of cryptographic installations.
19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
THE OPSEC PROCESS
OPSEC is a
continuous process of planning, collecting information,
analyzing and forming, changing data base, issuing orders
and instructions and
execution.
OPSEC PROCESS
Planning the
gathering --->Information gathering--->Analyzing
Report on
Report
results
Executing orders
<----Issuing orders <-----Revising the
and instructionsdata Base
NOTE: Once
started, the OPSEC process is continuous and more than one
section can do it at any moment.
The OPSEC process
is done in a sequence of planning, execution and
reporting the results. The process begins with information
already known of
the data base and continues in a logical way resulting from
the assessment,
recommendation and operation plan. The plan is carried out
by the units. The
OPSEC measures are monitored by members of the different
unit and by elements
of the CI to verify the effectiveness of the OPSEC measures.
The commander and
the operations officer take action to correct the
vulnerabilities based on the
different reports. The process can be illustrated as
follows:
THE OPSEC PROCESS
S3/D3 S2/D2
Based on OPSEC
profile Estimate of the enemy
Data base or intelligence threat
Condition
of
our forces
------------
and
Commander
countersurveillance
guideline in effect
20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
The Concept of the Commander
of the mission or operation
P --Determine the sensitive aspects of the operation
L --Develop the essential elements of friendly information
(EEFI)
A --Advise on our vulnerabilities
N --Analyze the risk
N --Determine countermeasures and requirements of deception
I --Estimate of OPSEC (written or orally)
N --OPSEC plan (written or orally)
G --Deception plan (written or orally)
I
M
P --Units implement
Operational Plan (With the OPSEC plan as an Annex)
L
--Counterintelligence elements supervise the OPSEC plan
E
M --Inform on
indicators that can influence the operations
E
N
--Effectiveness of OPSEC program is evaluated
T
A
T
I
0
N
R
E
S --Counterintelligence elements inform the commander and
the
U operations
officer orally or in a written report.
L
T
S
Figure 1
21
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
THE DATA BASE
Data base for the
planning of OPSEC is maintained by the CI section.
This information on our units and enemy capability for
gathering information
is always in the process of evaluation and change.
The intelligence
section informs the CI element regarding the capability
of the element to collect information. This information
about the enemy is
important because:
Time is not wasted
advising an erroneous threat.
Counter measures
are not assigned to indicators which the enemy does not
have the capability to collect.
Counter measures
are assigned to counteract the capabilities of the
enemy to collect information on our activities.
The CI section
establishes the data base to develop the indicators, the
signatures, the patterns and the profile of our forces. This
information
indicates how our units appear in the battlefield -- the way
they operate, how
they communicate, how they are supplied, etc. The
information about our own
unit is important for the planning of our operations
because:
It determines the
essential elements of information on our forces and
our vulnerabilities.
Counter measures
are applicable to the units which need them. In
carrying out and
providing advice for OPSEC measures.
Deception can be
done effectively. The use of deception depends on
common sense,
precise information about enemy intelligence and our
involved units.
For example, the units which use deception have to
demonstrate
indicators, signatures, patterns and profiles showing the
same
characteristics as the type of unit they are trying to imitate.
COMMANDER GUIDE
The concept of
the operation and the mission of the commander provides
the direction and guideline for the OPSEC plan. The
commander can order
certain general measures of OPSEC or perceive specific
procedures of security
during operation. For example, it can establish measures for
protecting the
revealing of unit movement, supplies and use of radio. The
commander should
announce which part of the operation should be protected for
the operation to
succeed.
22
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
PLANNING
The C3/S3 is
assisted by the CI section and other high staff and general
staff officers, realizing the plan described in Figure 1.
Although the
different aspects of the planning might not be completed in
detail, each one
should be completed as much as possible in a given time.
Determine
the Sensitive Aspects of the Operation
Take note of the
information which if known by the enemy provides
indicators that reveal our operation. Operational indicators
and physical
characteristics are compared constantly with the operation.
Once this is done
the planners can --
Determine
the Essential Elements of the Elements of
Friendly Information (EEFI)
The essential
element of friendly information is information that if it
falls in the hands of the enemy, our operations will fail.
The EEFI reflect
the concern of the commander regarding areas that need
security. The CI agents
use the EEFI to identify and inform regarding
vulnerabilities. The unit uses
the EEFI to plan operations of countersurveillance.
Advice on Our Vulnerabilities
Noting the EEFIs,
the CI sections begin to advise on our
vulnerabilities. The CI agents identify the units and
activities that are most
vulnerable and detectable by enemy intelligence. This step
is necessary for --
Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is
a process that compares our vulnerabilities with the
enemy capabilities for gathering of collect.
The CI agent
identifies indicators that if detected would result in the
divulging of important combat intelligence regarding our
operations. The
purpose is to identify the risk and determine what can be
done to reduce them.
This includes an evaluation of the operation of
countersurveillance and
counter measures actually in effect for determining what
more needs to be
done. The units always employ procedures of counter
surveillance. The units
separate and evaluate the effectiveness of
countersurveillance as they receive
new information. Based on the new information, they can
decide and adjust the
measures for countersurveillance in order to focus on
certain techniques and
procedures. This process continues throughout the CI agents
structure.
23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Determine the Counter Measures
Counter measures
are used to protecting these indicators and EEFI which
are most vulnerable for enemy detection, as a result the
counter surveillance
measures which are not adequate. Generally there are five
options:
Counter measures
are not necessary
Applying a
counter measure
Stop the activity
Employ deception
operations
Change the
operation
Counter measures
are not necessary under the following conditions:
A indicator
cannot be detected by the enemy
If it is
detected, the indicator supports the deception plan.
The commander
decides to accept the risk.
The use of counter
measures in deception requires common sense,
information over our units and knowledge of the capabilities
of the enemy to
gather intelligence. The specific counter measures are
directed towards the
capabilities of the enemy in order to collect information.
Counter measures
may include the physical destruction of the enemy -s
collection measures. If this is the case, the S3, in
accordance with the
commander, has to react quickly in order to counteract the
enemy's gathering
capability. For example, it is known that an enemy
reconnaissance patrol is
collecting enough information regarding our operation, the
53 can recommend
the increase of combat patrols to destroy the reconnaissance
element.
Deception
The planning of
deception is integral in the planning operations. A
deception plan can be done because it is a good idea for a
specific operation;
because it is a requirement to support a plan of deception
at a higher level
as part of the measure against the enemy intelligence
threat. In any case,
deception and the OPSEC are inseparable. In order to use
deception
successfully, a unit as o have a good knowledge of all of
the aspects of
OPSEC.
24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Deception is
designed to deceive the enemy by means of manipulation,
distortion, making him react in a way that is detrimental to
his interest. In
order for a plan of deception to function, certain
conditions have to exist:
-- The plan of
deception should be credible. The concept of deception
should be carried out in conjunction with the concepts of
operation. Whenever
possible, the operation activities should support the plan
of deception.
-- The deception
should be part of the technical situation.
-- The enemy should
be given the opportunity to react to deception.
-- One should
consider all the information gathering capabilities of the
enemy. There is no point in deceiving an enemy resource if
it is detected by
another resource. The success depends on the good knowledge
of the
characteristics, capabilities and the use of intelligence
systems of the
enemy.
-- The units
involved in the deception have to accomplish their different
missions. This may not require anything special if the unit
is doing its
normal mission. It is possible that it may have enough
information and
equipment to project a false image. The subordinate units
have to support the
plan of deception of the superior units.
Deception
requires good intelligence, OPSEC and an operational
implementation in order for it to be successful.
Intelligence units inform
regarding information gathering capabilities of the enemy
and possible
reactions. The CI section informs regarding indicators,
signatures, patterns
and profiles of the units involving deception; and the
operations sections
applies the deception plan of the combat operations. A
satisfactory OPSEC
program needs to be established in order for the deception
to be successful.
INDICATORS,
SIGNATURES, PATTERNS AND PROFILES
General
All the armies
have their ways of operating. The normal operating
procedures, the field manuals, the training instructions,
and other local
instructions result in similar units functioning in a
similar way. The effort
of maintaining the similarities and functioning adds to the
effectiveness and
efficiencies of the units. Its weakness is that the units
become stereotypical
units, and consequently more predictable. This causes that
the analyst of any
intelligence can interpret more easily the indicators,
signatures, patterns
and profiles of our military forces.
The commanders and
the operation officers should examine and study
carefully how to conduct their military operations. They
need to know if they
25
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
are conducting operations in the same way each time there is
an operation, and
advise on the manner the operation should be conducted. This
means that they
should revise the actions that occur during the planning
phase, execution and
the debriefing after the combat drills. It could be that a
comparison of the
activities of various combat drills is necessary.
INDICATORS
Indicators are
activities that may contribute to determine a course of
action of our military forces. When preparing combat
operations, it is
virtually impossible for a military unit to hide or avoid
giving out
indicators. Certain activities must be conducted. Some of
these activities are
essential for the operations -- others can be directed by
the commander or by
standard operational procedures of the operations. In many
cases, these
activities might be detected by the enemy and used to
predict possible courses
of action.
Identifying and
interpreting specific indicators is a critical task for
the intelligence operations, either for the enemy of for our
own armed forces.
The intelligence personnel looks for indicators, analyze
the, and make an
estimate of the capabilities, vulnerabilities and
intentions. These analyses
have become a requirement for information, plans, and
eventually provide the
basis for directives and orders.
Identifying the
critical activities of the military forces could
indicate the existence of specific capabilities or
vulnerabilities, or the
adjustment of a particular course of action. Determining
which indicator is
important, could be the result of previous action analysis.
The lack of action
is as important, in certain cases, as actions already taken.
For example, if a
unit does nor normally deploy its attack artillery
equipment, this information
is important for the analysts to include it in their
estimate. In any case,
the indicators that arise requires a concrete knowledge of
the organization,
equipment, doctrine of the tactics, the command
personalities, and the
logistic methods, as well as the characteristics of the
operations. Indicators
are not abstract events. The indicators are activities that
result from the
military operations.
Indicators are
potential tools for each commander. The indicators are
probabilities in nature, which represent activities that
might occur in the
military operations. The interpretations of the indicators
require knowledge
of the enemy and the current situation. Some indicators are
mentioned below.
It is not intended to be a complete list, or applicable to
all situations.
26
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Possible Attack Indicators
-- Concentration of
mechanized elements, tanks, artillery, and logistic
support.
-- Delivery of
combat elements (mechanized, tanks, anti-tank) in echelons.
-- Deployment of
tanks, guns, cars to the front units.
-- Extensive
preparation of artillery.
-- Artillery
positions very much to the front and in concentration.
-- Extensive patrol
activity.
-- Change in the
level of communications, crypto, codes and frequency.
-- Placement of the
air defense forces beyond the normal front.
-- Logistics
activities, reinforcement and extensive replacement.
-- Relocation of
support unit at the front.
Possible Defense Indicators
-- Withdrawal of
defense positions before onset of battle.
-- Successive local
counterattacks with limited objective.
-- Counterattack is
suppressed before regaining positions.
-- Extensive
preparation of field fortifications and mined fields.
-- Firing positions
in the front are used; the long-range firing is
started.
-- Movement to the
rear of long-range artillery equipment and logistics
echelons.
-- Destruction of
bridges, communication facilities and other military
equipment.
27
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
SIGNATURES
The signatures
are a result of the presence of a unit or activity in the
battlefield. The signatures are detected because several
units have different
equipment, vary in size, emit different electronic signals,
and have different
noises and heat sources. The detection of the individual
signatures could be
grouped by analysts to point out the installations, units,
or activities.
In general, these
are the categories applied to the units: visual,
acoustic, infrared, and electromagnetic. Each one of these
areas are discussed
individually. Have in mind, however, that the enemy will try
to exploit
several individual signatures grouping them in order to
determine a signature
for the unit. Usually, action is not undertaken as a result
of the detecting
only one signature. With exception of the detection of
critical areas, which
can result of the detection, identification and location of
a signature. The
critical areas are key activities such as command posts,
communications
facilities and systems, some equipment and its surveillance
systems. The
detection of these areas reduces the ability of a military
force to conduct
military operations. However, the longer the critical areas
are exposed, the
easier would be for the enemy to detect, identify, locate,
attack and destroy
these critical areas.
VISUAL
Visual signatures
are detected through light photography and by human
eyesight, assisted or unassisted. Visual signatures are
equipment, location of
personnel, activity patters, and the frequency of these
activities. Also, some
of these visual signatures include vehicle movement, tanks, vehicle
marking,
uniform markings, etc. Theoretically, a target is detected
when it is seen by
a human eye. The targets might be detected and identified by
using photography
by --
-- Its distinct form, or recognizable patters,
form, style, size,
design, shadow, and its dimensions of
height and depth.
-- A distinct deployment system, possibly
involving other targets.
-- The color, hue, shine, tone and texture of
the target.
It is possible to
detect a target without having to identify it.
Detection is the discovery of a target or activity, while
identification
requires an additional step - to establish what the target
is, what it does,
or the capabilities of such target. The violence, confusion,
and the darkness
in the battlefield introduces variables that might prevent
identification or
detection of military targets.
28
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Some studies
point out that the visual detection is affected by the
following:
-- The size of the target and the time it has
been exposed to sight.
-- The degree to which the target has been
camouflaged or covered.
-- Light variation, visibility and weather.
-- Number of targets - the more targets there
are, it is more
difficult
to identify them correctly.
-- Target distance - the longer the distance
the more difficult to
identify
the target correctly.
-- The contrast of the target against the
background -- the less
contrast
there is, the more difficult it is to identify the
target.
Some factors help
the probability of visual detection. For example, the
probability of detection is increased by knowing previously
that a target is
in a particular area. The probability of detection and
identification is also
augmented if the target detected in a particular area is
associated with other
targets in the vicinity, in other words, find a known target
and search for
similar ones in the area. For example, if a tank repair
vehicle is detected in
an area, look for tank units or mechanized units in the
vicinity.
The
identification and visual detection can be enhanced with the use of
photography. Visual location of ground and air observers, of
which there is no
specific identification, can be used to lead photographic
reconnaissance
missions. Unlike the location in one site only, or having a
short view of the
target, photographs provide the opportunity to enlarge and
study specific
areas and equipment. Photography is limited mainly because
it provides the
record of an area as it was at the moment the photograph was
taken.
ACOUSTIC (SOUND)
The acoustic
signatures come in two types: The first are noises produced
during battle by explosives and rifle firing. The second
sound is associated
with the noise of certain military functions - such as
vehicles, equipment and
the activities of the installation. The acoustic signatures
are detected by
human hearing, sound detection equipment, or special devices
that magnify the
sound.
Acoustic sounds
could be very significant because different equipment
and guns have a unique sound. These signatures have
considerable importance
for planning countersurveillance, countermeasures and
deception. The forces
29
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
try to prevent escape of signatures in order to reinforce
security; a
deception plan must sound as if it were an actual unit.
The noises
produced by operations are affected by the weather
conditions, terrain, atmospheric conditions, and the
propagation of sound. The
relative direction of wind, the amount of wind, the
temperature and humidity
influence the quality of sound. In general, the sound
travels better when
projected by the wind, when humidity is relatively high, and
during nighttime.
The enemy is not
expected to react only to what he hears. The sound only
serves to alert us on what is happening. The acoustic
signature, unlike the
visual signature that can stand by itself, normally is used
to support other
sensors.
The acoustic
sounds are integrated with other information to enhance
intelligence. But have in mind that under certain
circumstances, the sound can
travel long distances. While the enemy cannot distinguish
between an M-60 tank
and an APC, the sound can alert him that there is movement
in the vicinity.
INFRARED (IR)
The infrared
signatures are those not visible by the eye. It is the
heat, or light, produced by equipment, person, unit or
activity. The infrared
signatures can be detected with the use of several
specialized equipment.
The infrared
surveillance equipment vary from the individual optical
device to sophisticated aerial systems. Under favorable
conditions, the
systems that have been improved will be able to produce
images that
distinguish between the equipment of the same quality and
type.
The tactical
infrared equipment come in two categories -- active and
passive. The active equipment require that the potential
target be illuminated
by infrared sources -- light sent in infrared frequencies.
These devices are
susceptible of being detected because they emit a distinct
and identifiable
signature. The enemy sensors can locate the active sources.
The passive
devices detect the infrared radiation of any of these two
sources: emissions
created by the target or solar energy reflected by the
target. These devices
are more applicable to play the role of surveillance because
the equipment
does not produce an identifiable signature. The passive
devices are vulnerable
to detection at the level at which their power sources are
detectable.
The majority of
the military equipment emit an infrared signature of
some type. The equipment more vulnerable to infrared
detection are those that
produce a high degree of heat, such as, tanks, trucks, long
guns, generators,
air conditioners, furnaces, aircraft, maintenance
facilities, artillery fire,
kitchen areas, landing areas and assembly points.
30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Infrared
surveillance has limitations. Humidity, fog, and clouds can
cause serious limitations, while smoke and fog can degrade
the operations of
some systems. The clouds present a more serious problem
because the radiations
emitted can be enough to prevent the operations of the
system itself.
Clouds also
telltale the infrared radiation of the objects being
targeted by the system.
ELECTROMAGNETIC
The
electromagnetic signatures are caused by electronic radiation of
communication and non-communication emitters. In other
words, the detection of
specific electromagnetic signatures can disclose the present
of an activity in
the area. This allows us to direct our sensors to that area
in order to detect
other signatures.
The communication
signatures are generally direct -- use a radio and a
signature will be provided. The battalions have certain
communication systems;
the brigades have other communication systems, and the
elements of higher
echelons also have different communication elements and
other additional
systems. To find the bigger units, to which a transmitter
belongs, it is the
duty to:
-- detect other transmitters in the area.
-- Use radio-goniometry to determine the
location.
-- Categorize signals by a signal analysis.
-- Locate the type of transmitter in the
vicinity of the area.
From this type of information, the intelligence can
determine the location of
a unit or command, supply point, weapons units, and assembly
areas. This is
particularly true when some radios or radars are used
exclusively by a
specific unit or weapons system. The movement, information
of the order of
battle, the structure of the radio network, tactical
deployment, and, in a
lesser degree, the intentions could be derived from the
interception of the
communications systems. All these could be detected and
identified by knowing
the location of communication equipment, without reading the
messages.
The signatures
produced by radars are considered from two viewpoints.
First, when radar systems are activated they transmit
signals and create
signatures.
This makes our
forces vulnerable when we use radar against the enemy.
Secondly, the equipment, buildings and mountains have
identifiable
characteristics which the radar can be used to detect and
identify. Therefore,
the forces exposed are vulnerable to the detection by radar.
31
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
The military
equipment have a great number of protuberances, angles and
corners which the radar could detect. This refers to what is
called the radar
cross-section (RCS). Modern radar surveillance equipment can
do more than
solely detect the RCS of a target. Aerial radars with
lateral view (SLAR) have
enough resolution to identify certain weapons systems by
detailed imagery or
by its pattern. The radar systems can penetrate the fog,
cloud and moderate
rain. The surveillance radars are active systems and can
operate against
mobile or fixed targets.
The radar systems
are limited in that they require an uninterrupted
passage, or visibility points, towards the target area.
However, have in mind
that these systems cannot penetrate forests or heavy rain.
The radar systems
are susceptible to enemy interception and can become targets
because of their
distinctive signature.
PATTERNS
A pattern is the
manner in which we do things. Patterns that can be
predicted are developed by commanders, planners and
operators. The different
classes of patterns are as numerous as the different
procedures in military
operations. Some examples of patterns are:
-- Command and Operations Posts
-- Artillery fire before an attack
-- Command posts located in the same position
relative to the
location of
the combat units.
-- Reconnaissance patrols repeatedly on a zone
before an operation.
The officers need
to examine their operations and activities in their
zones of responsibility and reduce the established patterns
whenever possible.
PROFILES
The profiles are
a result of the actions taken by military units and
individual soldiers. The profile analysis of a unit could
reveal signatures
and patterns on the procedures, and, eventually, the
intentions of the unit
could be determined, collectively, the profiles could be
used by the enemy to
find out our various courses of action. Our
counterintelligence units develop
profiles of our units in order to determine our
vulnerabilities and thus
recommend the commanders on the correction measures. In
order to achieve this,
all activity of the unit has to be identified to see if it
presents indicators
to the enemy.
Usually, profiles
are developed by means of the gathering of information
on the electromagnetic equipment and on physical actions and
deployments.
32
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Electromagnetic information identifies the activities of the
units by
associating the different signals with the equipment. Physical
actions and
deployments are things that the unit does: how a unit
appears while it is
performing; how it moves; its configuration during march or
when it deploys.
These different factors identify the different units.
In the majority
of units, the electromagnetic and physical information
is applicable to 5 areas of importance in order to complete
an entire profile.
The five profiles are:
-- Communications and command post
-- Intelligence
-- Operations and maneuvers
-- Logistics
-- Administration and other support
COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND POST
Some factors to
be considered when developing and profile:
Where are
the command posts located with regard to other units -
particularly subordinate units?
-- How does the
command post look like?
-- When is it
transferred with regard to the other command elements?
-- Is the post
surrounded by antennas - thus creating a very visible
target?
-- What type of
communications equipment is used and where is it located?
-- What is the
amount of communications traffic with regard to the
activities and operations?
-- Are there any
road signs that might help the enemy units or agents to
located the command post?
-- Do the logistics
and administration communications compromised the
operation?
33
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
INTELLIGENCE
Profiles on
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and elements
identifying targets are developed in order to determine
whether our activities
indicate our intentions. Some considerations:
-- How frequently
and to which zones have the land and air elements been
assigned for information gathering?
-- Where are the
information gathering elements located? (Which
communication methods are used to report? Which are the
information channels?
Which are the security measures?)
-- How are the
radars used? (For how long are they used before transferring
them?)
-- Are there sensors
in the target zone?
-- Have the
reconnaissance vehicles (land and air) compromised the location
of future operations?
-- Are the patrol
levels been varied?
-- Can the different
gathering activities relate to the different stages of
operation - planning, preparation, execution?
OPERATIONS AND MANEUVERS
Activities during
the preparation and execution of combat operations can
be identified. Many activities are hard to cover due to the
number of men
involved, the noise, dust, tracks of vehicles, heat emitted,
etc. However, the
activities for combat operation have to be examined.
-- Can the drilling
and instruction of men be easily detected?
-- If there is
special training required for the operation, are there any
special security measures?
-- Where are the
units located before the operation? Artillery? Aviation?
Reserves? Maintenance and supply? Is the movement indicated
towards the front
or the rear during their course of action?
-- How are the same
actions carried out for preparation of offensive or
defense operations? Do they indicate intentions?
LOGISTICS
34
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Supply,
maintenance, transportation and services and facilities
indicating an operation have to be examined.
-- Which movements
indicate the starting of an operation?
-- Are material and
special equipment visible?
-- Where is the
material being stored? When?
-- Is the change of
schedule for vehicle and weapons maintenance indicating
the start of an operation?
-- Are new roads
being built?
-- Are special
munitions being delivered secretly?
ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER SUPPORT
Activities
seemingly completely innocent individually could provide
valuable information for the enemy analyst. The
administration and support
profile could identify these actions which become obvious
because they are
different from what is normal. Some examples follow:
-- Things change
before an operation:
* Getting up and
meals schedules?
* Directions
* Larger mail
volume?
* Frequency of
reports:
* Entry of
licensed personnel?
-- There is a
special request for:
* Personnel?
* Equipment?
* Supplies of all
types?
-- How is trash,
paper, etc. being destroyed? Can enemy agents locate and
use the waste?
-- Expecting wounded
personnel by medical units, do they indicate a pending
operation?
35
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
36
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
THE OPSEC PROCEDURE
1) To identify the
enemy capability to gather intelligence (D-II/S-II).
2) Identify our EEFI
and profiles.
Profiles +
Patterns and signatures
Profile: All the characteristics pertaining a unit.
Patterns: Repeated activities established by SOP or by
doctrine.
Signatures: Field actions of a unit.
--
visual
-- sound
-- infrared
-- electromagnetic
Profiles: Command Post
-- Communications
-- Operations
-- Logistics
3) Identify the
vulnerable profiles that indicate our intentions.
4) Implement a risk
analysis and make note of the EEFI.
-- Profiles
\
-- Patterns
> Indicators
-- Signature
/
5) Recommend OPSEC
measures
-- Countersurveillance
-- countermeasures
-- Deception
6) Select the OPSEC
measures.
7) Apply the OPSEC
measures.
8) Apply efforts to
monitor OPSEC.
9) Monitor the
effectiveness of OPSEC.
10) Recommend OPSEC
adjustments.
37
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Step (1)
--- OPSEC estimates
Step (2)
--- OPSEC estimates
Step (3) --
Planning estimates/guidelines
Step (4)
--- Estimate/guidelines
Step (5)
--- Estimate/guidelines
Step (6)
--- Estimate/guidelines
Step (7)
--- OPSEC Annex
Step (8)
--- OPSEC Annex
Step (9)
--- OPSEC Annex
Step (10) --- OPSEC Annex
ESTIMATE -->
GUIDELINE --> ANNEX
EVALUATION:YEARLY REPORT
38
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
OPSEC ANNEX
Item 1): Mission of
the unit. (From the Plan of Operation)
Item 2): Summarize
the enemy situation in terms of intelligence gathering,
sabotage,
and subversion. Discuss the situation with regard to
recent
enemy activities and their potential capability. This item
is designed
to indicate their capability for intelligence
gathering;
while item 3 include the measures to counteract those
efforts.
The following factors should be analyzed:
A. Indicate the effect of weather on the
enemy's capability to gather
intelligence on our OPSEC measures.
B. Indicate the effect of the terrain on the
enemy's capability to
gather
intelligence on our OPSEC measures.
C. Resume the enemy's capability to gather
intelligence and carry out
sabotage
and subversive actions. This includes:
1) Intelligence
A) Ground Observation and
Reconnaissance
1) Eye observation
2) Patrols
3) Ground radars
4) Infrared surveillance
5) Long-range ground sensors
6) Other
B) Air Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
1) Penetration flights
2) Long-distance flights
3) Reconnaissance satellites
C) Signal Intelligence
1) Communications Intelligence
2) Electronic Intelligence
D) Electronic Warfare
1) Interception and radio
goniometry
2) Interruption
3)
Destruction
E) Guerrilla, insurgents,
agents
39
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
F) Other: infiltrators,
refugees, prisoners of war, etc.
2) Sabotage
A) Military
B) Economic
3) Subversion
A) Propaganda
B) Terrorism
C) Political
D. Summarize the enemy's intelligence and
security weaknesses.
Summarize
its intelligence gathering weaknesses, for committing
sabotage
and subversion sabotage. Discuss its internal security
posture.
Item 3):
Implementation
A: Make a list of all the countersurveillance
measures taken by the
field SOP.
Emphasize new countersurveillance measures or changing
of measures
that are part of the SOP.
B. In this section, make a list of all the
additional countermeasures
that are
not included in the SOP and are applicable to all the
units.
These countermeasures are designed to counteract a specific
threat by
the enemy counterintelligence.
Item 4): Miscellany
A. Summarize the threat to internal security.
Discuss the problems of
internal
security detected in the command post.
B. Establish any special instructions not
covered previously as
targets of
interest for counterintelligence (with priorities and
locations).
C. Establish the chain of command for
counterintelligence.
Item 5): Command
This item
deals with instructions on where counterintelligence is
sent to,
the link between the various units, location of counter-
intelligence personnel, the different dissemination channels,
types of
reports required, frequency and priorities.
40
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
OPSEC ESTIMATION
Item 1): The Mission
of the Unit. (From the Plan of
Operations)
Item 2): Area of
Operations. (Discuss the influence of the area of
operations
on the enemy capabilities to gather intelligence and
commit acts
of sabotage and subversion).
A. Time/weather. (From the Intelligence Annex)
--
The enemy's capabilities for surveillance and ground and air
reconnaissance.
-- The time/weather is or is not favorable to
the enemy's
gathering
efforts.
-- The impact of time/weather on our countermeasures.
B. Terrain. (From the Intelligence Annex)
-- Surveillance
-- Coverage
-- Natural and artificial obstacles
-- Key Terrain
(How the
terrain affects the enemy's capability to gather
information/intelligence and how it affects our countermeasures).
C. Other factors of the zone.
-- Political
-- Economic
-- Sociological
-- Psychological
-- Transportation
Item 3): Current
Enemy situation on intelligence, sabotage and subversion
activities.
A) Intelligence
1) Ground surveillance and reconnaissance.
-- Eye observation
-- Patrols
-- Ground radars
-- Infrared surveillance
-- Long-range ground sensors
-- Other
41
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) Air
surveillance and reconnaissance
-- Penetration flights
-- Distance flights
-- Air Sensors
-- Reconnaissance satellites
3) Signal Intelligence
-- Communication intelligence
-- Electronic intelligence
4) Guerrillas and Insurgents
5) Espionage
6) Other:
infiltrators
refugees, displaced persons,
prisoners of war, etc.
B) Sabotage
1) Military (installations, line of communication)
2) Economic
C) Subversion
1) Propaganda
2) Terrorism
3) Political
Item 4: Enemy
capability for intelligence gathering and to commit sabotage
and
subversive actions.
A) Intelligence
1) Ground surveillance and reconnaissance.
-- Eye observation
-- Patrols
-- Ground radar
-- Infrared surveillance
-- Long-range ground sensors
-- Other
2) Air
surveillance and reconnaissance
-- Penetration flights
-- Distance flights
-- Air Sensors
-- Reconnaissance satellites
3) Signal Intelligence
42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
-- Communication intelligence
-- Electronic intelligence
4) Guerrillas and Insurgents
5) Espionage
6) Other:
infiltrators
refugees, displaced persons,
prisoners of war, etc.
B) Sabotage
1) Military
2) Economic
C) Subversion
1) Propaganda
2) Terrorism
3) Political
Item 5): Conclusions
A) Indicate how the enemy will use its capability
to gather
intelligence and to commit sabotage and subversion actions.
B) Indicate the effects of the enemy
capability on our course of
action.
C) Indicate the effectiveness of our current
countersurveillance
measures.
D) Indicate the effectiveness of our current
countermeasures.
E). Recommend additional countersurveillance
measures.
F). Recommend additional countermeasures.
43
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
OPSEC PLANNING GUIDELINES
UNIT ______________________________ COMMANDER:
__________________________
G3/S2: ______________________ NAME OF OPSEC OFFICER:
____________________
CONTENTS DISCUSSED WITH:
________________________________________________
NAME RANK
PERSON COMPLETING REVISION:
____________________________________________
YES
NO
CAMOUFLAGE
A.
B.
DOCUMENT SECURITY (INFORMATION)
A.
B.
COMMAND POST
A.
B.
COMSEC
SIGSEC
TRANSSEC
Back to Top 44
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 3 LN324-91 OPSEC EVALUATION
INTRODUCTION:
OPSEC means
Operations Security. It is the duty of the Intelligence/
Counterintelligence Agent to determine the extent to which
the security
measures are being followed within the OPSEC program. If the
measures have not
been carried out, then nothing has been accomplished and the
security of the
command is in serious danger. When the OPSEC measures,
developed from the
OPSEC Procedures, are applied to an operation or activity
(Commando) there are
several methods to evaluate its effectiveness. All are
included under the
subject of "OPSEC Evaluation." The phrase OPSEC
EVALUATION is applied to two
different concepts:
a. One concept refers to an evaluation or
study of the activity,
unit, or project, using the OPSEC Procedure in order to
recommend the OPSEC
measures and create a Data base for Counterintelligence
(CI).
b. The second concept is an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the
OPSEC measures already recommended. This evaluation might
result in
modification or suppression of measures, or the
identification of new OPSEC
measures.
OVERVIEW:
1. The OPSEC Evaluations vary, as already
mentioned, depending on the
units needs.
2. All evaluations have in common the
characteristics of examining
the effectiveness, the failure or the lack of OPSEC measures
in a unit.
3. All evaluations are structured in a way
that can provide complete
and detailed information as to how the units and agencies
are implementing the
OPSEC measures.
4. THE OPSEC EVALUATIONS ARE NOT INSPECTIONS.
The evaluations are
presented and must be considered as data finding and/or
failure finding.
5. The Evaluation is used to identify those
areas of the security
procedure of a unit that need to be improved.
6. When a team of agents carries out an OPSEC
evaluation, it must be
done sensibly and not overlook or ignore something, having
always in mind that
the evaluation results will be used to improve the system.
7. EVALUATIONS IN PEACE TIME AND IN WARTIME:
45
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. During peacetime the OPSEC Evaluations can
be prepared
several months in advance. An OPSEC evaluation of each
command (unit) within a
Division or Brigade, must be carried out annually.
b. In addition to a yearly evaluation, a
commander may request
it, through the G3/S3, that an OPSEC special evaluation be
made of his unit.
c. During wartime, as vulnerabilities and
threats are
identified, the evaluations are carried out in response to
an emergency
request or urgency by the affected agencies.
8. Each evaluation is unique, since each one
reflects the operation
or activity being evaluated. However, there are certain
common procedures for
all evaluations, and these are as follows:
a. Planning
b. Evaluation
c. Report/Information
9. Planning of Evaluation:
The main
factor in the planning stage of an evaluation is detail.
It must be prepared in detail to carry out an evaluation.
Normally, the
planning stage includes the following:
a. Development of the purpose and scope of the
evaluation:
The
purpose/scope of the evaluation is prepared by the
analysis section of CI, and by the OPSEC element, for
approval by G3/S3.
SAMPLES OF POSSIBLE PURPOSES AND SCOPES OF AN EVALUATION:
(1)
"This OPSEC Evaluation will discuss the vulnerability of
the Division or Brigade to the multi-disciplinary threats of
the enemy. These
threats include Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal
Intelligence (SIGINT),
etc.
b. Selection of the team that will carry out
the Evaluation:
The
team shall be selected by G3/S3, who will request its
units to assign expert personnel in the areas of operations,
intelligence,
communications, logistics and administration. The team can
be re-structured
according to the type of evaluation to be made.
c.
Establish the contacts (link) in the area to be evaluated:
One of
the initial steps before evaluation is to contact the
security chief of the installation to be evaluated. He can
provide access to
the necessary files needed for an evaluation.
46
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. Compilation of the reference materials:
The
team must review the Standard Operations Procedures
(SOP) of the unit to be evaluated. This will make the team
familiar with the
mission and the operational procedures of that installation.
e. Review the Essential Elements of Friendly
Information
(EEFI):
By
reviewing the EEFI, the team may identify the valuable
intelligence data which the commander deems important for
the security of the
installation. This information may include any information,
classified or not,
which, if revealed to enemy intelligence agent, could result
in serious damage
to the installation.
f. Review the threat of hostile intelligence:
The
team must be familiar with possible espionage threats,
activities of intelligence gathering by the enemy, by using
all the sources in
the area of operations.
g. Become familiar with the activity or
installation to be
evaluated:
Members of the evaluation team shall review all the
directives of the installation. The evaluation team leader
should be briefed
by the commander of the installation.
h. Prepare organizational charts:
Preparation of organizational charts for evaluation purposes
will facilitate the evaluator's work. The chart should be
prepared according
to the area to be evaluated. The charts should include the
areas to be
reviewed by the agents and specific notes that might be
useful for the
individual evaluator to carry out his duties.
i. Give notice of evaluation:
The
final step in the preparation of an OPSEC evaluation is
to notify it. The G3/S3 notifies the installations that will
be evaluated by
means of an amendment. The information that might appear in
the message is as
follows:
(1) The purpose and scope of the
evaluation.
(2) The members of the
evaluating team and its access to
classified information.
(3) Necessary briefings and
familiarity.
(4) Date and time that will be
spent in the evaluation.
(5) Support required from Signal
Security (SIGSEC)
47
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
10. The
Evaluation:
After
completing the planning stage, the evaluation will be
performed. The following steps, in order, must be carried
out at the onset of
the evaluation.
a. Beginning briefing:
This
briefing could be formal or informal. It must be given
by the evaluating team leader. The areas to be covered
during this briefing
are:
(1) Purpose and scope of the
evaluation.
(2) How the evaluation will be
conducted.
(3) Summary of the enemy threats
and the vulnerability of
the installations to these threats.
(4) Previous OPSEC evaluations,
if any, will be discussed.
b. Briefing by the Commander:
This
briefing will give the Evaluating Team an opportunity
to receive information on the operations from the viewpoint
of the commander
of the installation.
c. The Evaluation: (Information that will be
covered later on
by this chapter).
d. Final Briefing:
The
purpose of the final briefing is to inform the Commander
of the results of the evaluation and the findings during the
evaluation with
regard to the OPSEC system of his installation. Also, the
outgoing briefing
could be an informal one.
e. Report:
During
this period, the evaluating team, the analysis
section of CI and the OPSEC section, shall evaluate all the
information
obtained during the evaluation. The product of this effort
shall provide a
data base that can be used to identify the vulnerabilities
of the installation
in the OPSEC areas. The evaluation results of the
information obtained by the
team will be the basis for recommendations of new OPSEC
measures, if
necessary.
48
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
OPSEC EVALUATION
BROCHURE: TECHNIQUES AND AREAS TO BE COVERED DURING AN
OPSEC
EVALUATION.
OPSEC EVALUATION
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
A. Security of
Information:
1. Reproduction machines (copiers):
a. How many machines are there?
b. What is the control on the reproduction of
classified
material?
c. Who is authorized to reproduce classified
material?
d. Who authorizes reproduction?
e. Has the personnel been instructed that when a
document is
copied in a copier, the image of the document remains latent
in the crystal
and could emerge if a blank paper goes through.
2. Destruction of classified information:
a. Who does the destruction of classified
information?
b. Where is destruction carried out?
c. When and how often is classified information
destroyed?
d. How is it destroyed?
e. What security measures exist during the
destruction process
of classified material?
3. Emergency Evacuation and Destruction Plan:
a. Obtain a copy of the plan and review it to
determine whether
it is effective:
b. How is the plan carried out?
c. Do they have the necessary materials on hand
to implement
the plan?
49
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. Has the plan been rehearsed (drilled)?
4. Sensitive unclassified Trash:
a. Is there a procedure with regard to the
handling of
sensitive unclassified trash?
b. Is there any mention of it in the SOP?
c. Is the SOP specification carried out?
d. How can they be sure that the command
instructions are
carried out with regard to sensitive unclassified material?
e. Is all the personnel aware of the importance
of controlling
the sensitive unclassified trash? How were they instructed?
5. Requests for
information:
a. How are requests for information processed?
b. What is the procedure if the request
originates from another
military or civilian command, or foreign country?
c. How do they control publication of
information on activities
evaluated by other sources?
d. Is there an Officer for Public Relations
(PRO)?
e. What are the responsibilities of the PRO in
this program?
f. How is unsolicited mail handled?
6. Open Publications:
a. Which are the open publications of the
installation? (A
publication which is unclassified and anybody can have
access to it.)
b. Obtain copies and determine whether the
publication has any
EEFI information.
c. How are open publications controlled?
7. EEFI:
a. Obtain copy of the current EEFI list.
b. On what was this list based?
50
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Is all the necessary personnel aware of what
is included in
the EEFI list? Is this information denied to some personnel?
d. Is the EEFI list realistic, does it in fact
contain
everything that the unit wants to protect?
8. Reports of Previous Inspections/evaluations
or Studies:
a. Obtain copies of all the inspections,
evaluations, studies,
of physical security, personnel, OPSEC, that has pertain to
the installation.
b. Review all the reports and determined which
measures have
been taken to correct problems identified previously.
9. Special Access Material:
a. Which materials requiring special access are
used by the
installation?
b. What security measures are enforces to
protect and safeguard
the material?
10. Classification guidelines:
a. Obtain copy of the classification guidelines
for classified
material of the installation.
b. Are these guidelines effective?
c. Are they written in an efficient way,
providing the
necessary information?
d. Is the personnel knowledgeable of this
classification
guideline?
11. Casual Conversation.
a. During the evaluation of the installation,
try to listen to
conversation carried out in areas where classified or
sensitive matters should
not be discussed; also be on the alert to conversation
between persons that
have access and the need to know certain information with
persons that do not
have the need to know nor the access.
b. Which is the procedure of the
unit/installation regarding
casual conversation?
c. Does the installation have an instruction
program to brief
its personnel with regard to the danger of casual
conversation?
51
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
12. Security Education Program:
a. Which is the level of security education of
the evaluated
installation?
b. Is there an education program in the areas
of sabotage and
espionage against the armed forces, OPSEC, SigSec, Humint,
and imagery
intelligence?
c. If there is a program, is it effective?
(Does the personnel
respond to the teachings?)
d. Has the installation informed on any attempt
of sabotage and
espionage or incident to the SEAAF?
e. Is the personnel contacted aware of the
purpose of OPSEC?
Could they identify an approach to SEAAF if it would happen
to them?
B. Physical Security
1. Inspections after working hours:
a. Are inspections of the installation carried
out after
working hours?
b. If they do, what do they look for?
c. How often are these inspections performed?
d. What happens if they find loose classified
material or any
other security violation?
2. Effectiveness of Physical Security:
a. What is the concrete effectiveness of the
physical security
of the installation?
b. Are the current physical security measures
adequate?
c. Examine doors, gates, fences, barriers, etc.
and determine
its weakness and strong points.
3. Inspection Program of the Security
Inspector:
a. Does the installation have an inspection
program by the
Security Supervisor?
b. When the security supervisor carries out an
inspection, is
it announced or unannounced?
c. Is the personnel performing the physical security
inspection, assigned to the same installation which they are
inspecting?
d. What do they look for when inspecting?
e. What happens when they discover a
vulnerability?
4. Access Control:
52
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Pretend you are a hostile intelligence agent
and determine
how could you manage to enter the installation. Plan it from
the outside to
the inside and how far could you penetrate. Try to obtain
classified material
or try to listen to casual classified conversation. Use your
imagination. The
enemy will do the same.
b. Are the gates adequate?
c. Is there a cleared zone beyond the perimetry
fences?
d. Is there an adequate number of guards? Are
they duly
trained? (How do they communicate among themselves?
e. Are the fences adequate?
f. Are the outer doors adequate?
g. Is the alarm system adequate? (Do they have
an alarm
system?)
h. Is there a control of visitors and their
vehicles?
i. Do the guards have an established routine of
movement that
will make them vulnerable to an attack?
j. Is there a reserve/support group that could
assist in case
of a surprise attack?
k. Prepare a scenario of how you could
penetrate the
installation, include a detailed account of the weak and strong
points of the
security program of the installation.
5. Pass system:
a. Is it adequate?
b. Can the passes be reproduced easily?
c. Is there another system that could be used
in case the first
one is compromised?
d. How are passes destroyed?
e. What happens when they are informed that a
pass has been
lost?
f. Do they allow for one pass to have access to
the entire
installation, or are there restrictions?
53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
g. If the pass is not shown, is he made aware
by the other
individuals, or is he allowed to walk without problem or
question?
h. Are all the passes always visible?
i. How is the access to classified information
certified or
verified of an individual visiting the installation?
j. Are visitors escorted through the
installation?
k. Is there a record of the passes?
l. How many times a year is the pass system
changed?
6. Visitors control:
a. What kind of access is authorized to
visitors?
b. How are their level of access to classified
information
verified?
c. Are the visitors required to sign at the
entrance? What
information are they required to provide?
d. What other controls are applied for
visitors?
7. Foreign Liaison Visitors
a. Are their access or authority for visiting
verified?
b. Who is notified of their visit to the
installation?
c. Which areas are they allowed to access?
d. What type of information is exchanged?
e. Is a briefing offered to the personnel that
will have
contact with the foreign visitors?
8. OPSEC Support - Physical Security Plan:
a. Review and determine whether the plan is
effective,.
b. Does this plan provide the
support/information/guidelines
needed?
c. Can a Study of Physical Security be carried
out?
d. What do the personnel know of the Physical
Security Plan?
54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. Is it reviewed and updated frequently?
9. Instructions for the Guards
a. Are the instructions to guards adequate?
b. Do the instructions to guards indicate which
are their
responsibilities?
c. Are emergency plans included in the
instructions?
d. What do the guards know about the plan?
e. Do the instructions include how to proceed
in case of a bomb
threat, sabotage, espionage, events of interest for the CI,
and the
destruction of government property?
f. Do the guards understand what they have to
do if they are
involved in an incident that concerns the military
intelligence?
C. Personnel
Security
1. Human Reliability Program: (This program is
used to determine the
reliability of persons in sensitive posts. The subject is
discussed in the
Chapter entitled "Security Investigation of
Personnel")
a. Does the installation have such a program?
b. If it does, how is it checked?
c. What has this program offered to the
Commander?
d. How is access to classified information
validated?
e. Where do personnel whose access has not been
approved yet
work?
2. Travel Abroad by Staff Personnel:
a. Where to and when do these individuals
travel to foreign
countries?
b. What is the procedure to notify the
commander of these
trips?
c. Are the travel schedules
controlled/evaluated?
d. Is the personnel travelling abroad briefed?
55
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. What kind of information do they carry and
what kind of
information can they exchange?
f. Are trips abroad reported to military
intelligence?
3. List of Accesses to Classified Information:
a. Is there a list of all the persons who have
access to
classified information?
b. Do the personnel have access to the
necessary information to
carry out their tasks?
c. Revise the access list and determine whether
there is any
individual with access to information who should not be
allowed.
d. How
does the command verify the access to classified
information of other agencies?
4. OPSEC Program:
OPSEC SOP:
a. Does the installation have an OPSEC SOP?
b. Is it adequate?
c. Does the SOP of OPSEC describe the
responsibilities of
everybody down to the individual level?
OPSEC
Officer
a. Does the officer in charge of OPSEC working
full-time for
OPSEC, or does he have other primary functions?
b. Which are the responsibilities of the OPSEC
officer?
c. What kind of support is given to him?
d. Does he have the
experience/education/reference material
necessary to carry out his tasks?
e. What importance does the Commander bestow on
the OPSEC
program?
OPSEC
Analyst
a. Is the
command aware of what is an OPSEC analyst?
56
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Does the command know what an Analyst can do
for them?
c. Have they requested support by the OPSEC
Analyst, and what
kind of support was requested?
d. Have they received in the past any support
by an OPSEC
Analyst?
e. Is the OPSEC Analyst effective?
4. OPSEC Consciousness:
a. Does the personnel know what OPSEC means,
what OPSEC can do
for them to protect their mission and work material?
b. Is OPSEC considered a daily routine in this
installation?
c. Is OPSEC considered before, after and during
a military
exercise?
d. What kind of OPSEC training have been given
to the
personnel?
e. Does the personnel believe in the importance
of OPSEC?
f. Which is your (the agent's) opinion of the
total
consciousness of OPSEC in the installation?
D. Signal
Intelligence
1. SOP:
a. Obtain and review all the SOP's of SIGSEC.
(are they
adequate?)
b. Are they reviewed and updated periodically?
2. Support by Signal Intelligence:
a. What kind of support has the installation
received from
Signal Intelligence?
b. What kind of signal intelligence support
does the
installation need?
3. Safe Communication:
a. What are the means for safe communication?
57
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Are they adequate?
c. Is there a backup system in case the primary
one stops
working?
4. Inspections of Safe Communications and
Signal Security:
a. When was the last SIGSEC/COMSEC inspection
done and what
were the results?
b. Does the system need to be improved? (Were
the improvement
measures carried out?)
c. Is there a need currently to improve the
SIGSEC and COMSEC
systems?
5. Security Education:
a. Is the installation personnel trained on
communications
security?
b. If they are trained, how is instruction given,
is it
accepted or rejected?
c. Is there a need to improve the security
education program?
6. ADP Security:
(ADP: is a
security system used to protect the computer communication)
a. Is the personnel trained on COMSEC?
b. Is a key code used? How can an unauthorized
person be
prevented to access the computer system?
c. Do unauthorized persons use the system?
d. What is the software used? What
classification does it have?
e. What is the procedure for controlling the
computer output?
f. What physical security measures are used to
protect the
computer terminals that are outside the computer room?
g. Which procedure is used for the necessary
maintenance?
58
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
h. If the system contains classified
information, how can they
get the cleared personnel to carry out the computer
maintenance?
i. Is there a Security Officer assigned for the
computer room?
j. Are the computer operators trained on the
need to protect
the systems security?
k. Can classified information be obtained
through the
terminals?
l. Are visitors escorted while visiting the
computers area?
m. Is there a pass system for the computers
area?
n. Does the installation share the use of
computers with other
installations or agencies?
E. Imagery
Intelligence
1. Aerial Photography:
a. Is the personnel conscious of the
existence/threat of aerial
photography?
b.
Is the installation vulnerable to this threat?
c. What precautions are taken for protection
against this
threat?
d. What kind of written information do they
have to protect
themselves against this threat?
2. Manual Photography by an Agent:
a. Is the personnel conscious of this kind of
threat?
b. What physical security precautions are taken
to protect
themselves against this threat?
c. How vulnerable is the installation?
d. Are the guards aware of this threat and know
how to prevent
it?
3. Outside Tryouts
59
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Does the installation conduct tryouts
outside the building
that could be vulnerable to the threat of imagery
intelligence?
b. Has the command considered using camouflage
before the
tryouts are carried out?
c. Does the SOP contain something with regard
to the protection
against this threat?
F.
Vulnerabilities/Recommendations of Signal Intelligence
G. Imagery
Intelligence
1. Local threat:
2. Vulnerabilities/Recommendations:
H. Other
Vulnerabilities and recommendations as appropriate:
I. Remarks:
(General remarks
are included which are not qualified as
vulnerabilities.)
J. Conclusions
(Support to be
given to the installation in the future.)
I. ANNEXES:
a. Data on Threats in general.
b. Results of the COMSEC evaluation.
c. Study of Signal Security
d. Essential Elements of the Enemy
e. Report of ADP Security
f. BEFI - Evaluation
g. Inspection of Technical Support
h. Other information or reports that might
backup the OPSEC
Evaluation.
60
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: Not all the
Annexes mentioned above are required in all the reports of
an OPSEC evaluation.
Back to Top 61
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER IV
DOCUMENTS SECURITY
INTRODUCTION:
The application
of this chapter will be based on the following main
principles:
1. It is essential that some official
information be given top
protection in order to safeguard the capability of the
nation to protect
itself against all hostile and destructive actions.
2. It is also essential that the citizens of
the nation be informed
as much as possible on the activities of the government.
3. This chapter should not be interpreted in
any way as trying to
withhold information that otherwise could be publicly
disseminated.
GENERAL:
A. DEFINITION OF
DOCUMENT SECURITY: The degree of protection given to
certain official information for the safekeeping of the
nation's capability to
protect itself against hostile or destructive actions.
B. All personnel
must be aware that the above-mentioned principles are the
fundamental factors that govern military security and must
be deeply
indoctrinated so as to be inherent with the routine
performance of their
tasks.
C. ORGANIZATION:
1. Categories of Classification
a. The official information requiring
protection in the
interest of national defense will be limited to three
categories of
classification, which are, in order of importance, TOP
SECRET, SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL. No other designations shall be used to
classify information of
national defense.
2. Other Definitions
a. Information of Defense. It pertains the
official information
that requires protection in the interest of national defense
that is not of
common knowledge, y which could be valuable military
information for a
potential enemy, to plan or sustain war or insurgency
against us or our
allies.
b. Classified Material. It is the official
information which
has been classified and marked with one of the categories
mentioned above.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Access to Classified Material. It allows
access to
classified material only to those persons authorized to work
with classified
information and need to know such information to be able to
accomplish their
official duties.
d. Custody. Is the person in possession or that
has the
responsibility of protecting and accounting for classified
material.
e. Inventory. It is the procedure used to
account for
classified material by control of entry and record of the
document, or entry
of destruction record, or by signed receipts.
f.
Document. Is any recorded information, without considering
its form or characteristics, and includes, without being
limited to, the
following:
(1) Handwritten, typewritten or
printed material.
(2) All drawn, painted or
engraved material.
(3) All sound recordings,
voices, tapes or records.
(4) All types of photographs and
films, in negatives or
processed, fixed or in motion.
g. Authority for Derived Classification: It is
the authority to
classify material as a result of being connected to, or in
response to other
material related to the same subject of an already
classified material.
h. Material: Means any document, product or
substance, on or
within which information can be recorded or included.
i. Properly authorized person: It is a person
who has been
authorized to work with classified information, according to
the established
norms.
3. TOP SECRET Information. Top Secret
classification is limited to
the information of defense or material that require the
highest degree of
protection. TOP SECRET information will be applicable only
to that kind of
information or material that is extremely important for
defense, and the
unauthorized disclosure of which would result in serious
danger for the
nation, as for example:
a. Definite severance of diplomatic
relationships, that would
damage the defense of the nation; [leading) to an armed
attack against them or
their allies or to a war.
63
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Compromise the military defense plans, or
the operations of
military intelligence, or technical or scientific
developments vital for the
national defense.
c. As examples of this type of information,
there are:
(1) A strategic plan that
documents the complete
operations of war.
(2) The documents for war
planning.
(3) Plan of operations for an
independent operation, or
for a series of coordinated operations.
(4) Documents of military
intelligence containing complete
information of a nature that would reveal a big effort of
military
intelligence activities by the nation, and that would enable
unauthorized
persons to evaluate the success obtained by the military
intelligence services
of the nation.
(5) Plans or programs to carry
out operations of military
intelligence, or other special operations, when the
knowledge of a particular
plan, program or operation would result extremely damaging
for the nation.
(6) Important information
regarding equipment (war
materiel) extremely important and radically new, whose
technical development
constitute vital information for the defense of the nation.
4. SECRET Information. The use of SECRET
classification will be
limited to defense or material information whose
unauthorized dissemination
could result in serious damage for the nation, such as:
a. Jeopardize international relations of the
country.
b. Endanger the effectiveness of a program or
policy vitally
important for the national defense.
c. Compromises important military plans for the
defense or the
technical development for the national defense.
d. Reveals important operations of military
intelligence.
e. Examples of this type of information are:
(1) A war plan or a complete
plan for a future war
operation not included under the TOP SECRET classification,
and documents that
indicate the disposition of our forces, whose unauthorized
publication, by
itself, could compromise such secret plans.
64
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Defense plans and other
military plans not included
under the TOP SECRET classification, or in the previous
paragraph, that
contain plans and development programs or acquisitions,
although they do not
necessary include all the emergency plans.
(3) Specific intelligence that,
by itself, could reveal
the military capability of degree of preparation of the
Armed Forces, but does
not include information whose unauthorized disclosure could
compromise a TOP
SECRET plan.
(4)
Intelligence that reveals the strength of our forces
involved in war operations; quantity or quality of
equipment, or the quantity
or composition of the units in a theater of operations or
other geographic
area where our forces might be involved in war operations.
During peacetime,
the information that would reveal the strength, identify,
composition or
situation of units usually would not require SECRET
classification.
(5) Military intelligence or
other information whose value
depends on concealing the fact that the nations possesses
it.
(6) Details or specific
information related to new
material, or modification of material that reveal important
military advances,
or new technical development that has direct application of
vital importance
for the national defense.
(7) Security measure for
communication or cryptographic
material that reveals vitally important information for the
national defense.
(8) Intelligence of vital importance
for the national
defense, with regard to amounts of war reserves.
f. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. The use of
CONFIDENTIAL
classification will be limited to defense information and to
the material
whose unauthorized disclosure could be damaging to the
interests of the
national defense. As examples of this type of material,
there are:
(1) Reports of operations and
battles that might have
valuable information for the enemy (The Essential Elements
of Friendly
Information).
(2) Reports that contain
military intelligence, no matter
what type of information.
(3) Frequencies of military
radios and call signals that
have special meaning assigned, or those that are frequently
changed because of
security reasons.
(4) Devices and material related
to the communications
security.
65
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(5) Information that indicates
the assets of our ground,
sea and air forces in national territory or abroad, or the
composition of the
units, or que quantity of specific equipment units that
belong to them. During
peace time a defense classification is not necessary unless
such information
reflects the numbers of the total assets or quantity of
weapons whose
characteristics are themselves classified.
(6) The documents or manuals
that contain technical
information used for training, maintenance or inspection of
classified war
material.
(7) Doctrine of tactical or
technical operations.
(8) The investigation,
development, production and
acquisition of war materiel.
f. Handling of classified documents
(1) Protection of classified
material in the hands of
persons that are travelling.
(a) A person receiving travel
orders, and who is
authorized to carry classified material, will protect such
material by the
following methods:
1- He will contact his commander
in order to
obtain, if available, the corresponding means of protection,
according to the
particular classification of the material, or;
2- Will keep the material under
his personal
control continuously. It is the responsibility of the
carrier of classified
material to use his best judgement for his actions, in order
to avoid risky
situations that might compromise the classified material.
(b) The personnel on travel
mission will not carry
classified material when crossing international borders
where the classified
material might be subject to scrutiny by Customs inspectors
or other
"unauthorized" persons. Such material, when
forwarded previously by diplomatic
pouch or by mail, will not encounter any obstacles on its
way.
(2) Covers of classified
material.
The cover of classified material is used to call the
attention of the personnel handling it, to the fact that it
is a classified
document, and to protect it against unauthorized scrutiny.
The cover shall
have the stamp identifying the classification of the
document.
(3) Destruction in case of emergency.
66
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(a) Plans
The commanders and chiefs that are responsible
for the protection of classified material will make formal
plans for the
destruction or safe transfer of all classified material
under its
jurisdiction, in case of civilian disturbance, disaster, or
enemy action.
(b) On board aircraft or ships
If the aircraft carrying classified material is
forced to land, or a ship runs aground in unfriendly or
neutral territory
where capture seems imminent, or in other circumstances when
it appears that
the material should be destroyed so as not to be recognized,
it is preferable
to burn it or destroy it in a way that will not be
recognizable.
(4) Security of the typewriter
ribbons: The typewriter
ribbons, whether made of cotton, rayon, paper, or silk,
which are used to
write classified information are not safe until they have
been written over
twice. Presently, many of the ribbons for typewriter
machines can only be used
once, therefore have in mind that the impression of letters
remain in the
ribbons and these are significantly valuable for the enemy
as is the paper in
which the information was typed. These ribbons should be
protected
accordingly.
(5) Classified trash: Trash such
as drafts, minutes,
notes, dictaphone recordings, or other recordings,
typewriter ribbons, carbon
paper, rolls of film, and similar articles, containing
information of national
defense, shall be protected by a responsible person,
according to their
classification, until they can be destroyed in an orderly
fashion the same as
for material of similar classification. It is necessary to
have a certificate
of destruction.
Back to Top 67
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 5 LN324-91
CHAPTER V
LIAISON
INTRODUCTION:
The purpose of
this chapter is to enable you to plan and carry out
Liaison with Government and civilian Agencies for collection
of
information/intelligence required, in compliance with the
commanders
requirements, without losing a mutual confidence with the
Source.
GENERAL:
A. Before carrying
out a Liaison, it has to be determined first which
agency or source will be contacted and the purpose for the
contact:
1. Liaison could be carried out with the
following sources or
agencies:
a.
Government agencies
b. Military units or agencies
c. Civilian agencies and industry
2. The purposes for carrying out the liaison
are:
a. To establish a relationship of mutual
confidence between the
various government agencies.
b. To develop sources of information for
immediate or future
exploitation.
c. To collect and exchange information that
might be useful for
future investigation.
d. To obtain assistance in investigations or CI
operations.
B. With this in mind, there are two forms or
types of Liaison that
can be carried out:
FORMAL
LIAISON and INFORMAL LIAISON
1. Formal liaison is carried out to obtain:
a. Specific information for an
ongoing investigation.
b. Information related to
security violations.
c. Information of threats to
the national security.
2. Informal Liaison is carried out to:
68
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Establish a relationship of
mutual confidence.
b. Develop Sources.
c. Obtain information related to specific
investigations.
d. Obtain information that has
not been requested
specifically but is related to one or more incidents or
investigations.
e. Maintain friendly
relationship among the Sources of
information and the CI agents.
C. Before starting a
liaison, you should review the SOP of the unit to
determine the proper Liaison procedure in your area of
operations.
D. Upon reviewing
the SOP you should determine the requirements and
establish priorities according to the SOP. Some of these
areas are:
1. The priority of intelligence requirements
are selected by the
Commander, higher authority or by the mission.
2. The requirements are generated by the
direction taken by the
investigation.
3. The priorities that have been established
based on the
recommendations by the Commander or the urgency of the
mission.
E. Once the
requirements have been reviewed, you can establish the liaison
contact.
1. There are three basic methods to establish
a contact, and these
are:
a. Personal Approach: This is done by the
person (Agent)
actually carrying out the liaison with the Source. This
individual (Agent)
introduces personally the new Agent to the Source. This
method is preferred
because it has the advantage of transferring the credibility
and confidence of
the old Agent directly to the new Agent or contact.
b. Introductory letter: In this method the new
Agent obtains a
letter of introduction from a person or old Agent that knows
the Source. This
letter is presented to the Source during the first contact.
The other method
of introduction letter is to send a letter to the Source
indicating that you
wish to visit him.
c. Cold Approach. This is the least effective
method since it
involved making the initial contact with a strange person.
The first visit of
this approach should always be on a social level and must be
a short one.
69
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2. When you have not done any personal contact
with the Source, you
must take into consideration the following:
a. The Agent must introduce himself and present
his official
credentials identifying him as a Special Agent of Officer of
Military
Intelligence.
b. Indicate the purpose of the visit.
c. Based on your personal observation of the
Source's reaction,
determine if a casual conversation is appropriate.
d. As the Agent you must be alert all the time
to the signals
by the Source that might indicate what kind of approach is
better to use with
the Source.
e. The Agent must be cordial, professional and
sincere.
f. Must show respect for the position or
profession of the
Source.
3. If there has been a previous personal
contact with the Source, the
actions of the Agent could be more relaxed (calm) according
to the
relationship established by previous contacts.
F. During the
liaison, you must establish a Relationship of Mutual
Confidence in order to:
1. Establish cooperation between you and the
Source. A great deal of
precaution should be used to develop the Source's
willingness to cooperate,
because you do not want to compromise the Source.
2. Have in mind that you can obtain
information from previous liaison
reports and other documentation that may assist you in
determining the type of
approach that would be best for the Source in particular in
order to:
a. Adopt the proper attitude.
b. Be ready to change attitude if it is
necessary. As the
Source calms down and starts to cooperate, a more relaxed
attitude could be
helpful.
3. One of the techniques that you can use is
to deal with subjects of
mutual interest.
EXAMPLE: "If a person is a football fanatic, he
would very
receptive to talk about that sport instead of another sport
that he does not
know, or does not care to about."
70
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4. During the liaison contact you must show
sincere interest in the
Source's opinions. If the Agent shows that his (Agent's)
opinion is better
than the Source's, you might lose the Source's confidence.
5. It is important, also, that you study well
the capabilities of the
Source before asking him for information. This might
embarrass the Source if a
request is made that he cannot fulfill.
6. You must always be aware of the jealousy
existing among the
various Agencies. And remember always that you do not have
to compare the
effectiveness of one Agency against the other, this could
cause a serious
problem because the Source could also be providing
information to other
agencies where you might also have another contact.
7. During the Liaison contact, maintain always
your position as a CI
Special Agent and do not fall into discussion of military
ranking; this is
very important because you are a direct representative of
the government.
8. If you do not have any previous knowledge
of the Source, establish
the contact and mutual confidence in the manner already
discussed. In this
situation, maintain flexibility and allow the circumstances
to dictate on the
approach that can be used with the Source.
G. During the
liaison contact there will be instances when information of
mutual interest will be exchanged.
1. Before exchanging such information, first
determine if that
information can be divulged. Consider the following points
as basis for such
exchange:
a. Whether the information does not violate the
SOP
stipulations.
b. Whether it is classified and cannot be
divulged among other
agencies, even if they are part of the Government.
NOTE: The
exchange of information is important because if you only
obtain information and does not offer certain information in
return there is
the possibility of losing the Source's confidence.
2. The Liaison contact can be considered
successful when:
a. both parts involved in the Liaison decide or
discuss the
exchange of information.
b. both parts can use the information exchanged
to their
advantage.
Back to Top 71
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 6 LN324-91
PREPARATION OF THE LIAISON REPORT
INTRODUCTION:
Upon conclusion
of a liaison contact, a report of the liaison has to be
prepare to include all the identification data of the
Source; all the
information on previous contact reports; a description of
the circumstances of
the contact and operational matters; data of the Source's
background; a list
of all the other reports prepared in relation to this
contact; all the
information related to the financial and logistic support,
remarks (if
applicable) and the signature of the Agent.
GENERAL:
A. First determine
whether the liaison report is necessary or
allowed/authorized (Some countries prohibit the
documentation of information
by the citizens of the same country).
1. Prepare the liaison report after the
contact has been completed.
B. Complete the
heading of the report (See Figure No. 1)
1. TOPIC/SUBJECT: Write down the name,
position, organization, and
other data that identifies the Source, as requested by the
local SOP. If a
code number has been assigned to the Source, use only this
number for
identification.
2. REFERENCES:
a. Write the date and control number of the
last Liaison Report
prepared in regard to this Source.
b. If there are no previous reports on this Source,
make a note
of it in the Report you are preparing.
c. Note down all the documents and material
that were
originated by, or related to, the Source.
3. DATE: Note down the date of preparation of
the report.
4. NUMBER OF THE REPORT: Write down the number
of the report, it
depends on the SOP of the unit. Usually, the CI section
keeps a record of all
the sequential numbers used for Liaison Reports.
72
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Figure #1
(CLASSIFICATION)
LIAISON REPORT
SUBJECT: DATE:
REFERENCES: REPORT NO.:
PROJECT NO.:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
(WRITE A WARNING NOTE IF NECESSARY)
1. ( )
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONTACT:
a. Purpose
b. Date, Hour, Place of contact
c. Persons present
2. ( )
OPERATIONAL MATTERS
3. ( )
INFORMATION OF PERSONALITY
4. ( )
PRODUCTION
5. ( )
FINANCE/LOGISTICS
6. ( )
COMMENTS:
(NAME OF THE AGENT)
(ORGANIZATION/UNIT)
(COUNTRY)
REMARKS BY THE REVIEWER:
(CLASSIFICATION)
73
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. NUMBER OF THE PROJECT: In the CI cases,
usually, each
investigation or project has a number assigned to it. The
unit's SOP assigns
those numbers if applicable.
C. WARNING NOTE: If
necessary, include in this section of the Report a note
that will indicate the sensitivity of the investigation or
the contact, as
shown in the following example:
"WARNING:
SOURCES AND SENSITIVE METHODS INVOLVED"
D. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH 11: "CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONTACT" (SEE FIG.#1)
Describe the
circumstances of the contact including:
1. Purpose
2. Date, hour: use the expression: "from
... to ... of May 19.."
3. Place where the contact occurred.
4. Persons present: Whether there were other
persons present during
the contact, note down their complete physical description and
other pertinent
details.
E. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH #2 (OPERATIONAL MATTERS)
1. List in chronological order all the events
and subjects discussed
during the contact.
2. Mention briefly any operational information
that has not been
included in other reports.
3. Write down all additional information and
the identification of
new leads or Sources with as much detail as possible.
F. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH #3 (INFORMATION OF PERSONALITY)
Give information
related to the Source as completely as possible. This
will include, but not limited to, the following:
1. Personality or personality traits.
2. Idiosyncracies, peculiarities of the
Source.
3. Sense of humor, or lack of it.
4. Type of information that the Source is
willing to discuss.
74
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. Topics that must be pursued or disregarded.
6. Background information on the Source that
has not been reported
before.
NOTE: If a code
number has been used to identify a Source in this report do
not give information of personality that might compromise or
identify the
Source.
G. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH #4 (PRODUCTION):
List, according
to the report's number, all the documents that were
produced as a consequence of the contact with the Source.
H. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH #5 (FINANCES AND LOGISTICS): If applicable, include a
list of:
1. Incentives used
2. Amount of expenses:
a. Official funds
b. Personal funds
I. COMPLETE
PARAGRAPH #6 (COMMENTS)
1. Write down comments that the Agent believes
are applicable but
cannot be confirmed (personal opinions, intuition, etc.)
EXAMPLE: "During this
contact the Source appeared to be very
nervous. In previous contacts the Source never showed to be
nervous."
2. Explain the specific purpose of all the
expenses paid in cash by
the Agent, disregarding "when", "where"
or "why"
J. FILL OUT THE
SIGNATURE BLOCK
1. Name of the Agent
2. Official title or position
3. Office to which Agent belongs
4. Country where the Agent's office is located
K. CLASSIFY THE
REPORT
L. PREPARE THE
REPORT IN TWO COPIES:
1. Sign both copies
2. Forward one copy to the Higher Control
Office
3. Keep a copy for your office files.
Back to Top 75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
CHAPTER 7
INTRODUCTION
- INVESTIGATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
A definite
concept with regard to security is that no person, merely
because of rank or position, has the right to know or
possess classified
information or material; and that such material will be
entrusted only to
those individuals whose official or governmental functions
require knowledge;
and that all persona that require access must be authorized
to received
classified information or material. These individuals must
be of undisputable
loyalty, integrity and discretion; must posses excellent
character and have
such habits and associations that leave no doubt at all of
its good judgement
in the handling of classified information and material.
GENERAL:
A. SECURITY is the
responsibility of the Command:
1. The Commanders may delegate work and
functions, but responsibility
cannot be delegated. One of the most important functions of
Military
Intelligence is to assist the commander is establishing and
maintaining
security. The Investigation of Personnel Security (IPS) is
one of the methods
used to attain that security. The investigation is done of
the individuals
occupying sensitive positions and are under the jurisdiction
of the military
service, or of individuals considered for filling out
positions of confidence
that require access to classified information or materials.
B. SENSITIVE
POSITION
1. A sensitive position is any post within the
military services
whose occupant could cause an adverse effect to national
security by virtue of
the nature of his responsibility.
2. All sensitive positions require an Investigation
of Personnel
Security (IPS)
a. Any positions whose functions or
responsibilities require
access to classified defense material.
b. Functions related to classified systems and
cryptographic
equipment.
c. Functions related to studies and
investigations and/or
classified development.
76
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. Duties that encompass the approval or the
process of cases
of presumed disloyalty, subversive activities or disaffected
personnel.
e. Any other activity or position designated as
sensitive post
by the senior command chiefs.
3. Usually, we refer to those functions that
require access to
CONFIDENTIAL information or to higher security
classification. In order to
occupy a sensitive position it is not necessary for the
individual to be
involved in the creation of classified information , nor to
act in making
decisions related to it. For example, the typist that copies
classified
documents has access to the information and therefore,
occupies a sensitive
position. The keeper of files does not have to read the
classified documents
that he handles has access to classified information and
also occupies a
sensitive position. All positions of officers, NCO's, and
enlisted men are
considered sensitive by virtue of their rank.
a. Up to this point, the sensitive positions
that have been
mentioned have something to do with classified information.
However, it is
possible to occupy a sensitive position or perform in a
sensitive post without
having anything to do with classified information. These
functions or duties
concern the teaching programs, briefing of personnel of the
armed forces,
including the training for such duties.
b. In this case, the sensitivity of the
position is not
determined on the basis of access to classified information,
but on the basis
of the influence that the personnel of instruction programs
may have on the
military personnel and their ways of thinking. The sensitive
classification is
reserved to persons of the military personnel that produce
or administer the
program. The recipients, the military personnel receiving
training are not
considered participants of a sensitive function or position.
c. Finally, the sensitive positions involve the
process of
investigation of allegations of disloyalty, subversion, and
disaffection.
Because of our duties and responsibilities, we, the
intelligence personnel,
are included in the category of sensitive positions.
d. These are the sensitive functions that
required a Security
Certificate. The commander decides whom to authorize such
certificate based on
the information that we, as Agents, provide through our
investigations of
personnel security.
4. WHY ARE INVESTIGATIONS OF PERSONNEL
SECURITY NECESSARY? ARE
ALL
MILITARY PERSONNEL CONSIDERED DISLOYAL?
a. Senior chiefs of Military Intelligence have
given some
reasons for carrying out investigations of personnel
security. Among them:
77
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(1) Any intelligence agency that
does not believe it could
be penetrated any day, by any of its officials, from the
concierge to the
director, would be very complaisant and we would be
criminally negligent if we
do not function under such supposition.
(2) We have to act under the
supposition that our
adversaries are as cunning as we are and that they will be
able to enter every
now and then.
(3) The security of the nation
demands constant vigilance
in order to maintain our adversaries outside, and prevent
them from obtaining
information and to uncover and remove them as soon as
possible.
4.[sic] How can
we keep our adversaries from entering?
(1) The proper authority will be
the one who determines
the need for a personnel investigation of an individual.
This authority
usually is the commander.
(2) The request is sent to the
Intelligence Officer of the
Staff at national level, who in turn orders his control
office to initiate an
investigation and refer it to the CI unit for investigative
action.
5. An investigation of personnel security is
used to find out the
following:
1. Loyalty
2.
Discretion
3. Character
4. Integrity
5. Morale
of an individual that will give information upon which a
decision would be
made on whether the individual will be posted to a specific
position that
requires access to classified material which is consistent
with the interest
of national security.
6. The action agency will be the same
commander who made the request.
The commander must take a decision in each investigation.
The decision will be
based on the information contained in the investigative
reports provided by
Counterintelligence.
7. The fact that the person enters voluntarily
into one of the armed
forces is no proof of loyalty, because:
a. The individual could be intending to
accomplish an
illegal/nefarious act.
b. Could be intending to gain access to
classified military
information.
78
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Could be intending to deliver such
information to an enemy
agent, present or potential, to obtain military experience
in order to be able
to apply it against us when the occasion arises.
7.[sic] Acts like
swearing allegiance (in writing), going to church,
etc. are only manifestations of loyalty and respect that
could be used to over
up ulterior motives. These manifestations cannot be accepted
as proof of
loyalty, although they have much value as indicators of the
right direction.
D. INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS:
1. (How does an investigation start? EXAMPLE:
a. Suppose a new typist will have to work with
classified
information, and therefore, needs access to same. Since he
never had previous
security authorization to work with classified material, the
commander,
responsible for the security of his command, requests a
security investigation
of personnel for the new typist. The request goes up to
national level to the
Staff Intelligence Officer whose function is to provide
information on
security. On the other hand, the counterintelligence of the
unit directs the
investigation of personnel security of the new typist.
b. In order to establish the loyalty of a
person, the lack of
disloyalty has to be proven. In order to prove it, the
qualities and
weaknesses that might lead a person to commit a disloyal act
are searched.
c. Among the things looked for to prove
disloyalty are:
1) Vengeance
2) Desire for material gains
3) Desire for more prestige
4) Friendship
5) Ideological tendencies
d. Among the weaknesses that make a person
susceptible to
committing a disloyal act under pressure are:
1) Close relatives in foreign
countries.
2) Big financial investments in
foreign countries.
3) Jealousy
4) Credibility
5)
Weak character
6) Serious guilty episodes in
the past
7) Debts
79
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
8) Use of Narcotics
e. Absence of the factors indicated above is an
indication of
loyalty and confidence on the individual under
investigation. Only a small
percentage of the investigations of personnel security show
that an individual
is disloyal. Our work as CI Agents is to find that small
percentage of
disloyal persons, and prevent them from getting access to
the type of
information that could be damaging to the national security.
We discover the
weak points within the national security, it is up to the
commander and the
agency to act, eliminating them from sensitive positions.
f. Description of each one of the factors
mentioned above,
which could affect the loyalty of a person:
1) VENGEANCE: Could be one of
the strongest motives. Hate
corrupts the moral value in such a way that the person could
do the utmost to
betray his country in order to take revenge against a person
or group he
hates.
2) MATERIAL GAIN: Some people
yearn so much for personal
gains that do not stop at anything to attain their goals. We
do not condemn
ambition and the innate desire to advance in life, but we do
condemn the
persons that want to amass riches without taking into
consideration the ethics
of society.
3) PERSONAL PRESTIGE: This
motivation applies to those
persons whose main ambition is for power, power above all,
to demonstrate the
work their superiority as leaders.
4)
FRIENDSHIP: Some persons of high integrity commit acts
against national security because of friendship ties to
another persons.
5) IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS: A
person that has hostile beliefs
against its own country is very vulnerable to be approached
by agents or
subversive groups.
6) CLOSE RELATIVES IN FOREIGN
LANDS: For a long time,
threats of mistreatment against loved relatives who are
under the regime of a
threatening power have been used. The Soviets have widely
applied similar
techniques, currently, as a means to obtain support and
cooperation.
7) INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES: Due to human nature,
there are many persons who consider that material riches are
more important
than the integrity of moral principles. When these persons
are in danger of
losing their investments in foreign countries, they can be
persuaded to betray
their own country.
8) JEALOUSY: One of the
strongest motivations used by
cunning agents in order to induce loyal persons to commit
hostile acts against
their own country.
80
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
9) CREDIBILITY: In this category are classified
those persons that believe in everything literally and do
not find anything
wrong in other persons. This type of person is almost always
an idealist and
sometimes could be used as an instrument by unscrupulous agents.
Credulous
persons by stupidity are not used frequently because of the
poor quality of
information that they might obtain, although in some
occasions they could be
used as "bait" for sabotage acts, strikes, and
public disorder.
10) A person with a weak
character can be easily dominated
by another one and is an easy prey for subversive elements
looking for a
servile assistant.
11) DEBTS: The persons that have
gotten into substantial
debts always try ways to recover their losses quickly and
easily. These
persons constitute a definite security risk, and is very
vulnerable because he
can be persuaded by a considerable sum of money. We all know
the saying:
"EVERY ONE HAS A PRICE," therefore, the price of
all persons in this category
is relatively low.
12) USE OF NARCOTICS: This
category does not need
explanation. We all know that the drug addicted commit
crimes in order to
maintain their habit.
13) GUILTY COMPLEX: As human
beings, many of us have
experienced certain episodes in the past for which we may
feel ashamed. The
enemy agents that have the mission to recruit
agents/sources, do not hesitate
in taking advantage of such experiences to force the
cooperation of the
individuals for subversive conspiracy. The threats to
divulge such episodes
has always been a powerful wedge to force a person to commit
illegal acts.
g. These are some of the factors that we must
look for during
an investigation of a person to be employed in a confidence
position. When we
discover indications in any of them, the investigation is
broadened in order
to:
1) approve them
2) reject them.
h.
Looking for the bad side of a person might seems like a
cynical act, but we are in a cynical occupation that has
demonstrate
throughout the years and by experience, that this is the
only way to approach
an investigation.
i. The experienced investigator does not accept
from the start
any information that has not been checked.
j. A very important part in the life of a CI
agent is his
behavior during an investigation of personnel security. The
behavior of the
agent ensures whether he will obtain the information or not.
The interview is
81
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a very emotional situation for many persons. Even though you
identify yourself
as am agent of Military Intelligence, they will take it as
though you are an
agent of criminal investigations (police). It depends on you
and your behavior
during the interview whether it will have positive results
or not.
5. CERTIFICATE OF SECURITY AUTHORIZATION
a. After the action agency (the commander)
finishes with the
study of the personnel security investigation results, he
proceeds to carry
out one of several lines of action:
1) He might ISSUE a certificate of security
authorization
2) He might DENY the
certificate of security
authorization
3) He might REVALIDATE a
certificate previously invalid.
4) He might INVALIDATE a security authorization
previously issued.
6. TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS OF PERSONNEL
SECURITY
a. Usually we are interested on two types of
investigations of
personnel security:
1) To check National Agencies
(CNA)
2) Investigation of Personal
History (IPH)
b. The type of investigation required at any
time depends on
the category of the classification of the defense
information to which access
is required, and the citizenship of the individual
concerned.
c. CHECKING THE FILES OF NATIONAL AGENCIES
1) It consists on an
examination of the files of those
national agencies that might have information related to the
loyalty and
reliability of the individual. The Control Office determines
which agencies
shall be checked in all the cases:
a) The Internal Security Agency
(DNI)
b) Index of Investigations of the
Armed Forces
2) Internal Security Agency:
The files of crimes and
subversive activities will be checked during all the
investigations. It should
include fingerprints of each applicant.
3) National Level of the Army:
a) Staff Intelligence Office
b) Director of Personnel
Administration (military)
82
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c) Chief of the Military Police
d) Index of Central Archives
(Minister of Defense)
These are checked when there are indicators that
the individual is or have been employed by, or is owner of,
a company that has
had classified contracts with the Minister of Defense.
4) National Level of the Navy
5) National Level of the Air
Force
6) Archives of the Government
Ministries
7) Other Investigative
Agencies.
7. CHECKING NATIONAL AGENCIES (CAN) AND
INQUIRIES IN WRITING:
a. We have already discussed CAN. Parts of the
investigations
of files include the Inquiries in Writing. This is done for
the following
agencies and individuals:
1) Local Agencies of Law
Enforcement
2) Previous supervisors of the
individual
3) References given by the
individual
4) Learning schools and
institutions
b. The Written Inquiry is usually a
mimeographed letter
distributed to the character references and credit
references given by the
individual, requesting from them a written report on
everything that they know
about the individual.
8. INVESTIGATION OF PERSONAL BACKGROUND:
The second
type of investigation of personnel security is the
investigation of personal background. This category constitutes
the majority
of the investigations that you will perform as CI Agents.
a. Components of an investigation of Personal
History
(Background):
1) Checking with National
Agencies (CAN)
2) Birth certificate
3) Education
83
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4) Employment
5) References
6) Investigations in the
neighborhood
7) Criminal background
8) Military service
9) Connections abroad
10) Citizenship
11) Credit Record
12) Organizations
13) Divorce record
b. Checking National Agencies (CAN) is to
verify the files of
national agencies with regard to the loyalty, morality,
discretion, character
and integrity of the individual.
c. Birth Record: Usually we do not check birth
records, unless
there is discrepancy in the birth dates of other recorded
files.
d. Education: The files of all the schools and
learning
institutions attended by the individual. Interviews can also
be had with
teachers and professors of the individual in order to get
more personal and
intimate information of the individual.
e. Employment (occupation): We are interested
in the degree of
efficiency at his work and the reason why he terminated his
employment.
f. References: In the majority of the cases we
must assume that
the personal references given by the individual will be
partially or totally
in his favor. There are three reasons why we verify the
references:
1) It is possible that the
person indicated in the
Personal History as a friend, might not be so friendly with
the individual.
2) A friend might reveal
damaging information without
being conscious of it.
3) The references are a good
source to obtain "developed
sources." These are persons that have knowledge of the
background of the
individual but have not been given as references in his
application.
g. Investigations in the neighborhood: Valuable
information is
obtained of the personal life of the individual. Mainly what
is done is a
compilation of gossip (rumors). But if this gossip come up
again in other
agencies, they could be taken as valid.
h. Record of criminal background: It could be
requested by mail
or through Liaison investigations. The information obtained
from these records
must be verified with the court register and judicial
procedures.
84
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
i. Military Service: The type of leave or
discharge is checked
in order to verify if it was because of disloyalty,
subversion, indiscretion,
or moral perversion.
j. Connections abroad:
1) Determine up to what point
the individual has
investments in foreign countries. What is the amount of
money invested by the
individual in these countries.
2) Another point that should be
examined is whether the
individual has relatives in those countries. It is possible
that the foreign
country may put pressure against the individual by using his
relatives as an
excuse.
k.
Citizenship. The citizenship of an individual and his
parents could be verified through the records of the
Immigration Service.
1. Travel abroad:
1) Dates of departure
2) Destination
3) Purpose of Travel.
Activities that the individual was
involved in during his stay in that country. It is possible
for the individual
to have been involved in some difficulties in that country.
m. Credit Record: Credit agencies are
contacted, credit
loaners, where the individual has resided for considerable
periods of time.
Through these records the integrity of the individual can be
determined.
n. Organizations: Investigate whether the
individual was a
member or was affiliated or sympathizer, with any
organization, association,
movement, group or combination of foreigners or locals that
have adopted or
manifested a policy of defending or approving enactment of
actions by force or
violence in order to deprive other persons of their rights
as dictated by the
country' s constitution.
o. Divorce records: It is used to prove or
contradict the
information already included in his Personal Background
(history).
9. EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED:
a. It is the duty of the investigator to point
out if the
information obtained during the investigation are
"Facts", "Opinions." or
"Rumors." There are three ways to comply with this
requirement:
1) Description in Words:
Indicate by means of a
description in words the degree of Reliability of the
confidential informants,
when submitting the information received from them. The
description in words
is used only to describe the information obtained from
reliable sources.
EXAMPLES:
85
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a) The Source (So and so), who
has submitted
confidential information in the past informed the following:
b) The Source (So and so),
reliability unknown, who
knew the Subject for the past ten years, informed the
following:
2) Notes or Remarks by the
Investigator (Agent): are
remarks by the agent which can be included in the report to
add validity to
the information provided by the source, or else to detract
validity to such
information. EXAMPLE:
a) " The source was very
nervous during the
interview.
b) "His statements (the
Source's) regarding dates
and places were very generalized and sometimes gave the
impression of not
being sure of himself."
3) Appropriate phrases: Using
certain appropriate phrases
in the report will help the control agency to determine more
accurately the
validity of the information provided. EXAMPLES:
a) "The Source said that
...."
b) "The Source provided the
following rumor...
10. ENDING THE
INVESTIGATION:
a. The action agency bases its determination
regarding issuance
of authorization certificates to classified material on the
investigation
carried out by the CI Special Agents:
b. The investigation that you have carried out
will determine
the future of the individual, and therefore each
investigation must be as
complete as possible.
c. In an effort to provide a superior
investigation, the Agent
should:
1) Obtain all possible
information.
2) Support all the conclusions
with facts.
3) Identify all the opinions as
such in the investigation
report (Agent's Report)
4) Explain all the leads that
were not followed.
86
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5) Obtain enough information
during the course of the
investigation in order to enable the Action Agency to adopt
a final action
upon receiving the results of the investigation.
11. AGENT'S
ATTITUDE
In order to
combine all the desirable requirements of a CI Special
Agent, while performing his functions in the field of
intelligence, you should
always have:
a. Know the significance of the words loyalty,
discretion and
reputation in order to be able to gather the required
information for the
Action agency.
b. Keep in mind the purpose of the
investigation so that the
findings will reflect the information required by the Action
agency.
c. Be impartial, absolutely, in order to do
justice to all; to
the SUBJECT of the investigation and to the national
government.
d. Be diplomatic while performing your duties
as investigator,
in order to obtain the information desired without wasting
any time.
e. Maintain a professional stance at all times
because it will
reflect your quality as an agent, the quality of the CI
service and of the
Army.
f. Avoid accusing the interviewee because you
need to obtain
certain information from that person, and if he becomes
scared, he will not be
able to talk.
Back to Top 87
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 8
LN324-91
CHAPTER VIII
INTERROGATION PHASE/TECHNIQUES
INTRODUCTION:
The interrogation
phase/techniques for questioning have a very unique
value because they will cover all the interrogatives. The
ability to ask
questions is as important as the investigation that is being
carried out.
Without a good knowledge of how to address his questions,
many times valuable
intelligence information could be lost or answers are given
that are contrary
to what the source provided.
GENERAL:
a. Usually, the interrogation
phase/questioning techniques starts
when the source starts answering questions pertinent to the
specific
objectives of the interrogation/interview.
b. The questions must be sufficiently
comprehensive to ensure that
the subject of interest has been completely exploited.
c. All the answers obtained from the Source
must established the
basic interrogatives which are:
(1) Who
(2) What
(3) When
(4) Where
(5) Why
(6) How
d. All your questions must be presented in a
logical sequence in
order to be sure that the significant topics or objectives
have not been
neglected.
e. Frequently a series of questions are used,
following a
chronological sequence of events, but it is by no means the
only logical
method of making an interrogation.
(one page missing from the original)
(3) Non Pertinent Questions:
(a) Non pertinent questions are
those that have nothing to
do the with objectives of the interrogation/interview. When
pertinent que non-
pertinent questions are carefully mixed, the Special Agent
[SA] could hide
88
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
the real purpose of the investigation and make the Source
believe that a
relatively insignificant matter is the basis for the
interrogation/interview
by asking pertinent questions in a casual manner. For
example:
* Emphasizing questions and details that are
not important.
* Dwelling on non-pertinent topics that the
Source seems unwilling
to discuss.
(b) One of the techniques for
which non-pertinent
questions are used is to make the source relax, and then go
back to pertinent
questions in order to obtain the information desired.
(c) Another use for
non-pertinent questions is to break
the "train of thought" of the source. This is
particularly important if there
is suspicion that the source is lying.
Always have
in mind that the Train of Though is an effort by the
Source to concentrate possibly to come up with a lie. The SA
could break the
concentration by introducing suddenly a completely unrelated
question, and
afterwards returning to the pertinent topic.
(4) Repeated Questions:
(a) The repeated questions are
used as a means to ensure
precision, particularly when the SA suspects that the Source
is lying.
(b) One of the techniques is to
repeat the same question
in another way or disguised.
(c) The repeated questions also
are useful to ensure
precision in the details, such as places, names, dates, team
components and
similar topics.
(5) Direct or tricky questions:
(a)
The way you express the questions have a direct
relationship with the response of the Source. A question can
be made in
different ways. Example:
"Where did you go last night?"
"Did you go last night to general headquarters?"
"You did go to general headquarters last night?"
"Didn't you go to general headquarters last night?"
(b) The first example (where did
you go last night?) is a
direct and simple question that requires a narrative answer.
This type of
question usually produces the maximum amount of information
and provides a
great number of leads that can be followed or exploited by
the SA.
89
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(c) The other three examples are
tricky questions in that
they are suggesting the answer.
(d) Tricky questions tend to
suggest the source the
response that he thinks the SA wants to know, and also
limits the number of-
details given in the answer.
(e) As a general rule, the
tricky questions are not good
for the purpose of interrogation/interview, but could be used
efficiently as a
means of verification, means of strategy, or as a means of
pointing out with
precision at specific details.
(6) Combined Questions:
(a) Combined questions are those
that contain more than
one question. This type of questions should be avoided
because they could be
evaded easily and sometimes are difficult to understand. For
example:
"What kind of training did you receive at the basic training
center of the enemy forces, and what kind of training did
you receive
afterwards at the advanced training center of the enemy
forces?"
(b) As you have noted in the
above example, the source may
answer only one, both or none of the questions, and the
answer given may be
ambiguous, incomplete or both.
(7) Negative Questions:
(a) Negative questions are those
that confuse and give
deceiving or false answers. This type of question could
suggest two answers.
For example:
"Don't
you know whether Col¢n went to General Headquarters last
night?
(b) If the SA is not aware of
the negative question, with
all probability he will extract an answer that the source
never wanted to
give.
(8)
Precise and Brief Questions:
(a) All questions should be
precise, brief and to the
point. There should be no doubt in the mind of the source of
what the SA wants
to know. This type of question is identical to the direct
question and limit
the level of the Train of Thought of the Source since it
should require a
narrative response.
(9) Questions Expressed Simply:
90
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(a) The SA must use simple
questions. Avoid convoluted
words (words whose meaning other persons might not know).
(10)
Reinforcement Questions:
(a) The reinforcement questions
are those used to impart
emphasis at a certain point of the interrogation/interview.
During the
interrogation/interview the SA must remain alert to detect
and exploit the
statements by the Source that indicate that he has valuable
intelligence
information, besides the one which is pursued in the present
interrogation/interview.
3. Information from Rumors:
(1) Rumors can provide valuable information.
However, rumor must
be classified as rumors.
4. Conclusions:
(1) The last step of the interrogation/interview
is to obtain
any additional conclusions, statements, remarks or
evaluations of a specially
qualified source.
(2) When the SA receives such information, he
must also obtain
the facts on which the source based his conclusions and/or
evaluations.
5. Interrogation/questioning techniques Phase
a. The interrogation/questioning techniques
phase is what
"truly makes a Special Agent" since it would be
worthless to have an excellent
"planning and preparation" and a wonderful
"approach plan" if the
"Interrogation/Questioning Techniques Phase" is
not exploited to the maximum
advantage in order to obtain the greatest intelligence
information possible.
b. Types of Interrogations/Interviews:
The SA
usually follows two general rules (the direct or indirect
interrogatory/interview). The essential difference between
the two lies on
whether the source knows or does not know that he is being
interrogated/interviewed.
c. The Direct Interrogation/Interview:
When we use
the direct interrogation/interview, the source is
conscious of being interrogated/interviewed, but knows or
does not know the
real objective of the interrogation/interview.
d. Advantages of the Direct Method:
(1) Consumes less time.
91
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Easier to carry out (nothing
to hide)
(3) Allows the SA to make
continuous verifications of the
information that he is receiving from the source.
e. Disadvantages
(1) The source does not want to
be a stool pigeon.
(2) He is afraid for his life
(or his comrades')
(3) Thinks that he can obtain
something in exchange for
the information offered (his own benefit).
f. Indirect Interrogatory/Interview:
This form
of interrogation/interview is characterized by getting
information through deceit and trickery without the source
knowing that he is
being interrogated.
g. Advantages:
(1) The information extracted is
almost always true (no
reason to lie.)
(2) It is useful for extracting
information (even) from
the most difficult sources.
(3) It serves for exploiting a
big human weakness (the
desire to talk).
h. Disadvantages
(1) A great deal of skill is
needed.
(2) It consumes too much time
and personnel.
(3)
We do not know really whether the source really wants
to cooperate/confess everything.
5. Use of techniques:
a. Have in mind that both types of
interrogation/interview can
be used at the tactical as well as strategic level.
b. Determining factors for the direct
interrogation/interview:
(1) Very limited time (TACTICAL
LEVEL)
(2) To use for immediate
operation
92
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(3) SA does not have much
training
c. Determining factors for indirect
interrogation/interview:
(1) Said operation/mission does
not have immediate
tactical importance.
(2) The goal to be attained is
at strategic level.
Example: To know the enemy
capabilities to sustain
hostilities for long periods of time.
6. Selection of the Source:
a) The criteria for the selection of personnel
to be
interrogated/interviewed could vary for innumerable reasons:
1) Time limitations
2) SA availability
3) Skills of the Ae (who in
general serve as selecting
officers).
4) Quality and quantity of
information that the sources
could have.
Back to Top 93
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 9
LN324-91
INVESTIGATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INTERVIEWS
INTRODUCTION:
The interviews of
personnel security enables us to obtain truthful
information to help us in our determination to offer a
person access to
classified information that might affect national security.
These interviews
are done normally with a person that has known the SUBJECT
being investigated.
GENERAL:
l. Before beginning the interview we have to
do good planning and
preparation for the interview. The following steps must be
taken if at all
possible:
a. Identify the individual that will be
interviewed.
NOTE: FOR THIS KIND OF INTERVIEW, A PRELIMINARY DATA SHEET
WILL GIVE
US THE
CHARACTER THAT WILL BE GIVEN TO THE INTERVIEW.
b. Prepare the questions that will be made.
1) Develop questions que will
extract information
regarding the following matters related to the SUBJECT:
a) His loyalty
b) His character
c) His reliability
d) If he is or is not adequate
to fill a position
of confidence.
c. Prepare questions that will allow the source
to answer in an
open and spontaneous manner (narrative form).
d. Avoid questions that only require
"YES" or "NO" as an
answer. Examples: Is your name Miguel?
e. Prepare your questions using the basic
interrogations
(always have in mind the basic interrogations during the
interview):
1) How
2) When
3) Who
4) What
5) Where
6) Why
94
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
f. Obtain the required forms, such as Sworn
Statement, signed.
2. Once planning and preparation have been
completed CONTACT THE
INDIVIDUAL TO BE INTERVIEWED.
a. Try to make contact and carry out the
interview during
working hours at the individuals work place (or where
appropriate depending on
the situation, if necessary make an appointment with the
Source).
3. Once the meeting has been arranged and you
meet the Source, carry
out the interview.
a. Identify yourself and show your official
credential (always
remember that you are the representative of a national
government and that you
are a Special Agent).
b. Ensure/certify that the Source himself knows
the SUBJECT (if
necessary ask him for an identification card).
c. Inform the Source of the purpose of the
interview (Example:
the purpose of this meeting is to obtain information onwho
is considered
for a confidence and responsibility position with the
national
government.......)
d. Obtain positive identification from the
Source.
e. Try to gain and keep the confidence of the
Source in such a
way that he will feel at ease with you.
f. Make the arrangements for the interview to
take place in a
quiet place and free of distractions.
NOTE: IF YOU HAVE A RECORDER AVAILABLE AND THE SOURCE DOES
NOT
OBJECT, EXPLAIN
TO ;HIM THAT YOU WANT TO USE TO PREPARE YOUR REPORT OF THE
INTERVIEW IN THE
MOST ADEQUATE WAY.
g. Obtain and make notes of the information of
the
identification of the Source, including:
1) Name and rank
2) Position
3) The complete designation of the
unit and its location
or place of work and position.
h. Inform the source that the interview is
considered official
business and warn him that he cannot discuss its content
with strange persons
to Military Intelligence.
i. Ask questions to obtain information from the
Source
regarding:
95
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
1) Day, time, place and
circumstances when he met the
SUBJECT.
2) Day, time, place and
circumstances when he last saw or
communicated with the SUBJECT:
3) Frequency of contact between
him and the SUBJECT:
1) professional contact
2) social contact
4) Any length of time over 30
days when he did not have
contact with the SUBJECT:
5) Number of times and
frequency of contact since he saw
the SUBJECT last and method of communication.
j. Ask the Source questions to determine his
knowledge of the
following regarding the SUBJECT:
1) Date of birth
2) Place of birth
3)
Use of nicknames
4) Military units to which he
belonged (if applicable).
5) Residences
6) Education (where did he
study and to what level).
7) Civilian employment
8) Family
9) Hobbies/interests
10) Partners/business associates
k. Questions asked to obtain the Source's
opinion regarding:
1) The honesty of the SUBJECT
2)
The confidence on the SUBJECT.
3) Can de SUBJECT be depended
on?
4) Maturity of the SUBJECT
5) Morality of the SUBJECT
6) Mental and emotional
stability of the SUBJECT.
l. as the Source if he has knowledge of any
problem that the
SUBJECT might have had with police authorities.
m. Ask the Source if he has knowledge of:
1) whether the SUBJECT uses or
has used illegal drugs
2) whether the SUBJECT abuses prescription
drugs
3) whether the SUBJECT has the
habit of gambling.
4) The financial stability of
the SUBJECT.
5) Use or abuse of alcoholic
beverages
6) If he is member, goes to meetings or
support any
organization that intents to overthrow the national
government.
96
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
7) If he is a member, or
support any organization that
tries to deny civil rights to a person or group of persons.
8) What is the professional
reputation of the SUBJECT.
9) Whether the SUBJECT has made
previous trips or long
trips abroad.
10) Social reputation
11) Relatives living abroad
12) Business contacts in foreign
countries.
n. Ask the Source if the SUBJECT is loyal to
the government.
o. As the Source if he would recommend the
SUBJECT for any
position of confidence and responsibility with the national
government.
p. THE SOURCE SHOULD BE ASKED TO PREPARE A
SIGNED, SWORN
STATEMENT; .sworn statements are required when:
1) The source does not
recommend the SUBJECT for a
confidence position.
2) The source gives negative or
derogatory information on
the SUBJECT.
3) The information given by the
Source does not conform
with the negative information previously received.
q. Obtain leads (additional contacts).
Determine whether the
Source knows other persons that know the SUBJECT and his
activities.
r. Determine whether the Source wishes his name
to arise as
provider of this information in case the SUBJECT requests
it.
s. End the interview.
1) The Source has to be
reminded that none of the
contents of the Interview should be commented with anybody
else.
2) Thank the Source for his
cooperation and bid good-by.
4. Prepare the required reports.
Back to Top 97
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 10
HOW
TO OBTAIN A SWORN DECLARATION
INTRODUCTION:
During its
functions as a Counter Intelligence Special Agent you must
get a sworn declaration from the persons whom you have
interviewed. These
sworn declarations will help you determine the truth of the
persons
interviewed as well as recognizing if the information that
they have given has
any connection with your investigations.
DEVELOPMENT:
A. Definition of a Sworn Declaration:
A Sworn
Declaration is a written statement about facts, given
voluntarily by a competent person who is a witness, who
states under oath that
the content of the statement is true.
B.
The Sworn Declarations must be obtained from the following
categories of interviews:
1. Witnesses with direct or personal knowledge
of the incident.
2. Sources who provide credible unfavorable
information. Credible
unfavorable information is defined as: Information related
to loyalty and
attitude of a person, who appears to be honest, and so who
could make a
probable base to take adverse action.
e. The sources who refuse credible unfavorable
information.
Information that has been refused its defined as: That
information that was
refused (without validity).
4. SUBJECTS of an interview.
5. Suspicious persons who are citizens of the
country.
6. Persons who have been accused and that are
not citizens of the
country.
C. You may obtain this information during the
interviews using the
interrogation basic techniques in an efficient way.
98
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. The next four blocks will note the complete
information about a
person who is making a sworn declaration. The following
information is
included in block E.
a. Complete name of the person
b. Personal identity number
c. Grade or civil rank
d. Military unit or civil residence
F. You must aid the interviewee to write a
declaration using one of
the following methods:
1. Narrative method
a. The narrative method allows the interviewee
making a declaration
to write the information in his own words. This method is
normally used when
preparing the declarations of Sources, Witnesses, or
Unscheduled persons.
b. The Sworn Declarations made by a source
must have a summary
declaration explaining the social degree or professional
association between
the source and the subject. This must have the facts and
circumstances of the
facts that support or contradict the unfavorable credible
information and
answer all the basic interrogations.
2. Question and Answer Method
a. When you are preparing a sworn declaration
for a subject, accused
or suspicious person use the question and answer method so
as to ensure the
verbal file in the interview. The question and answer method
has both
questions that you make and answers from the interviewee.
This method allows
you to limit to just the information contained in the
declaration that is
pertinent.
b. The sworn declarations made by a subject,
source or accused
persons must contain, in addition to the facts and
circumstance the following
information:
99
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
1. An explanation of the purpose of the
interview.
2. A declaration of recognition of the
provisions of privacy
according with the national government and these provisions
must be explained.
3. A declaration of recognition that the
SUBJECT was advised of his
constitutional rights and that he denied these rights in
writing noted in the
certified text of the SWORN DECLARATION/LEGAL RIGHTS/USE OF
A LAWYER.
4. A petition to have an interview under oath
and the answer.
5. A complete personal identification of the
interviewee.
6. A final question to find out if the
interviewee wishes to add or
change the declaration.
3. A combination of the two methods mentioned
above normally provides
the best result. The person interviewed is allowed to
express himself and
afterwards you may use the method of questions and answers
to obtain specific
information that has been omitted previously. This method
also allows you to
clarify the areas where the interviewee has not been clear
in the declaration.
G. All sworn declarations will be written in
first person. The
vocabulary and the grammar of the interviewee must be used
during the entire
process, including vulgarities if they are pertinent or
provided as part of
the actual interviewee's appointment. Expressions written in
parenthesis,
abbreviations, facts in military style and investigative
jargon or the use of
capital letters only used by the counter intelligence agents
must not be used.
H. Use additional pages to complete the body
of the declaration. The
additional pages are used when the sworn declaration does
not fit in the
second page of the document.
I. When typing the sworn declaration, write
the declaration as close
as possible to the margins of the document, or write a line
towards the margin
when the declaration or sentence does not reach the margin.
100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
J. At the end of the sentence of the sworn
declaration, include the
phrase, "Declaration Finished".
K. In a sworn declaration that has been
typewritten, have the
interviewee put his initials at the beginning of the first
sentence and in the
last sentence of each page, as well as putting his initials
on the side of any
correction or errors. The sworn declarations made in
handwriting do not need
the initials unless there are corrections. Corrections made
to the sworn
declarations must be done in ink and ball point pen
preferably in black ink,
but keep in mind that the interviewee must put his initials
next to the
corrections.
L. Complete the section under the page
including the number of the
page and the total of pages (page from page) and then you
must make the person
making the declaration put his initials in the upper part of
each page in
block F.
M. Complete the section of the declaration
writing down the name of
the interviewee in blank sections in block H.
N. Make the interviewee read the sworn
declaration and make sure that
he understands it.
0. Make the interviewee repeat the oral oath.
If the interviewee does
not wish to take the oath, you must not try to persuade him
to change his
mind. But, you must explain that a declaration that is not
under oath could be
used as evidence as well as you must explain that the
meaning of the oath, and
the penalties for submitting a false declaration.
P. Make the interviewee to sign the sworn
declaration. If the
interviewee took the oral oath but does not wish to sign the
sworn
declaration, do not try to change his mind. Explain to him
that the oral oath
and not his signature is what makes this document a sworn
declaration and that
such document will be sent to the appropriate destination.
Allow him the
opportunity of making any changes to his first declaration.
But, never destroy
the original declaration.
Q. Write down the place and the date where the
oral oath was obtained
in block J.
R. Sign the document in block K, and typewrite
the complete name of
the counter intelligence agent in block L.
101
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
S. Write down the authority that the counter
intelligence agent has
in block M.
T. Make the witness (if it applies) sign the
sworn declaration. The
witness signs the sworn declaration affirming that the
interviewee understands
the content of the sworn declaration and that the
interviewee signed such
declaration in your presence. THE WITNESS DOES NOT HAVE TO
BE PRESENT DURING
THE INTERVIEW, ONLY ONE WITNESS IS REQUIRED DURING A SWORN
DECLARATION, UNLESS
THE INTERVIEWEE WISHES A WITNESS TO BE PRESENT DURING THE
INTERVIEW.
U. If the interviewee wishes a copy of the
sworn declaration provide
him with a copy under the conditions that the sworn
declaration is not
classified.
NOTE: If the sworn
declaration is classified make sure that it is classified
according to the SOP.
V. Complete the appropriate reports, write
down and add all the
details.
NOTE: When a sworn
declaration is taken from a person that does not speak the
national language, copies of the declaration must be
prepared in the language
spoken by the person. If necessary, use an interpreter for
this purpose. Both
declarations must have a statement indicating that the
content of the
declaration is complete and without errors. The person who
transfers the
document must sign the declaration and indicate that he is
competent. The
counter intelligence agent must supply the oath to the
interpreter before the
interpreter signs the declaration.
Back to Top 102
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 11
UNSCHEDULED INTERVIEWS
INTRODUCTION:
Frequently you
will find an interview in which the person comes to the
counter intelligence office to give information. This
interview is not
prepared beforehand, but it must be professional at the
moment it takes place.
GENERAL FACTS:
1. Once the person comes into the office you
must:
a. Be courteous and professional.
b. Show your official badge (credentials).
c. Obtain any personal identification.
NOTE: GAIN THE
PERSON'S CONFIDENCE AND BE NICE AND ALERT. THE EFFORT
TO WIN
THE PERSON'S CONFIDENCE MUST COME FROM THE MOMENT THE PERSON
ENTERS AND
CONTINUE THROUGH THE INTERVIEW.
d. Determine the purpose of the source's
visit.
1. Definition of an unscheduled interview
An unscheduled
interview is that in which the person comes voluntarily
to the Counter Intelligence office and offers information
that he thinks has
value to the military intelligence. Frequently the person
has some personal
interest (money) in giving this information to the Counter
Intelligence.
2. Some persons that fall within this category
(unscheduled
interviews) are:
a. Native persons (residents of the same area
where the incident
occurred).
b. Deserters
c. Refugees or displaced persons
d. Tourists and other persons visiting the
area.
103
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. Participants in international conferences.
f. Enemy agents under low rank, or importance.
g. Persons who are only a nuisance to military
intelligence. That is
those who give constant information that is useless to the
CI.
2.
Once the person has come to your office start a Review of Files
(the review is done normally when a person is busy and this
review is done
normally by his assistant):
a. Determine if the name of the person appears
in the list of persons
that are only nuisances to the CI.
b. Determine if the National Police, Military
or Treasury has a file
about this person.
3. If the review of the files indicate that
the person is a nuisance
to military intelligence:
a. Thank the person for his information.
b. Close the interview and walk out the
person, be polite when doing
it.
4. If the review of files does not indicate
anything negative
regarding the person, continue with the interview.
5. Once the assistant gives you the results of
the review of files
you may carry on with the interview:
a. Ask the person permission to use a tape
recorder during the
interview. Explain to the person that this will help you
prepare the report
for this interview, and obtain all the information that he
brings without
making mistakes.
b. Turn on the tape recorder only if the
person allows you to.
c. Take the oath of truth from the person
(Example: You pledge or
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth). The oath
of truth must be taken standing up (if applicable) and with
the right hand
raised (if applicable).
104
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. Ask the person to tell you the whole
incident, or whatever
information he has.
1. Encourage the person to give you
information in his own words.
2. Listen carefully and take mental notes of
the areas of interest
from the information given by the person.
3. Don't take written notes while the person
is telling you the
incident.
4. Don't interrupt the person.
NOTE: IF THE PERSON
GOES OFF THE SUBJECT, TACTFULLY LEAD HIM TO THE
MAIN
THEME.
e. Go over the story the person has given you:
1. Assure the person that the information he
brought will be kept in
strict confidentiality.
2. Go over the story the person has given you
covering all the points
of emphasis and to clarify all discrepancies or
contradictions.
3. Write down all leads that come up.
f. Obtain information from person's history to
help in the evaluation
of the information. This information of history must
include:
1. Identity (complete name, rank, and personal
identity number.)
2. Date and place of birth
3. Citizenship
4. Present and past addresses
5. Occupation
6. What motivation he had to come to report
the information
g. Develop the secondary information:
Frequently the story and
history of the Source indicate that it is possible that he
would have
additional information of interest to military intelligence.
105
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: IF DURING THE
INTERVIEW, THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS NOT
WITHIN
JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PUT THE SOURCE IN
CONTACT
WITH THE
AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT THAT COULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH
INFORMATION. IF THE
SOURCE DOES NOT WISH TO TALK TO ANYONE ELSE, MAKE NOTE OF
THE
INFORMATION AND
PASS IT ON TO THE INTERESTED AGENCY.
h. Obtain a sworn declaration, signed by the
source.
i. Explain to the person the official nature
of the interview and
caution him not to talk with anyone about what happened
during the interview.
6. Close the interview:
a. Advise the Source that it is possible that
he may me interviewed
again. Determine if he is willing to participate in another
interview.
b. Make arrangements for the new contact.
c. Close the interview in a nice manner.
d. Walk with the Source to exit the office.
7. Prepare the reports/necessary reports.
Back to Top 106
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
CHAPTER 12
WITNESS INTERVIEW
INTRODUCTION:
Interviewing the
witnesses of an incident offers the CI agent the
opportunity of verifying information that is provided by
another source. It
helps us clarify doubts that we may have about the truth of
the information
collected.
GENERAL FACTS:
1. DETERMINE THE NEED TO HAVE A WITNESS
INTERVIEW:
a. You must answer the incidents/activities
and interview all the
existing witnesses, who were in the area where the incident
occurred.
b. You must answer the tasks that are
presented by the preliminary
sheet.
2. You must determine if the witness had
personal knowledge of the
incident.
3. Plan to carry
out the interview in a quiet place, free of
interruptions.
4. Identify yourself to the witness and show
the Official badge.
5. Identify the witness examining his badge
and any other identity
card that he may have.
6. Try to win his trust and make him feel
secure.
7. ASK PERMISSION FROM THE WITNESS TO USE A
TAPE RECORDER DURING
THE
INTERVIEW. EXPLAIN THAT THE TAPE RECORDER WILL HELP YOU TO
COMPLETE
THE
REPORTS MORE ADEQUATELY.
8. Turn on the tape recorder if the witness
allows you.
9. Ask the witness to tell you his story.
107
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Take general (mental) notes about the
information brought by the
witness.
b. Take detailed notes of the unclear or
doubtful areas to develop
them later in more fully.
10. GO OVER THE STORY WITH THE WITNESS:
a. Discuss the story with the source in
detail, covering all
outstanding points.
b. Ask questions in detail (use the basic
interrogations) about
specific areas that you noted while the witness told the
story.
c. Clarify any doubtful area
d. Take detailed notes.
e. Use drawings, sketches, charts as
supplements if these may help to
clarify any information, or to interpret the incident as it
happened.
11. OBTAIN ADDITIONAL LEADS:
a. Determine if the witness knows any other
person that might have
knowledge of the same incident. Obtain names, addresses, if
possible,
telephone number of these persons.
b. Determine if the witness know any other
person or persons that
were present in the area of the incident and get a complete
description of
these persons.
12. OBTAIN A SWORN DECLARATION, SIGNED BY THE
WITNESS.
13. ASSURE THE WITNESS THAT THE INFORMATION THAT
HE HAS BROUGHT
WILL
BE KEPT IN STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THAT HE WILL NOT
DISCUSS IT WITH
ANYONE
ELSE.
14. MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANOTHER CONTACT OR
INTERVIEW IN THE
FUTURE
WITH THE WITNESS.
a. Advise the witness that you may need to
contact him again.
b. Obtain address and telephone number of the
witness and determine
where you may be in contact with him if you cannot find him
at home.
108
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Determine if there is any hour in which the
witness may not be
available for an interview.
15. CLOSE THE INTERVIEW:
a. Explain to the witness that the interview
that was just over is
considered as an official matter of the government and that
he must not
discuss it with anyone.
b. Bid the witness goodbye.
16. MAKE THE Review OF FILES.
17. WRITE THE NECESSARY REPORTS.
Back to Top 109
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 13 LN324-91
PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH THE SUBJECT
INTRODUCTION:
An interview of the
SUBJECT takes place after having completed an
history investigation. The office of personal security
provides us a
preliminary sheet (see example #1), which indicates the
purpose of the
interview, the type of interview or investigation that is
taking place, leads
we must follow or develop, history information of the
SUBJECT (person to be
interviewed), and other special instructions.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. The first thing we must do upon receiving
the preliminary sheet is
to read it and study it carefully.
The following is
the order in which we must carry out the preparation
and how to conduct the interview of the SUBJECT:
1. Determine if the information in the
preliminary sheet is a valid
requirement. To do that, we must:
a. Verify if the preliminary sheet has a
pardon date.
b. Look up in the sheet, the identification of
the unit that sent the
same, the name of the person who signed it and if such
person is authorized.
2. Identify the requirements of the interview:
a. Determine what type of interview will take
place.
[page missing in original document]
110
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. Use or abuse of drugs.
f. Abnormal sexual contact.
g. Criminal behavior.
h. Hostage situation.
i. Security matters.
c. Subject interview, in complaint style:
1. This type of interview allows the person to
deny, tone down or
explain any accusation or allegation against him.
2. These interviews take place to respond to
the requirements of the
preliminary sheet.
3. These interviews are required when
information is obtained that
the SUBJECT participates in, or is in a position which he is
exposed to
blackmail or coercion to participate in:
a. Sabotage
b. Espionage
c. Treason
d. Insurrection
e. Subversive activities
3. Review the personal file of the SUBJECT to
identify areas or
affairs that will develop during the interview.
4. Develop questions that will be used during
the interview:
a. EIA/ES [missing translation): For these
interviews use the
subject's HP [missing translation] and obtain the areas
(affairs) to be
develop during the interview.
b. Interviews about specific affairs/and
complaints: Use the
preliminary sheet and the subject's file to develop the
questions that could
fulfill the requirements.
c. Use the basic interrogative words: who,
what, when, why, where,
and how. Make sure that all areas of interest are exploited.
111
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. Make arrangements for the interview:
a. Call the SUBJECT to arrange a date.
b. Try to find someone that could act as
witness during the
interview, if necessary.
6. Select and prepare the interview place:
a. Select a room that provides privacy and
eliminates distractions
during the interview.
b. Select a room that allows the interviewer
to control the physical
environment.
c. Select a room where you could keep a nice
temperature during the
interview.
d. Arrange the furniture in the room. The
furniture must be just a
small table, and three chairs.
e. Select a room that does not have a
telephone and if it does, lift
the receiver
f. Install and test recording equipment.
7. Greet and Identify the SUBJECT:
a. Greet the SUBJECT in a professional manner
and try to win his
trust.
b. Identify the SUBJECT orally and take him to
the interview room.
8. During the interview:
a. Verify the SUBJECT'S identity examining his
identification card.
b. Identify yourself and your position as
representative of military
intelligence.
c. If the SUBJECT is of the opposite sex,
determine if he/she wishes
to have a witness of the same sex present during the
interview.
NOTE: IF THE SUBJECT IS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX YOU MAY
ADVISE THAT A
WITNESS OF THE SAME SEX MAY BE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.
112
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. If the SUBJECT is of the opposite sex and
wishes to have a witness
of the same sex present during the interview we must do the
following:
1. Call the witness
2. Introduce the witness and the SUBJECT and
explain the
responsibility of the witness to the SUBJECT.
e. If the subject does not wish a witness,
write this in your Agent's
Report.
NOTE: EVEN THOUGH IT
IS NOT REALLY A REQUIREMENT TO HAVE A WITNESS OF THE
SAME SEX PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW, IT IS ADVISABLE TO
USE ONE, SINCE WE
PROTECT OURSELVES FROM BEING ACCUSED BY THE SUBJECT OF USING
ABUSE, COERCION
AND THREATS.
f. Inform the SUBJECT of the purpose of the
interview.
g. Ask the SUBJECT if he will allow to use a
tape recorder during the
interview. Explain that the tape recorder will help you in
preparing the final
report.
h. Turn on the tape recorder only if the
SUBJECT has given permission
to use it.
i. Advise the SUBJECT of the civil rights that
he has: (See example
#2)
1. Advise the SUBJECT of his civil rights
when:
a. A specific matter of complaint is the
subject of the interview.
b. At any time during the interview, the
SUBJECT says incriminating
things.
2. Make sure that the SUBJECT understands all
his rights.
NOTE: IF THE SUBJECT
DOES NOT UNDERSTAND HIS RIGHTS, DETERMINE WHAT HE DOES
NOT UNDERSTAND AND CLARIFY HIS DOUBTS.
113
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: YOU MUST NOT
INTERVIEW THE SUBJECT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE IF HE DOES
NOT UNDERSTAND HIS RIGHTS.
3. Ask the SUBJECT if he does not wish to
contact a lawyer.
a. If the SUBJECT wishes to talk with a
lawyer, do not continue the
interview until he has the opportunity to talk with his
lawyer.
b. If the SUBJECT does not have a lawyer,
obtain a sworn declaration
from the SUBJECT indicating that he wishes to continue the
interview.
NOTE: IF THE SUBJECT
DECLARES THAT HE DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE A LAWYER BUT THAT
HE DOES NOT WANT TO SIGN A SWORN DECLARATION, CONTINUE WITH
THE INTERVIEW AND
INDICATE THIS IN THE AGENTS REPORT.
c. After establishing if the SUBJECT wishes or
not to have a lawyer,
before starting to question, give the SUBJECT the oath to
truth. If the
SUBJECT refuses to swear ask him if he is willing to
continue with the
questions.
4. Inform the SUBJECT of the following privacy
rights in regards with
the interview:
a. The authority you have to carry out the
investigation and obtain
the information desired.
b. The main purpose of the obtaining such
information.
c. How you will use that information.
d. Why it is obligatory or voluntary to give
that information.
5. Have the SUBJECT sign a sworn declaration
or document that
indicates his understanding of these privacy rights in
regards with the
interview and the search for information.
114
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
j. Ask the SUBJECT about information
concerning history information.
k. Ask the SUBJECT about the matters under
investigation:
a. Use the questions developed during the
preparatory phase.
b. Use the control questions, non-pertinent,
repeated and follow-up
questions.
c. Examine carefully all the new areas
presented by the SUBJECT.
d. Follow a logical sequence of questions to
avoid overlooking
significant themes.
1. Concentrate in recognizing and interpreting
the non-verbal
communication of the subject.
a. Listen to how the SUBJECT talks. Audio
leads include changes in
tone, speed of the voice.
b. Be alert of visual leads, such as facial
expressions, body
position, hand, legs and head movement.
c. Interpret the subject's non-verbal leads
with the verbal leads to
obtain a clear idea of the real message.
NOTE: EXPLOIT ALL THE
DISCREPANCIES IN THE SUBJECT'S ANSWERS UNTIL EVERYTHING
IS CLEARED UP.
d. Use your own non-verbal communications to
gain and keep the
control during the entire interview.
m. Review the entire matter and affairs
discussed up to that point
during various intervals of an interview.
1. Identify the areas of interest that have
not been discussed.
2. Identify and bring up the inconsistencies
and discrepancies in his
answering to the SUBJECT .
115
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
n. Obtain a sworn declaration:
Make the SUBJECT
sign a sworn declaration with all the information he
brought during the interview.
o. Close the interview. The interview could
end by any of the
following reasons:
1. The SUBJECT is sick and requires medical
attention.
2. You need more interviews to cover all the
areas of interest.
3. The SUBJECT refuses to cooperate with you.
4. All the requirements have been met and the
SUBJECT has answered
all the questions.
5. You lost the initiative and decide to
postpone the interview.
p. Use the closing phase to obtain facts that
perhaps were not able
to discuss during the interview. The SUBJECT perhaps will
calm down more when
you end the questioning and turn of f the tape recorder or
put your notebook
away. It is possible that he could bring additional
information if he believes
that you are not going to record or write down.
8. Say goodbye to the SUBJECT.
9. Prepare the reports/corresponding reports
necessary.
116
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #1
PRELIMINARY SHEET FOR SUBJECT INTERVIEW
__________________________________________________________________________
PRELIMINARY SHEET
DATE/START OF THE INVESTIGATION
__________________________________________________________________________
1. Subject 2. Date
Name:
Rank,
personal identity number:3. Control number
__________________________________________________________________________
4. Type and purpose
of investigation:
5. Leads to be
verified:
6. PAST HISTORY INFORMATION:
7. SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:
________________________________________________________7.
Agency
requesting investigation|Agency preparing investigation
__________________________________________________________________________
OFFICE OFFICE
__________________________________________________________________________
ADDRESS ADDRESS
__________________________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION) SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION)
__________________________________________________________________________
NAME OF AUTHORIZED PERSON NAME OF AUTHORIZED PERSON
__________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSEDADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
__________________________________________________________________________
117
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE # 1 CONTINUED
PRELIMINARY SHEET FOR SUBJECT INTERVIEW
____________________________________________________________PRELIMINARY
SHEET
DATE/START OF INVESTIGATION
____________________________________________________________
1. SUBJECT 2. DATE: May
15, 1988
QUINTANILLA, Roberto
A.
CPT, PPP-00-000
3. CONTROL NUMBER
Chalatenango, 10 Dec. 54
____________________________________________________________
4. TYPE AND PURPOSE
OF INVESTIGATION:
INVESTIGATION TO
DETERMINE IF THE PERSON IS STILL SUITABLE TO HAVE
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. The SUBJECT at present is
assigned to the
4th Infantry Brigade and has access to classified
information up to the level
SECRET.
5. LEADS TO BE
VERIFIED:
Interview Mr.
Quintanilla to give him the opportunity to deny, mitigate,
or explain the negative information that was obtained during
the present
investigation.
6. INFORMATION ABOUT
PAST HISTORY:
(See the
SUBJECT'S personal history)
7. SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:
a. Determine the circumstances of subject's
arrest by the National
Police on 9 April 1980, for driving a vehicle while
intoxicated.
b. Determine the financial stability of the
SUBJECT.
c. Determine how much he participates in
extramarital relationships.
d. Determine if the SUBJECT has used, owned,
or traffic illegal drugs
including marihuana and hashish.
e. Determine his present and past use of
alcoholic beverages.
f. Determine the SUBJECT'S mental and
emotional stability.
g. Inform the SUBJECT of his legal rights.
h.
Carry out the interview under the SUBJECT'S oath.
i. Send a copy of the interview report to our
offices not later than
30 May 1988.
118
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
_______________________________________________________7.Agency
requesting investigation|Agency preparing investigation
______________________________________________________________________
OFFICE OFFICE
_______________________________________________________
ADDRESS ADDRESS
_______________________________________________________
SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION) SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION)
_______________________________________________________
NAME OF AUTHORIZED PERSON NAME OF AUTHORIZED PERSON
_______________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSEDADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
119
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #2
HOW TO
INFORM THE SUBJECT OF HIS LEGAL RIGHTS
NOTE:THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF A SUBJECT ARE INFORMED IN THE
FOLLOWING
MANNER:
1. "BEFORE
STARTING TO MAKE QUESTION, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND HIS LEGAL
RIGHTS".
a. "You are not under obligation to
answer my questions or anything
else".
b. "Anything you say or do could be used
against you in a court or
criminal court of law".
c. "You have the right to talk privately
with a lawyer before, during
and after an interview. You also have the right to have a
lawyer present
during the interview. Although you will have to make your
own arrangements to
obtain a lawyer, and this will not be at any cost to the
national government.
d. "If you decide to discuss the charges
under investigation, with or
without a lawyer present, you have the right to finish the
interview at any
time, or to take privately with your lawyer before
continuing to answer,
unless you sign a sworn statement testifying that you do not
wish a lawyer".
120
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #3
SWORN
STATEMENT/LEGAL RIGHTS/USE OF LAWYER
_____________________________________________________________PLACE
OF
INTERVIEW
DATE TIME FILE NO.
_____________________________________________________________
NAME
UNIT OR ADDRESS
_____________________________________________________________
IDENTITY NUMBER RANK
_____________________________________________________________
THE INVESTIGATOR
WHOSE NAME APPEARS IN THIS DECLARATION INFORMED ME THAT
HE WORKS IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EL
SALVADOR AND
WANTED TO QUESTION ME ABOUT THE FOLLOWING
ACCUSATIONS/OFFENSES TO WHICH I AM
ACCUSED OR
SUSPECT:__________________________________________________
BEFORE STARTING TO QUESTION ME ABOUT THE OFFENSES, HE
INFORMED ME THAT I HAVE
THE FOLLOWING LEGAL RIGHTS:
1. I DO NOT HAVE TO
ANSWER OR SAY ANYTHING
2. EVERYTHING I SAY
COULD BE USED AGAINST ME IN A COURT OF LAW.
3. I HAVE THE RIGHT
TO SPEAK PRIVATELY TO A LAWYER BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER
THE INTERVIEW AND TO HAVE A LAWYER PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.
NEVERTHELESS
I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I DESIRE A LAWYER PRESENT I HAVE TO
PROCURE HIM AND PAY
HIM ON MY OWN. THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PAY THE EXPENSES.
4. IF I AM NOW
WILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS UNDER INVESTIGATION, WITH OR
WITHOUT A LAWYER PRESENT, I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO
ANSWER QUESTIONS OR TO
SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH A LAWYER, EVEN WHEN I HAVE DECIDED NOT
TO USE A LAWYER
COMMENTS:
_______________________________________________________________________
I UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS MENTIONED ABOVE. I AM WILLING TO
DISCUSS THE OFFENSES
UNDER INVESTIGATION AND TO MAKE A DECLARATION WITHOUT
SPEAKING TO A LAWYER
BEFORE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF A LAWYER DURING THE
INTERVIEW.
___________________
WITNESSES SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
(SUBJECT)
1. NAME:
___________________________________
2. UNIT: SIGNATURE OF AGENT
(INTERVIEWER)
1. NAME:
___________________________________
2. UNIT: SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
___________________________________
INVESTIGATOR'S
UNIT
___________________________________________________________________
I DO NOT WISH TO RELINQUISH MY LEGAL RIGHTS:
_______ WISH TO HAVE
_______DO NOT WITH TO BE INTERVIEWED
A LAWYER.
NOR TO ANSWER ANYTHING.
Back to Top 121
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 14
LN324-91
INTRODUCTION TO SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE AGAINST
THE ARMED FORCES (SEAAF)
INTRODUCTION:
The knowledge
about subversion and espionage against the Armed Forces
(SEAAF) has a very important role for counter intelligence
agents. The counter
intelligence agent must recognize the weaknesses generally
sought by a hostile
agent and use these weaknesses to get valuable information
about the Armed
Forces. When the espionage agent of the counter intelligence
does not identify
these weaknesses he has lost the first battle which is to
avoid the collection
of intelligence information. (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE).
GENERAL FACTS:
a. The term "SEAAF" means subversion
and espionage against the Armed
Forces. A SEAAF incident or a contact is an effort by a
foreign intelligence
agent to get information, classified or non-classified,
using you as the
source to obtain the information.
b. First we must have knowledge of the two key
SEAAF words which are
espionage and subversion.
1. Espionage. Generally, espionage is the act
to obtain, give,
transmit, communicate or receive information regarding the
national defense
with the intent or purpose to believe that this information
will be used to
harm the national government and to the benefit or advantage
of the foreign
country. Likewise we must keep in mind the following when we
talk about
espionage terms:
a. Any person or persons in legal, illegal
possession, access or
control over or he is receiving information regarding the
national defense
which the person in possession believes such information
could be used to harm
the national defense and to the benefit or advantage of a
foreign country,
voluntarily communicates, transmits, or intents to
communicate or transmit
such information to any non-authorized person, is guilty of
the act of
espionage.
122
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Any person or persons in charge of having
legal possession and
control over national defense information who by their own
negligence allows
the same to be lost, stolen, misplaced, destroyed, or
removed from the
safekeeping place or gives such information in violation of
faith, trust, and
responsibility, is guilty of an espionage act.
2. Subversion. Generally, the elements of
subversion are:
(a) Actively induce the military and civilian
personnel of the defense
forces to violate laws, disobey legal orders or rules and
behavior regulations
or to interrupt military activities.
NOTE: "To
actively induce" is defined as advising, alerting or requesting in
any manner that causes or intents to cause the acts
mentioned above. This
includes the distribution or intent to distribute the
written material that
alerts, advises, or requests.
(b) The voluntary intent to intercept, or
diminish the loyalty, moral
or discipline of the defense forces.
(c) The subversion acts occur during war time or
during peace time.
(d) The subversion includes all the voluntary
acts with the intent to
harm the interest of the national government and that do not
fit the
categories of treason, insurrection, sabotage or espionage.
c. Having knowledge of the two SEAAF key
words, we must recognize
also the importance of the insurrection acts.
1. Insurrection. There are four types of
specific activities which
are taken place with the intention of overthrowing the
government through
force or violence are acts of insurrection. These four types
are:
(a) Training about the need to overthrow the
government.
123
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(b) The publication, sale or distribution of
written material plotting
or training to overthrow a government.
(c) Organizing a society or group with the
purpose of plotting or
training to overthrow a government.
(d) Members or initiation members or affiliation
with this type of
society knowing the purpose of such organization.
d. An agent looks for weaknesses to trap, to
see if you could be
convinced, bribed, threatened, or trapped in a difficult or
embarrassing
situation so to make you work for him. He must realize some
general weaknesses
looked for by an agent. These are:
(1) Doubts, financial problems and bad credit.
(2) A criminal file or present criminal
activities.
(3) Homosexuality.
(4) Immoral behavior, past or present.
(5) Abuse of drugs or alcohol.
(6) Marriage infidelity.
(7) Routinely boasts and brags.
(8) Mentally or emotionally unstable.
(9) Going with persons of weak character.
(10) Relatives or foreign friends.
e. SEAAF/SAEDA incidents and situations you
must report:
124
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(1) Intents of
non-authorized personnel to obtain classified or non-
classified information about the facilities, activities,
personnel or materiel
of the armed forces using questioning techniques, seduction,
threats, bribe or
trapping a person in an embarrassing or difficult situation
by personal
contact, direct or indirect or by correspondence.
(2) Intent of
non-authorized personnel to obtain classified or non-
classified information by photography, observation,
collection of material or
documents or any other means.
(3) Intent by known persons, suspicious persons
or with possible
foreign intelligence history or associations. Intent to
establish any type of
friendship, association or business relationship.
(4) Every
incident where members of the defense forces, his relatives,
travel by or to a foreign area of special consideration
(figure 1) who are
exposed to:
(a) Questioning regarding their work.
(b) Provide military information.
(c) Bribe, threats or trapped in a difficult or
embarrassing situation
of any type so as to cooperate with the foreign intelligence
services.
(5) Incidents known, suspicious, or possible
acts of espionage that
result or resulted in danger to documents, information or
classified material.
(6) Other acts by members of the armed forces to
involve, intent or
consider the communication of classified information,
documents or material to
a non-authorized person.
(7) Non-official contact by members of the
defense force with:
a. Personnel they know or suspect are members
of a security service
or foreign intelligence.
125
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Foreign political or military organization.
c. Any member of the countries mentioned in
figure #1.
(8) Official contact with personnel mentioned in
paragraph #7 when
these persons:
a. Show knowledge or curiosity about members
of the defense forces.
b. Intent to obtain classified or
non-classified information from a
member of the defense forces.
c. Intent to establish any type of friendship
or business
relationship with members of the defense forces outside the
official tasks of
the defense forces.
(9) Information regarding with international
terrorism plans which
present a direct threat to personnel, activities, facilities
or material.
(10) Known acts or suspicious acts to harm or
destroy property of the
armed forces by sabotage acts.
f. What you must do if you suspect to have
come in contact or someone
made contact to obtain information:
(1) Do not deny or accept to cooperate. Ask for
some time to think
about the proposition.
(2) Remember the person's details. Try to
remember things as the
description of the person, the place and circumstances of
the meeting,
identification or description of the vehicle.
NOTE: Do not try to
ask the suspect for more information or suggest another
meeting in the future. This, may surprise the agent.
(3) Report the contact to the counter
intelligence agency. If you
cannot contact them, contact the S2 or an intelligence
official and tell them
about the details of the contact. If you are travelling to
another country or
abroad, report the contact to the closest consulate of your
country or to the
office of the Defense (military) Attache.
126
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(4) Do not investigate the matter by your own
efforts. Let the
investigation up to the qualified counter intelligence
agents. Do not tell the
contact events to anyone except the departments mentioned
above.
Figure 1
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION
Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Republic
of China and its adjacent islands
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
German
Democratic Republic (Communist Germany)
Hungary
Iran
Iraq
Laos
Lebanon
Arab Republic of Libya
North
Korea and adjacent demilitarized zones
Nicaragua
Republic of Mongolia
Poland
Democratic Republic of Yemen
Romania
Soviet Sector of Berlin
Syria
Soviet Union
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Back to Top
127
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 15 LN324-91
INSURRECTION AND ESPIONAGE INTERVIEWS AGAINST
THE ARMED FORCES (SEAAF)
INTRODUCTION:
In criminal
cases, the identity and the capture of the person is the
main objective. In espionage cases the identity of the
person is only the
first step. The most important thing is the knowledge of his
contacts,
objectives, information sources and communication methods.
The capture and
public news of the incident must be the last resource used
by the counter
intelligence agencies. It is better to identify these
persons, what they are
doing, and stop the movement of their efforts than to expose
them to the
public and then try to find out who are their successors.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Receiving the source.
1. The counter intelligence agent must be
professional and courteous
with the source.
2. Identify yourself and show your badge.
3. Obtain identification facts about the
source.
NOTE: Establish
harmony, be friendly and alert, this will help the source to
feel confident. Once the harmony has been established with
the source, you
must be able to hold this confidence during the interview.
4. Determine the purpose and intention of the
source.
a. An unscheduled source is a person who comes
to a counter
intelligence agency to offer information he believes is of
interest to
military intelligence.
b. The information the source provides must
fall within the
intentions of SEAAF.
5. Once you obtain the identify data from the
source you must start
the review of files to:
128
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Determine if the source appears in the
nuisance files.
b. Determine if the Military Police or other
agencies have
information about the source.
6. If the review of files reveal that the
source is in the nuisance
files you must:
a. Thank the source for the information.
b. Close the interview and say goodbye to the
source.
7. If the files do not have information about
the source, continue
the interview.
B. Carry out the interview.
1. First ask permission to the source to use a
tape recorder to
record the content of the interview. Explain that the tape
recorder will help
you to prepare the final report as a verbal transcription
which the source
will have the opportunity to review, correct and sign.
2. Turn on the tape recorder "only"
if the source agrees to let you
use it.
3. Give the source the oath of truth.
4. Have the source tell you the incident.
a. Encourage the source to tell you the incident
in their own words.
b. Be alert and listen to the source and take
mental notes of
important points to explore these points during the review
of the incident
with the source.
c. DO NOT write notes while the story of the
incident is told.
d. DO NOT interrupt the source while telling
the incident.
NOTE: If the source
goes of f the incident theme he is telling, tactfully
make the source return to the main theme.
129
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: If during the interview the source tells you
information outside your
jurisdiction, ask the source to go to the appropriate
agency. If the source
does not wish to go to that agency, continue the interview
and collect the
information and send it to the proper agency.
C. Carrying out the review of the incident.
1. Assure the source that the information will
be kept in strict
confidentiality.
2.
Review the incident with the source point by point to clarify
discrepancies, contradictions, and holes in the information.
3. Write with precision the additional
sources.
D. Obtain history information about the source
to help you evaluate
the information of the source. The history information must
include:
1. Identify
2. Date and place of birth
3. Citizenship
4. Addresses (past and present)
5. Occupation
6. Reasons that motivated the source to
provide information
E. Develop secondary information. Frequently
the information and the
source's history could indicate that he could have more
significant
information and it could be of value or interest to military
intelligence.
F. Obtain a sworn declaration.
G. Advice the source that the interview has an
official nature and
that he must not tell about the incident or nature of the
incident to any
other person.
130
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
H. Closing the interview.
1. Notify the source that the investigation
could require a
subsequent interview and new contacts with him.
2. Make arrangements to have new contact with
the source.
3. Again notify the source about the official
nature of the
interview.
4. Close the interview in a friendly note.
5. Exit or say goodbye to the source.
I. Start the evaluation of the incident to
make sure that it is in
your jurisdiction.
J. Prepare the appropriate reports.
1. Prepare an initial report for SEAAF.
NOTE: Make an effort
to send a detailed complete report. If a detailed report
takes much time, submit an intermediate report with the
available information.
Afterwards submit the complete report.
2. Classify the SEAAF report according to the
Normal Operation
Procedures.
NOTE: All SEAAF
reports will receive limited distribution.
3. Write down the unit that will receive the
SEAAF report.
4. Write down the unit that sent the report.
5. Write down the instructions to send the
report.
NOTE: All the SEAAF
reports require one of the following sending
instructions: "Required Night Actions" or
"Hand during the first hours of the
day".
6. Complete paragraph A and 1-6 of the SEAAF
report.
131
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Write down the references in A.
b. Write down the date of the incident in
paragraph 1.
c. Write down the place of the incident in
paragraph 2.
d. Write down the following information from
all the involved persons
in paragraph 3:
1. Complete name (father's last name, mother's
last name, first name
and initial)
2. Date of birth
3. Place of birth
4. Identity card
5. Unit assignation
6. Position
7. Day when separated from the Armed Forces
8. Type of access to classified information
e. Write down in the subsequent paragraphs to
paragraph 3:
1. All the sources
2. All the witnesses
3. All persons who have knowledge about the
SEAAF incident.
NOTE: If there is
more than one person written down in any of the categories
mentioned above, write down as #1, #2, etc. (Example: Source
1, Source 2).
NOTE: If the data
identification from the witnesses or suspects are not
known, write down a physical description available.
132
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4. The description must include:
a. Age
b. Sex
c. Nationality/citizenship
d. Complexion
f. Height
g. Weight
i. Hair color
j. Eye color
k. Appearance
1. Physical built
m. Outstanding characteristics.
f. Write down in paragraph 4, a detailed
description of the incident
as described by the source(s). Start the paragraph with
details in regard to
as how the source came to the attention of your agency.
g. In paragraph 5, write down all actions
taken, such as review of
files or interviews.
NOTE: You will not
carry out more actions except as directed by a proper
higher agency.
h. In paragraph 8, write down any commentary
or pertinent
recommendation about the source, suspect or the incident.
K. If applicable prepare the Agent Report with
the appropriate
exhibits.
1. Send copy or the original and a copy
directly to the appropriate
higher agency.
2. Send copy of the information, when
instructed by the higher
investigation elements to the chain of command.
3. Do not do anything else, nor spread
information unless it is
addressed to the appropriate higher agency.
133
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
CLASSIFICATION
REPORT ABOUT INCIDENTS
____________________________________________________________________
PAGE______FROM_____
DATE AND TIME_______PRECEDENT_______________________
___________________________________________________
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SENDING:
(CLASSIFICATION)
TITLE OF REPORT:
REFERENCES:
1. ( )
DATE OF INCIDENT:
2. ( )
PLACE OF INCIDENT:
3. ( )
PERSON(S) INVOLVED:
A. ( )
SOURCE(S):
B. ( )
WITNESS(SES):
C. ( )
OTHERS WHO HAVE KNOWLEDGE:
D. ( )
SUSPECT(S):
4. ( )
NARRATION:
5. ( )
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN:
6. ( )
COMMENTARIES:
7. ( )
POINT OF CONTACT:
____________________________________________________________________NAME,
ORGANIZATION
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
AND TITLE OF ORIGINATOR
_____________________________________________________________
NAME, ORG., REVIEWER'S TITLE, TELEPHONE NUMBER
_____________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER
REVIEW DATE
_____________________________________________________________
134
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
CLASSIFICATION
135
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
( )
REPORT ABOUT INCIDENTS
____________________________________________________________________
PAGE______FROM______
DATE AND TIME__________PRECEDENT_______________
____________________________________________________________________
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
___________________________________________________________________NAME,
ORGANIZATION SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS
AND TITLE OF ORIGINATOR
_____________________________________________________________NAME,
ORG.,
REVIEWER'S TITLE, TELEPHONE NUMBER
_____________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER REVIEW DATE
_____________________________________________________________
( )
Back to Top 136
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 16 LN324-91
ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS
INTRODUCTION:
As counter
intelligence special agent you must have specific knowledge
of the aspects of an espionage investigation to get security
information for a
Commander of the Armed Forces responsible for the safety of
his command. You
as espionage agent must always have in mind that all
information must be
developed in detail, even though the information is
favorable or unfavorable
for the SUBJECT.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Preliminary Sheet (Figure 1).
1. Review the preliminary sheet (PS), found in
the control office for
the investigation requirements. The PS has specific leads or
leads that must
be investigated.
a. A PS has collected information during an
investigation and could:
(1) Require a development of more investigative
leads.
(2) Identify a source that will provide
additional information about
the case or leads about additional sources that could have
information.
b. Areas of interest in the PS are: (Figure 2)
(1) Block 1, SUBJECT: Contains information about
the identity of the
SUBJECT of the investigation.
(2) Block 4, TYPE AND REASON FOR THE
INVESTIGATION: Contains the
specific leads or the leads that must be developed. This
block also contains
information of history and special instructions that will
help the special
agent in the requirements to develop the leads.
137
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(c) SIGNATURE BLOCK: Make sure that each PS is
signed with the
signature of the official in charge of the case or
authorized person.
(d) BLOCK 8, CONVINCING DOCUMENTS: Identify all
convincing documents
that are not considered necessary to the development of the
required leads.
2. Review the initial report prepared by the
personnel of the Armed
Forces (AF) involved or who have knowledge of the incident
or situation.
NOTE: With the
exception of obtaining the initial details of the incident and
submitting the priority report, only elements of counter
intelligence are
authorized to investigate SEAAF cases without the approval
of the higher
department.
3. Start the espionage investigation when you
have the approval from
the higher control office, based on the leads originated
from various
information sources, including:
a. Reports from confidential sources.
b. Reports from other intelligence agencies,
security, or police
agencies or national guard.
c. OPSEC evaluations, CI technical inspections
or reviews.
d. The review of refugees, border crossers,
displaced persons, PGE
and other similar groups.
e. Routine security personnel investigations.
B. Identify the type of security investigation
that you will conduct.
1. Incident investigations
a. These are activities or specific actions.
b. Implications are suspected from acts of
espionage.
138
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. This case will be kept as Type of Incident
during the
investigation, although, the identity of the person implied
will be
established at a later date.
2.
The Personal SUBJECT investigations.
a. Imply one or more known person.
b. They originate allegations about the
specific activities of the
person.
c. This case will be kept as personal SUBJECT
investigation, although
information has developed about an act or specific activity.
3. Investigative jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction for the CI section
will take place according to the SOP laws.
C. Review of legal statutes which applied to
the espionage acts.
1.
Espionage - Is the act of obtaining, giving, transmitting,
communicating or receiving information regarding the
national defense with the
intention or reason to believe that the information is going
to be used to
harm a national government or for the benefit or advantage
of a foreign
country.
a. Any person or persons with legal or illegal
possession, access,
control over, has been given confidential information
regarding the national
defense, which the person in possession has reason to
believe the information
could be used to harm the national defense and for the
benefit or advantage of
a foreign country, voluntarily communicates, transmits, or
tries to
communicate, or transmit this information, to any person who
is not authorized
to receive it, is guilty of an espionage act.
b. Any person or persons in charge, or in
legal possession and
control over national defense information, who by negligence
allows the same
to be lost, stolen, displaced, destroyed, or removed from
the place of
safekeeping, or gives this information in violation of faith
and trust, is
guilty of a espionage act.
139
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
D. Review the operative methods (OM) of the
hostile intelligence
agents regarding the activities of the espionage acts.
1. Review the types of hostile operations.
a. Legal Operations. Involve espionage
networks which are controlled
by a representative from the foreign country who is official
charge and is
sanctioned by the host country. Frequently, the person
possibly has diplomatic
immunity, and is not subject to inspections, detentions, or
trials for ilegal
activities committed.
b. Ilegal Operations. Involve espionage
networks that are not in
direct contact or relations with the foreign country. Most
of these persons
are native of the country or of another country. Ilegal
operations are more
difficult to detect and have the advantage that the
operation is continued
during war time or in countries that do not have diplomatic
relations.
2. Review the control methods of the hostile
intelligence.
a. The centralized control procedures require
approval from the
central headquarters from all the espionage activities. Many
countries for
security reason regarding the espionage activities have a
central control
point.
b. The internal control method. Involve
operations conducted totally
within the host country. All hostile agents are controlled
by a general
headquarter or by a residence that has been established in
the same country.
This method is the most outstanding in the external method.
c. The external control method. Involve
operations conducted within
the host country controlled by another country. This is the
safest method to
control personnel.
3. Review the type of hostile agents used in a
hostile operation.
a. Penetrating Agents have direct access to
the information required
by the hostile country.
140
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Recruited agents in massive form are badly
trained and belong to
echelon of low category; these agents are infiltrated within
the country in
great numbers when there are favorable opportunities within
that country.
c. Confusion agents are used to deceive the
intelligence agencies to
waste their efforts in useless investigations.
d. Provoking agents are used to provoke the
intelligence agencies to
take inappropriate actions for their disadvantage.
e. Sleeping agents are kept inactive for a
long time until the
hostile country has a mission for them.
4. Review the espionage network used by the
hostile country.
a. The single system of agents involves
collective intelligence
efforts from a person. These agents operate only with the
support of the
administrative personnel, but only one person is involved in
the collective
operations.
b. The echelon system are networks that
provide security when great
number of agents are being used in operation. Only the
leader of the network
knows the identities of all the members of the network.
Contact is initiated
only by the higher echelon and code names are normally used.
There is no
lateral contact because the members of the network do not
know each other.
c. The cell system could be simple or complex
depending in the number
of agents that each cell has. The members of a cell know the
identities and
the places of each member involved in espionage acts. They
have the liberty of
coming in contact with each other and as minimum a member of
a cell keeps
contact with the supervisor. It may or may not be that they
have arrangements
for unilateral contacts.
d. The echelon network could degenerate in
emergencies in a cell type
system. Unilateral contact could develop and a member of a
segment could be
instructed to establish contact with members of another
segment.
141
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: Most of the
hostile intelligence services use more than one espionage
network to cover or operate in the same area.
5. Review the hostile recruitment methods
a. Acquisition techniques are used to find a
person who has been
coerced or made to accept recruitment by force.
b. The analysis of sources/potential recruits
makes a detailed study
of the files and information of past history to identify the
potential the
person has as agent and his reactions to contacts or
possible methods of
contact. The motivation of the recruitment also is
determined (ideology,
money, coercion and selfishness).
c. The recruitment by contact is used to
obtain contact with the
person and through him obtain his cooperation and involve
him in espionage
acts. The contact could occur in the person's own country or
while the person
is traveling in a communist country. The customary way of
hostile agents is to
allow another person to make the contact and not to involve
the agents that
did the consecutive process and the analytical steps.
NOTE: The "Small
Hook" is the favorite method used by the hostile
intelligence service to prepare the potential agent. In this
method, the
subject is requested to provide innocent information and
material of no value
to intelligence or classification.
6. Review of the hostile camouflage method.
a. The natural camouflage is the way of legal
residence or entry to a
country, the use of a real name frequently, occupation or
legal ways. The
local persons who are recruited normally operate under the
natural camouflage
because they have established in the community and are
employed in the
country.
b. The artificial camouflage involves the
fabrication of history and
position of an agent and the falsification of identification
documents in a
way that matches the fabrication of history and camouflage
history.
142
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
7. Review the hostile communication method.
a. Conferences are normally kept to the
minimum, but when used, these
conferences take place in public areas so as not to arouse
the public
curiosity.
b. Official messengers are used to transport
information to the
control official. Diplomatic bags are considered as the
safest method to carry
material obtained for espionage acts.
c. The post is used to carry information,
using codes, secret writing
and microfiche.
d. Radios or communications systems are mainly
used during operations
in war time, but instructions could be transmitted to agents
using lateral
communication systems at any time such as CB radios or
Motorola. The
communications through cryptographic systems are used to
transmit messages in
a safe way.
e. "Mail drops" are hidden secret
places used to transmit or safekeep
information and material. Most of the services of hostile
intelligence put
considerable emphasis in the use of "mail drops".
NOTE: Always keep in
mind that mail drops could be done by a middlemen and
moved to another mail drop to provide necessary security to
the controlling
officer.
8. Review the Financing Method for espionage
activities.
a. Limited or unlimited resources are normally
available for
espionage operations to the hostile agent.
b. The financial resources will come from the
hostile country.
c. The financial resources will be obtained by
organizations or
hidden business.
d. The financial resources will we obtained by
ilegal activities
(black market, drugs, etc).
143
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. The financial resources or money of the
target country are
transferred to the country by diplomatic bags, official
messengers, or by
hostile agents.
f. Bank accounts are established in the target
country for the access
of the agent.
E. Prepare an interrogatory plan (Figure 2)
NOTE: Depending on
the type of investigation that will be conducted, the
available time, the investigation plan could require only a
mental study, or
could be a written formal document requiring approval
previous to the
continuation of the investigation.
1. Plan an investigative agenda detailed for
each step of the
operation to:
a. Define the requirements of the information.
b. Define the pertinent aspects to be considered.
c. Prevent unnecessary investigative efforts.
2. When the plan develops, consider:
a. The reason or purpose for the
investigation.
b. The assigned phases of investigation.
c. The investigation type (open, covered).
d. Priority and suspension time.
e. The restrictions or special instructions.
f. A definition of the problem.
g. The methods and sources that could be used
(review of files,
interviews, etc.)
144
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: There is no
fixed procedure that could be recommended for treatment of
an espionage investigation. One must determine the specific
method to each
individual case based upon the circumstances of the case.
h. The coordination requirements.
3. Update the investigation plan.
a. When new data is discovered.
b. As a result of continuous analysis.
F. Conduct an investigation of the incident
based upon the
type, if appropriate.
1. Go to the incident's place.
2. Protect and safeguard the incident place
giving appropriate orders
and isolating the place physically. All non-authorized
persons must be taken
out of the place.
3. Find out the circumstances of the incident
by visual observation
to determine the investigative approach that will be most
appropriate.
4. Identify and segregate the witnesses.
5. Obtain photographs of the place, if
required, provide a series of
photographs to give the maximum amount of useful information
and to help the
reviewer to understand what had happened.
6. Search the place and collect evidence, if
appropriate. Evidence is
defined as articles or material found in connection with the
investigation or
that could help establish the identity of the person or
circumstances that
caused the incident, in general, facts that will help
uncover the events.
7. Control the evidence obtained.
G. Coordinate and conduct ties with other
investigation
agencies. Coordination is a continuous activity during many
of the espionage
cases.
H.
Interview the witnesses.
1. Conduct interviews of witnesses in the
place, if appropriate, to
obtain all the pertinent information.
145
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2. During investigations of the subject,
conduct interviews of all
the witnesses who could have pertinent information or
knowledge of the case.
NOTE: The most
time-consuming part of the investigation is the interview,
because through the interview we obtain the greatest part of
the information
sources.
I. Conduct the review of files.
J. During investigations of incident type, it will
be desirable
to make contact with the confidential sources for any
information that comes
to your attention.
NOTE: Information
regarding the espionage incidents or the present espionage
investigations will be limited only to few persons and only
to persons who
need to know the information.
K. Conduct the investigative analysis of the
facts of the case.
Although, an investigation is basically a collection of
facts, the secondary
function is also important; the analysis of the facts. The analysis
is
established in the review and comparison of facts from the
case to develop a
hypothesis and come up with conclusions regarding the
identity of the
suspects, circumstances surrounding the incident, and future
actions.
NOTE: There are no
established procedures to analyze the information from the
case to come up with a solution. One method could work as
well as another
method. All must include the basic function of review,
comparison, and
hypothesis.
1. Review all information available of the
case.
a. Placement and correlation of all
information.
b. Examine the information to identify the
pertinent facts.
c. Determine the dependability of the
information.
d. Determine the truth of the information.
2. Compare the information already known.
(Figure 6)
a. Compare the available information with the
legal espionage
elements.
(1) Identify the information that supports or
show the legal espionage
elements.
(2) Identify the holes in the information that
could be completed with
further investigations.
146
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Compare the information obtained from
witnesses to the information
from other witnesses or sources.
c. Identify the possible suspects by
comparison of the information.
(1) Identify persons with connection to the
incident.
(2) Identify the "opportunity" forpossible suspects.
("Opportunity"--the physical possibility that a
suspects has of committing
espionage acts).
(3) Develop information to prove the motive of
each suspect.
(4) Develop information that proves the intent of
each suspect.
(5) Develop all the circumstantial evidences and
associations of
each suspect.
NOTE: In cases of
personal subject, the suspect, or possible suspect, is
identified therefore. Therefore all efforts are directed to
identify his
connections in espionage acts, his opportunities, motives,
and intents. Show
all information and evidence in terms of elements of
required evidences to
support the charges.
3. Show one or more hypotheses. Hypotheses are
theories that explain
the facts and that could be examined in later
investigations. The best
hypotheses are selected to resolve the problem between the
information
available.
a. Apply inductive
or deductive reasoning to show the hypotheses.
147
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(1) Inductive reasoning involves moving the
specific and the
general. Develop generalities, from observations that
explain the relationship
between events under examination.
(2) Deductive reasoning involves procedures from
general to
specific. Starting with the general theory and applying it
to the particular
incident to determine the truth contained in the theory of
the incident.
NOTE: In both
processes, the steps must follow a logical manner point by
point.
b. If you come to a point where the deductive
reasoning is not
productive, consider using the intuition. Intuition is the
quick, unexpected
act which clarifies a problem when the logical process and
experimentation has
stopped. Intuition must not be ignored, particularly in
difficult cases where
little progress is evident.
c. Put your hypothesis to a test of
considerations of probability,
additional information of the witnesses and other known
facts.
d. Eliminate various possibilities
systematically considering each
hypothesis between:
(1) The opportunity
(2) The motive
(3) Observed activities
(4) Corroboration of the alibi.
e. Select the best hypothesis based in the
consistency with the known
facts and the high degree of probability.
f. Examine the hypothesis objectively.
g. Modify and refute the hypothesis if
contradictions to the evidence
are discovered.
4. Determine the direction of the future
investigation
activities.
148
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Identify future actions that will examine
or verify the selection
of the hypothesis.
b. Ask approval from the higher control office
to complete the
identified actions.
L. Conduct vigilance, if appropriate.
M. Conduct interviews of the SUBJECT, if
appropriate.
N. Conduct interrogations of the SUBJECT, if
appropriate.
0. Prepare the appropriate reports.
P. Consider an investigation successful when:
1. All information and pertinent material or
allegations from the
case are discovered.
2. The physical evidence available is
completely handled.
3. All witnesses were appropriately
interviewed.
4. The suspect, if he allows, is interrogated
in an effective way.
5. The report of the case was understood,
clear and detailed.
149
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #1
PRELIMINARY SHEET
_____________________________________________________________________
PRELIMINARY SHEET
DATE/START OF INVESTIGATION
_____________________________________________________________________
1. SUBJECT 2. DATE
NAME: RANK, RANK NUMBER
IDENTITY BADGE: 3. CONTROL NUMBER:
PLACE/DATE
OF BIRTH:
_____________________________________________________________________
4. TYPE AND PURPOSE
OF INVESTIGATION:
5. LEADS TO BE VERIFIED:
6. INFORMATION FROM
HISTORY:
7. SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:
______________________________________________________________7.AGENCY
REQUESTING INFORMATION AGENCY PREPARING REPORT
______________________________________________________________
OFFICE OFFICE
______________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION) SIGNATURE (AUTHORIZATION)
______________________________________________________________
PERSON'S NAME NAME OF AUTHORIZED
PERSON
______________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
______________________________________________________________
150
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #2
INVESTIGATIVE PLAN
1. REASON FOR
INVESTIGATION:
2. TYPE OF
INVESTIGATION: LIMITED
3. INVESTIGATION
WILL BE CONDUCTED: DISCRETELY (Safety will be t h e
main
factor
during
the
invest
igatio
n).
4. PRIORITY:
5. SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:
a.
b.
6. INFORMATION
GIVEN:
7. SEQUENCE OF
INVESTIGATION:
a. Conduct review of local files.
b. Examine the subject's military and medical
files.
c. Interview the following persons:
(1) Carry out the review the neighborhoods
(2) Carry out the review of the financial or
credit reports.
NOTE: The plan
mentioned above must have flexibility, it is only a guide.
Each case must be treated individually. Your plan could be
similar, shorter or
longer, but this will depend upon the requirements dictated
in the Preliminary
sheet.
Back to Top 151
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 17 LN324-91
SABOTAGE INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION:
To understand the
importance of a sabotage investigation you must always
think that the sabotage act is the intent to cause harm,
intercept, or
obstruct by the desire to cause harm or destroy or intent to
destroy material,
installations, or utilities with regards to the national
defense.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. IDENTIFY THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:
1. Use various reports from other agencies to
identify the
requirements so that the counter intelligence elements could
start an
investigation of the sabotage act. These reports could be
found in the
following agencies:
a. Military police
b. Criminal Investigation Divisions
c. Local Civil Authorities
d. The superior authority/supervisor in charge
of the facility where
the sabotage occurred.
e. Confidential sources that could testify
that a particular incident
was indeed a sabotage act.
2. Review the Preliminary Sheet (PS), prepared
to be distributed by
the Central Intelligence Office, to identify the
investigative requirements:
a. The PS has information collected during an
investigation that may:
(1) Require further investigation and
development.
152
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #1
PRELIMINARY SHEET
_____________________________________________________________PRELIMINARY
SHEET DATE
INVESTIGATION STARTED
_____________________________________________________________
1. SUBJECT/THEME 2. DATE
3. CONTROL OR FILE NUMBER
_____________________________________________________________4. TYPE AND
REASON FOR INVESTIGATION
7. AGENCY
REQUESTING 8. AGENCY PREPARING REPORT
_______________________________________________________________________
OFFICE OFFICE
_____________________________________________________________
ADDRESS ADDRESS
_____________________________________________________________
FOR G2 ACTION FOR G2 ACTION (IM)
_____________________________________________________________
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
_____________________________________________________________
NAME AND RANK NAME AND RANK
_____________________________________________________________
8. CONVINCING
DOCUMENTS CONVINCING
DOCUMENTS
_____________________________________________________________
153
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4. To condemn a person for an act of sabotage
during peace time, you
have to prove that he had tried to cause harm described
above. In war time it
is sufficient to prove that the person had knowledge that
his act will affect
the "war effort".
5. If more than one person conspires to carry
out a sabotage act and
one of them is captured while carrying out the plans of the
act, all could be
accused and condemned for the sabotage act.
C. DETERMINE THE TYPE OF SABOTAGE
INVESTIGATION THAT WILL TAKE PLACE:
1. PASSIVE SABOTAGE: This type of sabotage
involves the passive
resistance of the population and it could be local or at
national level. The
passive sabotage is not so organized so that persons or
groups are assigned
specific missions: nevertheless, the population reaction is
the result of
propaganda, well organized propaganda by a subversive group
that is well
organized. In other words, the passive sabotage is when a
population locally
or nationally has been convinced by a propaganda group to
carry out or to
allow the acts previously described that could be classified
as sabotage acts.
2. ACTIVE SABOTAGE: This type of sabotage is
characterized by violent
sudden actions with visible results and which commonly turn
into conflicts
with military forces. Within this category, we found the
following physical
forms of sabotage:
a. Fire sabotage: Is when combustible
materials are used to cause
fires and destroy government properties. This is normally
considered as an act
of vandalism or a common criminal act.
(1) This act changes from vandalism to sabotage
when it is
proven that it took place with the purpose of affecting the
national defense,
the war or the war effort.
b. Explosive sabotage:
(1) In this type of sabotage explosives are used
to destroy or
neutralize targets that are resistant to fires and to obtain
the maximum
quantity of destruction at the minimum time.
154
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Targets that are sensitive to explosive
sabotage are:
(a) Bridges
(b) Tunnels
(c)
Railroads
(d) Ships/boats
(e)
Heavy equipment
(f) Industrial machinery
c. Mechanical sabotage:
(l) the
mechanical sabotage is easier to maintain since it does
not require instruments or special tools, and normally is
directed against
railroads, ships or industrial facilities.
(2) The mechanical sabotage is normally
classified within one of
the following categories:
(a) Destroy/break/tear
(b) Inserting materials or abrasive substances
such as, sand,
soil, etc., into lubricants and vehicle's fuels.
(c)
Omission acts. This consist of not doing something so that a
mechanical equipment stop working. Not lubricating a motor
so as to damage it,
not adjusting a mechanical part so that when the motor is
turned on it will
stop working.
(d) Substituting real parts for fake parts in
apparatus or
vehicles. Ce) Contamination of lubricants or fuels.
d. Biological, chemical and nuclear sabotage:
(l) The
sabotage with biological agents is know as "biological
warfare", and is considered as the introduction of
living organism and its
toxic products in the environment with the purpose of
causing death, impede,
or harm people, animals or crops.
(2) Sabotage using chemical agents is know as
"chemical warfare:
and is considered as the introduction of chemicals to the
environment to cause
death, impede, or harm people, animals or crops.
155
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(3) Sabotage using nuclear weapons, could just
with its
destructive capacity, cause serious damage or destruction to
property,
materials and persons.
D. PREPARE AN INVESTIGATION PLAN: (See example
#2)
1. Initial plan:
a. Determine the purpose of the investigation.
b. Determine the place of the incident.
c. Determine what official documents are
required to travel to
the place where the incident took place (passport, visa,
etc.)
d. Make arrangements to get these documents.
e. Determine priorities, if any, that exist in
regards to the
case being investigated.
f. Determine if any restrictions or special
instructions are
necessary.
2. Modify the investigation plan according to
how you could obtain
more information.
F. CARRY OUT THE INVESTIGATION:
1. Go to the place where the incident took
place.
2. Write down the date and time you arrived to
area and the
weather conditions.
3. Visually search the area to try to find
wounded persons and:
a. Coordinate medical attention.
b. Write down identity of the wounded, so as to
possibly
question them later.
c. Coordinate transportation of wounded persons
to medical
facilities.
156
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(FIGURE/EXAMPLE #2)
INVESTIGATION PLAN
1. PURPOSE OF THE
INVESTIGATION:
2. TYPE OF
INVESTIGATION: Limited
3. THE INVESTIGATION
WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:
(Discretely)
4. PRIORITY: 30 days
after having received the preliminary sheet.
5. SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:
a.
b.
6. INFORMATION PROVIDED:
7. INVESTIGATION
SEQUENCE:
a. Carry out the review of files.
b. Examine the medical and military files of
suspect.
c. Interview the following persons:
(l)
(2)
(3)
d. Carry out the investigation of the
neighborhood.
e. Carry out the review of credit bureaus.
NOTE: THE PLAN
DESCRIBED ABOVE MUST BE FLEXIBLE AND ITS INTENTION IS ONLY TO
BE USED AS A GUIDE. EVERY CASE MUST BE TREATED INDIVIDUALLY.
YOUR PLAN COULD
BE SIMILAR, SHORTER OR LONGER ACCORDING TO WHAT THEIR OWN
REQUIREMENTS.
157
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4. Coordinate work with other investigation
agencies that are present
in the incident area, or if they should arrive later.
5. Identify and search a road for the medical
personnel to use when
arriving to the place where there are wounded and/or dead
persons.
6. Do not allow the corps to be covered since
this could destroy
evidence.
7. Protect the area of the incident using
persons to maintain the
curious passersby away from the area and to avoid that
witnesses, suspects and
victims destroy evidence.
8. Protect all that could possibly be
destroyed by fire, rain or any
other thing, such as footprints, etc.
9. Find the possible witnesses in the area.
10. Ask and write down the identity of the
witnesses.
11. Separate the possible witnesses and take
them outside the incident
area.
12. Carry out questioning/preliminary interviews
of witnesses to
determine:
a. How much knowledge they have of the
incident.
b. Movements that the witnesses have done in
the incident area.
c. Any tool that the witnesses or other
persons have possibly
touched.
12. Write down
all the pertinent facts:
a. Identify the persons involved or that were
involved in the area.
b. Initial impressions or observations.
c. Take photos of the area in all angles.
d. Take photos of the persons in the vicinity
of the area.
13. Search the
incident area and adjacent areas to collect all evidence
using the search patterns more useful in the area.
a. Pay particular attention to fragile traces
of evidence that could
be destroyed if not collected immediately.
158
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Carefully examine all objects or areas
where there may be latent
fingerprints and make sure that a follow up is done of this
fingerprints.
c. Take photos or prepare imprints that could
have value as evidence.
(Example: shoe prints, or boot prints on the ground could
indicate the amount
of persons involved in the incident).
d. Treat stains or accumulation of liquids as
evidence and write down
its place and take photos of them.
e. Treat any tool as evidence until this could
be found to the
contrary.
14. Collect, mark for identification and process
the evidence.
F. Transfer the evidence to the criminal
laboratories and proper
agencies to evaluate such evidence.
G. Carry out the review of files.
H. Carry out the interviews with
"Witnesses" that are necessary:
1. To obtain more information about the
incident.
2. To develop new leads and/or sources.
I. Prepare Preliminary Reports, if necessary.
NOTE: THE PRELIMINARY
REPORTS ARE PREPARED WHEN THEY ARE REQUIRED BY THE SOP
OR IF AN ORDER IS RECEIVED FROM THE HIGH COMMAND.
J. Contact your confidential sources of
information.
K. Carry out an analysis of the information in
the case to identify
the suspect. Even though an investigation is basically a
collection of
information, the analysis of such information is a secondary
function. This
analysis is the review and comparison of information
obtained to develop a
hypothesis and come up with conclusions that could be used
in identifying the
suspects and determining the circumstances of the incident
and future actions.
NOTE: THERE IS NO FIXED PROCEDURE IN THE ANALYSIS OF
INFORMATION OF A CASE TO
159
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION. ONE METHOD COULD WORK AS WELL AS THE
NEXT. NEVERTHELESS,
ANY OF THE METHODS USED MUST HAVE THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF:
(REVIEW, COMPARE,
AND MAKE A HYPOTHESIS).
1. Review all the information in the case:
a. Arrange in an orderly fashion all the
information.
b. Examine the information in detail to
identify the pertinent facts.
(1) Determine the dependability of the
information.
(2) Determine the truth of the information
2. Compare the information known:
a. Compare the available information with the
legal aspects of
sabotage.
(l)
Identify facts/evidence that support or prove the legal
elements of sabotage.
(2) Identify vulnerabilities in the information
that could
require further investigation.
b. Compare the information obtained from
witnesses with such obtained
by other witnesses and sources.
c. Identify possible suspects through the
information comparison.
(l)
Identify such persons that have connection with the incident.
(2) Identify information that supports or proves
the
"OPPORTUNITY" that possible suspects may have.
(Ask yourself: Is it physically
possible that the suspect could have committed the act of
sabotage?)
(3) Identify information that supports or prove
"MOTIVATION" by
each suspect.
(4) Identify information that proves
"INTENT" by part of the
suspects.
(5) Identify all circumstantial or association
information
related with each suspect.
(6) Evaluate all information and evidence in
regards to the test
elements required to support the sabotage accusation.
160
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3. Show one or more hypotheses. The most
possible hypotheses are
selected to solve a problem according to the information and
available
evidence.
a. Apply
deductive and inductive reasoning to show your hypothesis.
(l) Inductive
reasoning involves moving from the specific to the
general. Develop a generalization of the information being
evaluated that
could explain the relationship between events under
investigation.
(2) Deductive reasoning involves moving from the
general to the
specific. Start with a general theory and apply it to the
particular incident
to determine if the truth of the incident is part of the
theory.
NOTE: WHEN USING
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING, THE MOVEMENT FROM ONE
POINT TO ANOTHER MUST BE DONE LOGICALLY.
b. During the study of information to show a
hypothesis, the concept
of intuition must be considered. Intuition is an internal
and sudden solution
towards a problem. Intuition frequently clarifies a problem
when there is no
progress through logic.
c. Submit the hypothesis to probability tests,
additional information
of other witnesses, and other data already known.
d. Eliminate the possibilities through the
systematic comparison of
the hypothesis with the following considerations:
(1) Opportunity
(2) Motivation
(3) Observed activities
(4) Corroboration of the suspects' bribes
e. Select the best hypothesis based in the
consistency of data
compared and the high degree of probability.
f. Test the hypothesis objectively.
g. Modify and/or refute the hypothesis if
information to the contrary
is found.
4. Determine the
requirement/direction of the future investigation
activities.
161
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Identify what could support or prove the
hypothesis selected.
b. Get the approval of the Control Office to
initiate actions that
have been identified.
L. Carry out the follow up, if necessary.
M. Carry out the personnel interviews if
necessary.
N. Carry out a CI interrogation of suspects,
when there is
suspicion in regards to the identity of a person.
0. Prepare and distribute the required reports.
P. You may consider that the investigation was
successful when:
1. All the information and material related to
the case has been
discovered and developed.
2. The physical evidence available was
handled.
3. All the witnesses were interviewed.
4. The suspect was properly interrogated.
5. The case has been reported in a clear,
exact and intelligible
manner.
Back to Top 162
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 18
LN324-91
PREPARING AGENT'S REPORTS
INTRODUCTION:
After the CI
agent finishes an investigation or part of the
investigation, the following step is to write down all the
information in a
report, which is known as the Agent's Report. The
preparation of this report
requires a great effort and skill from the agent. To know
how to prepare a
good agent's report is one of the requisites and duties of
any counter
intelligence agent. In this chapter we will discuss all the
areas and rules
that govern the proper preparation of an agent's report.
GENERAL FACTS:
NOTE: For effects of
this chapter we will use as example an agent's report,
see the format that appears in EXAMPLE #1.
A. COMPLETE BLOCK #1: (NAME OF SUBJECT OR
TITLE OF INCIDENT)
NOTE: Typewrite all
the information in this block as close as possible to the
left margin arid below block #1.
1. THE TITLE BLOCK in this report is always the
same that
appears in the preliminary sheet (refer to previous
examples), or of any
pertinent investigative report, with only two exceptions:
a.
Change the title block to include alias or any other essential
information developed during the investigation.
b. Change the title block to change any error
in the preliminary
sheet. All changes and corrections will be written down in
Section "Agent's
Notes" of the report.
2. When there is no preliminary sheet, or any
other investigative
reports in regards to this case, prepare the title block in
the following
manner:
163
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Write down the answer to the question
"Where" in the second line.
(3) Write down the answer to the question
"When" in the third line.
B. Write down the date in which the report was
prepared in block #2
(day, month, year).
C. Write the control number in block #3
(CONTROL NUMBER OR FILE
NUMBER)
1. If you have a preliminary sheet the name
that appears in
block #3 of the sheet could be used in this report as well.
D. Complete block #4 (Report of Findings):
(SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #1)
1. Use this block to write down the information
obtained during
the investigation. This is the most important part of the
Agent's Report and
must:
a. Show in detail all the facts that the
source brought. Write down
as facts as facts and opinions as opinions.
b. It must be pertinent and directly related
to the investigation.
c. Be written clearly, orderly and clearly
understood to avoid wrong
interpretations of facts.
d. Be impartial, and include favorable and
unfavorable information
developed during the investigation.
e. Be concise and to the point. Describe
exactly the activities and
attitudes of the SUBJECT. Avoid unclear phrases.
f. Be complete.
2. Normally, write the report:
(1) In narrative style
(2) Using third person (grammatically)
(3) Using the simple past.
165
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3. PRIVACY PHRASES: (SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #2)
a. According to Figure #2 select and write
down the most appropriate
privacy phrase.
b. Write down the phrase in the third line
where block #4 starts.
c. Leave 15 spaces where the left margin of
the report.
d. This phrase is written entirely in capital
letters.
4. DESIGNATION OF PHRASES: (SEE FIGURE EXAMPLE
#3)
a. Select the appropriate phrase on Figure #3
and write down in
parenthesis according to the description in Figure #1.
b. It is written two spaces under the Privacy
Phrase.
5. Start the Introduction paragraph which has
the information
about the SOURCE, including identity, employment and
address.
a. This paragraph starts in the same line of
the Designation Phase.
b. In the right margin of the report, allow a
blank area of at least
five spaces to write down the word (LEAD) if necessary. (A
LEAD is any
information collected during the investigation that requires
further
development. It could be a name, address, or whereabouts of
a person or
organization.
c. Write down the specific information in the
Introduction Paragraph
according to the type of report. (SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #4, TO
SEE WHAT
INFORMATION COULD BE USED ACCORDING TO THE REPORT TYPE AND
IN WHAT ORDER)
d. Write the last name of the SUBJECT in
capital letters in the
report's text always.
166
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #1
______________________________________________________________________
AGENT
REPORT FROM
______________________________________________________________________
1. SUBJECT NAME OR
TITLE OF INCIDENT2. DATE
RAMIREZ. Juan O. 15 May 1988
TCC: TORRES, Antonio O. 3. CON. NUMBER
CPT, 000-00-000
FLDN: 9 March 1956,
San Salvador, ES
______________________________________________________________________
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS:
WRITE HERE THE
PRIVACY PHRASE USING CAPITAL LETTERS.
(PHRASE
DESIGNATION) Here starts the introduction paragraph under the
privacy phrase and in the same line of the designation
phase. Allow a space in
the right margin to write the word (LEAD) when one comes up
during the
investigation. (LEAD)
If there are more
than one paragraph allow two spaces between the
paragraphs and prepare the first the same as the second.
(RUMORS IDENTIFICATION) Rumor information is written down in
a separate
paragraph and is indicated with the phrase RUMORS
INFORMATION in parenthesis.
AGENT'S NOTES:
Here you write down all the notes or commentaries that
the agent has in reference to the source or the case. The
agent's notes are
used only once in the report.
______________________________________________________________________
5. NAME AND
ORGANIZATION OF AGENT 6. AGENT'S
SIGNATURE
______________________________________________________________________
167
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #2
PRIVACY PHRASES
THE SOURCE DID NOT HAVE AN OBJECTION THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
IDENTIFYING HIS IDENTITY TO THE IN THIS REPORT IS OBTAINED
SUBJECT. FROM CIVIL
FILES.
THE SOURCE RECEIVED A PROMISE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
CONFIDENTIALITY AS A CONDITION THIS REPORT IS FINANCIAL
OF HIS COOPERATION WITH OUR INFORMATION AND WILL NOT BE
INVESTIGATION. REVEALED TO ANY
OTHER AGENCY.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED IN
OFFICIAL FILES FROM THE GOVERNMENT.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM PUBLIC
FILES.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM MILITARY
MEDICAL FILES.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT WAS OBTAINED IN MILITARY
FILES FROM THE PERSONNEL OFFICE.
168
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #3
DESIGNATION PHRASES
(SUSPECT'S INTERROGATION) (EMPLOYMENT SUPERVISOR)
(FILE REVIEW OF LOCAL AGENCIES) (CO-WORKER)
(MILITARY SERVICE) (EMPLOYMENT FILES)
(MEDICAL FILES) (EDUCATION FILES)
(MILITARY FILES) (EDUCATION INTERVIEW)
(CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FILES) (DEVELOPMENT/EMPLOYMENT SOURCE)
(CITIZENSHIP)
(DEVELOPMENT/RESIDENCE SOURCE)
(BIRTH)
(DEVELOPMENT/EDUCATION SOURCE)
(CREDIT REFERENCE/WRITTEN DOWN) (MILITARY COMRADE)
(CREDIT REFERENCE/DEVELOPMENT) (MILITARY FILES REVIEW)
(PERSONNEL REFERENCE/WRITTEN DOWN) (MILITARY SUPERVISOR)
(PERSONAL REFERENCE/DEVELOPED) (COMMANDER)
(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) (FIRST SERGEANT)
(SUBJECT'S INTERVIEW) (POLYGRAPH TEST)
169
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. Use the complete name of the SUBJECT in the
first sentence of the
introduction paragraph.
6. Complete the rest of the report, writing
down all the information
about the SUBJECT obtained during the investigation. The
exact report format
will be determined by the type of report. Below, we list
various formats for
the different types of reports:
a. INVESTIGATION REPORT OF PERSONNEL SECURITY:
1) Enter the association paragraph which has a
complete and concise
description between the Source and the SUBJECT.
(a) This paragraph must be answered with the
questions in figure #5 as
a minimum, which will establish the nature, degree and
length of its
association. (SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #5)
_______________
(b) Write down the last name of the SUBJECT the
first time it comes up
in the association paragraph. After mentioning for the first
time, it could be
referred to it with the word SUBJECT.
2) Between the history paragraph which
contains information of the
SUBJECT'S history, such as:
(a) Date and birth place
(b) Family situation/marriage
(c) Military service
(d) Residences
(e) Education
(f) Employment
(g) Associates
NOTE: Information areas that are not covered during the
interview could be
used to include the first sentence like: (The source could
not provide more
information about the education, residence, employment of
the SUBJECT).
NOTE: The history information must be written down
chronologically, that is in
the time frame they occurred.
170
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3) Between the LIDMC paragraph, which contains
favorable and
disfavorable information in regards to loyalty, integrity,
discretion, moral
and character of the SUBJECT. (This is known as LIDMC) Areas
that enter or are
discussed in the LIDMC paragraph are:
Sexual moral
Non-prescribed medications
Ethics
Financial stability
Honesty
Improper gains
Integrity
Police agencies
Maturity
Government overthrow
Discretion Deny civil rights
Character
Other organizations
Mental stability
Foreign travels
Emotional stability
Friends/foreign friends
Betting
Foreign business connections
Alcoholic beverages
Loyalty
Drugs
NOTE: Answer all the
questions on the themes mentioned above even though the
SUBJECT gives you a negative answer such as (I DON'T KNOW).
The negative
answers are included in the report in the last sentence,
("THE SOURCE did not
provide information about the SUBJECT'S foreign
travels").
4) Between the RECOMMENDATION paragraph such
as the last paragraph of
the personal security investigation report.
(a) This paragraph contains the recommendation
from the source in
regards to if he recommends that a position of trust and
responsibility is
given to the SUBJECT.
(b) Use the SUBJECT'S complete name and not the
word SUBJECT in the
first phrase of the recommendation paragraph.
(c) A source could be give one of four
recommendations:
(1) He could decline to recommend him: "The
Source refused to give a
recommendation in regards to Arturo G. RIVAS, for a job in a
position of trust
and responsibility since he has only known hin for (8)
weeks.
171
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Could give a favorable recommendation:
"The Source recommended
Arturo G. Rivas for a position of trust and responsibility
with the national
government".
(3) Could give a non-favorable recommendation:
"The Source did not
recommend Arturo G. RIVAS for a position of trust and
responsibility with the
national government due to his dishonesty and lack of
integrity. The Source
made a sworn declaration and was willing to appear before a
hearing or trial
in regards to the SUBJECT."
(4) Could give a qualified recommendation:
"The Source recommended
that Arturo G. RIVAS is considered favorably for a position
of trust and
responsibility with the national government, under the
condition that he
(RIVAS) control his drinking habits. The Source made a sworn
declaration and
was willing to appear before a hearing or trial in regards
to the SUBJECT.
b. Files review:
1) The format will depend upon the type of
file being reviewed:
(a) The information obtained from the normal
files will be presented
in a tabulated manner (SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #6).
(b)
The information was also presented in a narrative manner. (SEE
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #6)
(c) A combination of narrative and tabulation
could be used. (SEE
FIGURE #6).
c. Incident, complaints, or limited
investigations:
(1) Write down one or more information
paragraphs that describe the
clear and complete story.
172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Present all
information in chronological order.
(3) Answer the following questions to develop
all the information:
(a) Who
(b) What
(c) Where
(d) When
(e) Why
(f) How
d. When a report is long and there is not
enough room in the first
page:
(1) Allow at least half inch of space in the
lower part of the report
and write down (continued) between parentheses on the lower
part below the
report. (If there is need to include classified information
in this report,
allow at least one inch of space.
(2) The report could be continued using the same
format on the first
page with the same information in blocks 1-3 and from 5-6.
7. Write down the Rumors' Information if
applicable: (SEE
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #1):
________________
a. Use this paragraph when developing rumors
or information such as
that.
b. When the original source of the information
could not be
determined.
c. When leads that could verify or deny this
information could not be
identified.
NOTE: Put the paragraph (Rumors' Information) in the
Investigation of Personal
Security reports between the LIDMC paragraph and the
Association paragraph.
8. Enter the agent's notes paragraph:
a. This paragraph helps officials that review
the report to evaluate
the information, and call the pertinent discrepancies to
attention.
(1) Discuss the reason why a lead was not
developed or why a
particular lead could not be developed.
173
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Write down facts of your (Agent) personal
knowledge that could
help to clarify the incident.
(3) Write down the pertinent information from
the Source and do not
discuss the rest of the report.
(4) From your personal opinion of the SUBJECT,
or the information
acquired from him, if it is necessary to clarify some
doubts. It must be
specified that this is only the Agent's opinion.
(5) Discuss any existing discrepancies in the
Personal History of the
SUBJECT.
(6) Discuss the condition in which the files
reviewed were found, if
this affects its validity or not.
(7) Explain and discuss any work or phrase that
is difficult to
understand normally.
(8) Call attention to conflicts or discrepancies
in the different
stories that come up from the investigation in regards to
the same
information. Write down your personal opinion about which of
the stories you
personally think has more validity.
(9) Indicate if any of the sources have the same
last name or are
related. (Only if it applies in the report).
b. Do not use the Agent's notes to:
(1) Provide much information that is not
pertinent to the case.
(2) Point out the minor discrepancies in the
Personal History of the
SUBJECT.
(4) Describe the difficulty you had to find a
source.
(5)
Indicate recommendations.
E. COMPLETE BLOCK #5: (NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE
SPECIAL AGENT) (SEE FIGURE/EXAMPLE #1)
174
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
F. EDIT/REVIEW YOUR REPORT ACCORDING TO THE
FOLLOWING RULES:
1. Structure of the sentences and their
contents:
a. The sentences must be:
1)
clear
2) concise
3) simple
4) impartial
b. The sentences must not contain:
1) Local idioms
2) Vulgar words (Unless you are quoting the
SUBJECT'S exact
words).
2. The correct use of the work SUBJECT, and
the name of the person
who is interviewing:
a. Always write the name of the person
interviewed in capital
letters.
b. The word "SUBJECT" in capital
letters could substituted the name
of the interviewee, except:
1) In the first sentence of the introduction
and recommendation
paragraphs.
2) The first time the interviewee is mentioned
in the association
paragraph.
c. Write in capital letters all the pronouns
that are used to refer
to the SUBJECT. EXAMPLE: (HE, SHE).
3. The appropriate use of the word
"SOURCE":
a. Write down the name of the source normally
when it its mentioned
in the report, without using capital letters.
b. You may substitute the word
"Source" with only the "5" in capital
letters when mentioning the source in the report.
175
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. If you wish to use the pronoun to refer to
the Source, write the
first letter in capital letters, "He",
"She".
4. The
appropriate use of the names of other persons mentioned in the
report that are not the "SUBJECT or the Source
a. The
first time another person is mentioned in the report, you must
completely identify him, including the complete name,
employment address,
residential address or any manner in which we could contact
him.
b. After
identifying the other persons for the first time, you could
refer to them in the rest of the report using only their
last name, unless
when two persons have the same last name, then you must
identify them with
their complete name.
c. If only the last name of the person is
known, write down FNU which
means, FIRST NAME UNKNOWN, EXAMPLE (FNU Gonzalez).
d. If you only know the first name of the
person, write down LU,
which means LAST NAME UNKNOWN, EXAMPLE (Raul LU).
e. Never use FNU, LU, together. If you do not
know the name of the
person, indicate it in the following manner.
"The SUBJECT
was married with a woman, unknown name...
f. If a source is not sure as to how to spell
a name, write down the
word "Phonetics" in parenthesis after the name.
This means that the name was
spelled by sound only.
g. Indicate the maiden names of the women in
the following manner.
(Maria Gomez, N: Gonzales) This means that the maiden name
of Maria is
Gonzales.
h. Do not identify the confidential sources by
their proper names.
Use the numbers or code names only. Do not use phrases in
the report that
could identify, or help find a confidential source in your
reports.
176
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. CAPITALIZATION: When you are preparing the
Agent's report you must
follow the following rules in regards to writing words and
capital letters.
Capitalize:
a. The first word of each sentence.
b. The first letter of the word
"Source".
c. The first letter of proper names, places,
countries, races,
languages, months, and days of the week.
d. All letters of the SUBJECT'S last name.
e. All the words in the PRIVACY PHRASE.
f. The word SUBJECT.
g. All the PHRASES OF DESIGNATION.
h. Al the classifications of security
(CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, ULTRA-
SECRET).
i. Pronouns when they are substituted by the
SUBJECT'S name (HE,
SHE).
j. Names of all the political parties and
organizations (Liberal
Party).
k. All the titles before the names (Dr., Att.,
Md.)
1. Titles of rank, office, or profession if
accompanied by names,
(GONZALES, Raul, JCS, Joint General Staff).
m. Names of regions, locations, or geographic
structures, (East,
West, North).
n. The names of organizations formally
structured and established.
(Joint General Staff, Department of National Investigations,
National Police,
etc.)
o. The names of languages, (English, Spanish,
French, etc.).
177
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
p. The names of schools, universities, (Santa
Maria School,
University of El Salvador, etc.)
q. University degrees, (Master in Medicine,
Law, etc.)
6. DO NOT
CAPITALIZE THE FOLLOWING:
a. Names of
studies/courses (mathematics, history, biology, chemistry)
except languages (English, Spanish, French, etc.).
b. Descriptive terms to show addresses, (over,
below, at left, at
right).
7. The use quotation marks " "
"
a. Do not use quotation marks to show common
nicknames, unless it is
used with the full name of the person. (Herman
"Babe" Ruth).
b. Do not use quotation marks with names of
newspapers and magazines,
underline them: (El Diario).
8. Use of commas:
a. Use commas between cities and country, (San
Salvador, El
Salvador).
b. Use a comma to separate absolute phrases,
(Juan Jimenez, the
richest man in the world, was arrested yesterday).
9. Underline:
a. Underline words in another language,
followed by the translation
to Spanish in parenthesis, (He worked at the Post Office
(Correo).
b. Underline any information developed during
the interview that is
different than that which appears in the SUBJECT/TITLE
block.
178
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
9. The use of short titles:
a. To use short titles means to take the first
letter in each name of
an organization or theme and to write them in parenthesis,
later, the short
title could be used in the report:
EXAMPLE:
"The Source works in the Joint General Staff of the Armed
Forces (JGSAF), of El Salvador (ES).
b. As soon as the short title is established
it could be used without
the parenthesis. Only use the parenthesis when mentioning
the short title for
the prist time. EXAMPLE: The Source said that the SUBJECT
also worked at
JGSAF, ES.
c. The short titles are used for schools,
units and military
installations.
d. Never use short titles for person's names.
e. Do not use short titles if the phrase will
only be used once in
the report.
10. Abbreviations:
a. Do not use many abbreviations in your
reports.
b. If you use abbreviations, spell out the
complete word the first
time mentioned in the report, and later use only the
abbreviation.
c. Do not abbreviate military ranks if they
are mentioned alone
without a name, (The man was a captain). You may abbreviate
when it is
accomplished by a name, (The CPT Ramirez is a good soldier).
d. Never abbreviate the months in the year and
use the complete year
in your reports, (the 15 May 1988).
11. The use of numbers and numerals:
a. When using numbers from one to nine, spell
them out, (one, two,
three, four,...nine).
b. From nine on you may use numerals (10, 11,
12, 13, etc.).
c. Use numerals to describe:
(1) Sums of money. The amount does not matter
always use numerals.
179
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) Numbers in streets in addresses, (50th
Street).
(3) Apartment and room numbers.
(4) Temperature degrees, prices, percentages,
etc.
d. Do not use numerals:
(1) When starting a sentence, spell out the
number, (Four terrorists
were captured yesterday).
e. Use the following rules for the military
reports:
(1) Use the military form of writing the time
(According to your SOP).
(2) The units, companies, squadrons, regiments,
etc., could be
abbreviated and are not placed in numerical order when
mentioned in the
report. (He belongs to the 1st Squadron, 2nd Company, Cavalry
Regiment).
G. Complete Block #6 (SIGNATURE):
1. Sign your name the same way in which it
appears written in block #
5.
2. All reports require an original signature
in each page, do not use
carbon paper or stamps when signing the report.
H. Mark all the pages of the report with its
appropriate
classification. (The classification will be selected
according to the
requirements of your SOP).
I. Send the completed report to the Control
Office.
180
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #4
EXAMPLES OF
INFORMATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION PARAGRAPH
_______________________________________________________________________
1. SOURCE'S
INTERVIEW (INVESTIGATION OF HISTORY):
(DESIGNATION
PHASE): Interview date; identity of interviewed person
(name, occupation, residence, rank, serial number,
position); and the place
where the interview took place. The reason for the
interview, and the
association and period of knowledge between the SUBJECT and
the interviewer.
2. SOURCE'S INTERVIEW (INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT):
Interview's date;
complete identity of the source; interview place, and
if necessary, the reason for the interview.
3. FOLLOW-UPS:
Date, length,
follow-up type and any information with respect to persons
under follow-up (observation); place, and the identity of
the persons that are
handling the follow-up. If the situation requires the
protection of the
identity of the persons (without counting the agents), a
code reference must
be used.
4. SUBJECT
INTERVIEWS:
(DESIGNATION OF PHASE); date of the
interview, identity of the SUBJECT
(complete name, rank, serial number/identity number,
position, employment
place and residence address and employment place); sworn
declaration of truth;
interview place; purpose for the interview; notice of legal
rights; notice of
need to have a written sworn declaration by the SUBJECT.
5. REVIEW OF FILES:
(DESIGNATION
PHASE); review date; finding the files, office or any
place, name and position of the person who brought access to
the files,
complete identity of the file (title, page, or any other
information that
helps in the identification of the file).
181
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
CONTINUATION OF FIGURE/EXAMPLE #4
6. SEARCHINGS, SCRUTINIES, SEIZURES:
Date of activity,
identification of persons and/or units carrying out
such activity; and the authority to carry out this
authority. In scrutinies
and seizures you need the name of the official that serves
as witness.
(Normally this person is the SUBJECT'S commander).
7. INVESTIGATIVE INTENTS:
Date of intent,
identity of the persons whom they tried to interviewed;
identity of persons to whom they talked; reason for which
the person was not
able to be interviewed; and any other possible lead. The
explanation must show
that everything possible was done to find the source or the
person but it was
not possible.
8. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES:
Sources that have
codes for identification purposes will not be
identified, neither phrases nor information that could give
leads as far as
identity or location will be included in the report. The
confidential sources
will only be mentioned by its code, or designated symbol. To
help evaluate the
information, the Agent indicates through a phrase the
security level the
source has. EXAMPLE:
"The Source,
who has brought confidential information in the past...
"The Source,
who has brought information that has been corroborated
partly by other sources
"The Source,
whose security is unknown, but who has known the SUBJECT
during the last five years....
182
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #5
ASSOCIATION PARAGRAPH
1. The first time they met (were introduced)
and the circumstances of
such meeting.
2. The last time they met and the
circumstances.
3. Type of contact (professional or social, or
both).
4. Contact frequency.
5. Closest association period, if any.
6. Moments in which they did not have contact
for 31 days or more.
7. Communication between them during the
period in which they did not
have contact.
8. Communication or correspondence from the
date of last contact.
183
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE/EXAMPLE #6
______________________________________________________________________
AGENT
REPORT FROM
______________________________________________________________________
1. SUBJECT'S NAME OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2.
DATE
RAMIREZ, Juan O. 15 May 1988
TCC: TORRES, Antonio O. 3. CONT. NUMBER
CPT, 000-000-000
9 MARCH 1956, San Salvador, ES
______________________________________________________________________
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS:
WRITE HERE THE
PRIVACY PHRASE USING CAPITAL LETTERS.
(MEDICAL FILES)
El (DATE), Juan O. RAMIREZ'S military medical files
at the Military Hospital, San Salvador, El Salvador were
reviewed by (rank and
Agent's name), Special Agent, Joint General Staff,
substantially and revealed
the following information:
NAME:
RANK:
SERIAL NUMBER:
UNIT:
DATE OF LAST
MEDICAL CHECKUP:
The SUBJECT'S file did not have information that could
indicate the ilegal use
of drugs or marihuana; abuse of prescription medicines or
any other medicines;
the chronic use of alcoholic beverages, or mental or nervous
disorders. No
physical disorder or medicines indicated in the file give
any abnormal
indications.
______________________________________________________________________
5. NAME AND
ORGANIZATION OF AGENT 6. SIGNATURE
OF AGENT
184
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
REPORT FROM
AGENT
_____________________________________________________________________
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT2. DATE
___________________________
3.
CONT. NUMBER
_____________________________________________________________________
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS:
______________________________________________________________________
5. AGENT'S NAME AND ORGANIZATION 6. AGENT'S SIGNATURE
Back to Top 185
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 19 LN324-91
INVESTIGATION REPORT
INTRODUCTION:
As CI espionage
agent you must have the knowledge of how to prepare an
investigation report. An investigation report is an
accumulation of agent's
reports in a concise summary of basic interrogations in
which only the facts
are written down.
GENERAL FACTS:
NOTE: Example #1 is the format for the investigation report.
A. PREPARE THE REPORT'S HEADING:
1. Write down the date in which the report was
prepared in the block
"DATE SUBMITTED" in the report.
2. Write down the "focus"
information if it applies in this report.
This block is pertinent if the report deals with an
investigation of history.
If this is not an investigation of history, leave this block
blank.
3. Write down the category of the case in
block "CASE
CLASSIFICATION". (Example: Espionage, Sabotage,
Subversion, etc).
B. If this is a
Personal investigation of a SUBJECT (that is, in which
the SUBJECT is known) fill out blocks 1 to 10. If the
SUBJECT is not know,
enter N/A (Not applicable) in these blocks.
1. Write down the name (last name in capital
letters, first name, and
initial) of SUBJECT in block #1.
2. Write down the serial number, identity
number, of the SUBJECT in
block #1.
3. Write down SUBJECT'S race in block #3.
4. Write down the rank, that is military or
civilian, in block #4.
5. Write down the branch of the Armed Forces
to which the SUBJECT
belongs, in block #5.
6. Write down the position that the SUBJECT
occupies in block #6.
186
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
7. Write down the date of SUBJECT'S date of
birth in block #7.
8. Write down the
SUBJECT'S place of birth in block #8.
9. Write down the
unit or the employment address of SUBJECT in block #9.
10. Write down the SUBJECT'S residential address
in block #10.
C. If this is an INCIDENT case (Person or
unknown persons), fill out
blocks 11 to 15. If this is not an INCIDENT case, write down
N/A in these
blocks.
1. Write down the incident's title in block
#11.
2. Write down the incident's date in block
#12.
3. Write down incident's time in block #13.
4. Write down the place where the incident
occurred in block #14.
5. Write down the register numbers or serial
numbers of any equipment
that was involved in the incident in block #15.
D. Complete the
Control Section:
1. Write down symbol/control number or the
file number in block #16.
2. Write down the name of organizations that are
involved in carrying
out the investigation in block #17.
3. Write down the name of the control office
in block #18.
E. Complete "Investigation Facts"
section:
1. Write down the name of the person or
organization that requested
the report in block #19.
2. Write down the reason for which the
investigation is being carried
out in block #20.
3. Write down the information about the date
of investigation in
block #21:
a. Write the date in which the investigation
started.
187
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Write down the date in which the
investigation ended (If it has
not ended yet, write down N/A in this space).
F. Write down the "Present Situation of
the Case" in block #22:
1. CLOSED: An investigation is indicated as
"CLOSED" when there is no
need for further investigative activities for the
authorities to make a
decision upon the case.
2.
FINISHED/ELIMINATED: An investigation is considered FINISHED when the
investigation has stopped for any reason that is not the
conclusion of the
case.
3. SUSPENDED: An
investigation is considered SUSPENDED when the
information obtained is not complete and all the tangible
leads have been
exhausted, but there is a possibility yet that new
information will spring up
in the future.
4. PENDING: An investigation is considered
PENDING when the
investigation is continuous. (or that there are many facts
and leads to be
resolved and developed yet).
F. Complete the
"Synopsis" Section:
NOTE: THE Synopsis IS A SUMMARY, CONCISE, IN PARAGRAPH FORMAT,
WRITTEN IN A
LOGICAL SEQUENCE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS, AND ANSWERING TO
THE MOST COMPLETE
MANNER TO "WHO", "WHAT", , "WHERE", "WHY", AND
"HOW" OF THE
INVESTIGATION.
RECOMMENDATIONS, OPINIONS, OR CONCLUSIONS MUST NOT BE INCLUDED
IN THIS REPORT. THESE
COMMENTARIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE TRANSMISSION
LETTER OF THE INVESTIGATION REPORT.
1. Margins:
a. Start the report three (3) lines below de
black border in the
upper part of the Synopsis block.
b. The black border in this report will serve
as the left margin of
the report.
2. Enumeration of Paragraphs: The paragraphs
in the Synopsis Section
of this report will not be enumerated.
188
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3. Classification of paragraphs: Each
paragraph of the Synopsis will
have the Specific Classification of that paragraph at the
beginning. This is
done by writing the classification of each paragraph in
quotes at the start of
the paragraph. (Example:
(C) THE STUDENTS WERE
4. Convincing documents to the report:
a. All convincing
documents (or additional documents) to the report will
be named in parenthesis within the Synopsis paragraph that
these support. For
Example if Agent #1's report supports the first paragraph of
the Synopsis, you
will include something like this within the paragraph:
(Agent #1's report).
5. Classification of the report: The report
will be classified
according to its content, and what is stipulated in the SOP.
G. Continuation pages: If the report could not
be finished in the
first page, it is continued in another page in blank, using
the normal margins
according to the SOP.
1. In the upper part of the continuation page,
write the Title
(Theme), or the name of the SUBJECT in the lower part and
the Date and number
of the file in the right portion of the paper. EXAMPLE:
BENITEZ, Wilfredo D.
DATE: 1 May 1988
FILE NUMBER: 50-88-0-1
H. Complete the "Distribution"
Section in block #24. The distribution
of the report will be made according to its SOP.
I. Complete the "Reviewed by"
section in block #25. The typewritten
name and signature of the authority that reviewed the report
is written down
in this section.
189
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
INVESTIGATION REPORT DATE SUBMITTED
_________________________________________________________________FOCUS
(HISTORY) CASE CLASSIFICATION
_____RAL _____RAG _____IAE _____IAI
_________________________________________________________
IDENTIFICATION DATA
1.LAST NAME FATH. MOTH. NAM., INIT. 2.I.D. 3.RACE 4.RANK
5.BRANCH
_________________________________________________________6
.POSITION7.
DATE OF BIRTH 8.
PLACE OF BIRTH
_________________________________________________________
9. UNIT OR
EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS 10. RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
_________________________________________________________
11. INCIDENT'S TITLE 12. INCIDENT'S DATE 13. INCIDENT'S TIME
_________________________________________________________14.LOCAL
(BUILD. UNIT) 15. EQUIPMENT, ETC. SERIAL NUN.
_________________________________________________________
CONTROL DATA
16. CONTROL SYMBOL OR
FILE NUMBER
__________________________________________________________________17.
INVESTIGATION DONE BY (ORG.) 18. CONTROL OFFICE
INVESTIGATION
DATA 19. INVESTIGATION
REQUEST BY20.
REASONS FOR INVESTIGATION
________________________________________
21. INVESTIGATION
DATE
START COMPLETION
________________________________________
________________________________________
22. PRESENT CASE
SITUATION
_____CLOSED _____FINISHED ______SUSPENDED ______PENDING
_______________________________________________________
23. SYNOPSIS
24. DISTRIBUTION
Back to Top 190
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 20 LN324-91
25.
REVIEWED BY
NAME AND TITLE SIGNATURE
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS
INTRODUCTION:
A summary report
(SR) is the vehicle used to summarize certain aspects
of an investigation, or give emphasis to key points of
actions in an
investigation. This report is not as detailed and is not
designed to replace
the Agent's Report. It is as the title implies, a summary.
The (SR) must
contain certain favorable or derogatory (unfavorable)
concise information
declarations, if it applies, this way the perspective of the
case or
investigation will not be altered.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Preparing the heading.
1. Write down the preparation date in the
"Date" section.
2. Write down the identity of the
"Preparing Office".
3. Write down the SUBJECT'S information using
the same rules in the
Agent's Report.
a. Father and
mother's last name in capital letters, name, initial.
b. Identification number.
c. Date and place of birth (FDLN).
EXAMPLE:
PEREZ-RIVERA, Juan A.
I.D.
NUMBER: 111-11-1101
PDOB: 1
January 1947, San Miguelito, ES
191
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
B. Write down the information to be reported
in the "Summary Report"
section. The text starts in the third line of the black line
in the upper part
of the block titled "Summary Report", leaving two
lines in the upper part. The
line or black border to the left of the document is used as
a margin for all
items.
1.
Write down the numbers in sequence. For example:
1.
2.
3.
2. Write down the classification contained in
each paragraph. For
example:
1. (C)
2. (S)
3. (NC)
3. Write down the evaluation code (key word)
of the information
content of each paragraph using the evaluation system shown
in the SR. The
evaluation code must be written down in the last line of the
paragraph in the
right edge (Figure 1).
NOTE: If there is not
enough space to write down the evaluation code in the
last line of the paragraph, the evaluation code will be
written down in a line
below the last line of the paragraph and in the extreme
right of the document.
Example:________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______he left in a Toyota with Cuban license plates.
(F-6)
192
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
C. Information Sources.
Information
sources normally are not revealed in the SR. If the report
is kept within military intelligence, the source could be
identified if the
identification is necessary to establish the truth of the
information. When
the source is not identified, for security purpose, an
indication of the
access to the information could be included while the
information about the
source is not as explicit that it identifies the source.
When the SR does not
reveal the source's identity the copy of the office files
should write down
the source(s) identity. A code number must be used when the
source's identity
requires protection. Bibliographies of the sources could be
added in the files
when using more than one source for the same report.
D. Information from other government agencies.
Information obtained
form other government agencies, except from the Armed
Forces, will not be
included in the SR. If other agencies outside the Armed
Forces solicit the
information obtained in the SR, the originator or the source
must give
permission for the information to be divulged. If the SR
contains information
that has been authorized to be divulged to other agencies,
this information
will be written in capital letters and underlined.
Example: THE SOURCE
WHO IS CONSIDERED TRUSTWORTHY INFORMED THE
__________________________________
___________(Figure 1, Paragraph 4).
When this type of information appears in the SR, the
following declaration
must be included and must appear as a non-numbered paragraph
and at the end,
written in capital letters. (Figure 1, Paragraph 4).
Example: INFORMATION
FROM OTHER SOURCES OUTSIDE THE SOURCES FROM THE ARMED
SOURCES ARE INCLUDED IN THIS SR. THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT
BE DIVULGED TO ANY
OTHER AGENCY OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES.
E. Additional space. If you need additional
space, two lines in the
lower part of the document will be left blank and the text
will continue in
blank paper with normal margins. In the upper part of the
white paper, the
SUBJECT'S block will be placed at left with the date and
reference files.
193
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
Example: 1
August 86
PEREZ-RIVERA, Juan A.
I.D. NUMBER: 111-11-1101
PDOB: 1 January 1947, San Miguelito, ES
he came into the restaurant and sat down at the corner table
where was
accompanied_____________________________________________
F. SR distribution.
The last item of the SR is the distribution. The
distribution will be indicated according to the SOP.
(Example in figure 1).
G. Closing the SR. The SR is not signed. The file copy will
have the person s
name who prepared the SR typewritten in the upper part at
the document's right
corner.
H. The SR will be
classified according to its content.
194
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
____________________________________________________________ SUMMARY
REPORT DATE
____________________________________________________________
PREPARING OFFICE
____________________________________________________________
SUBJECT SOURCE'S
EVALUATION CODE ABOUT THE
INFORMATION
COMPLETELY TRUSTWORTHYA CONFIRMED BY OTHER
NORMALLY TRUSTWORTHY
B SOURCES 1
COMFORTABLY TRUSTWORTHY
C PROBABLE TRUTH 2
NORMALLY NON-TRUSTWORTHY D POSSIBLE TRUTH 3
NON-TRUSTWORTHY
E DOUBTFUL TRUTH 4
TRUST NOT KNOWN
F IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT
BE
JUDGED 6
___________________________________________________________SUMMARY
REPORT
___________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION
___________________________________________________________________
Back to Top 195
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 21
LN324-91
SCRUTINY OF CI INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION:
The scrutiny
process and CI interrogation allows us to identify and
explore the persons/targets of interest to CI. This process
allows us to
detect these persons or targets, it helps us in the
imposition of the same in
an effective manner.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. DETERMINE THE PURPOSE OF THE SCRUTINY AND
CI INTERROGATION:
1. The CI
scrutiny operations, submit, in a systematic way, the
civilians in the combat area to a series of
questioning/interviews/interrogations with the purpose of:
a. Find and segregate suspicious persons.
b. Identify persons of interest to the CI.
(See Example #1).
NOTE: THE CI SCRUTINY
OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT TO INTERCEPT ENEMY
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS, SABOTAGE AGAINST, INSURRECTION TRYING
TO INFILTRATE OUR
AREA OF OPERATIONS.
c. Obtain information of immediate value to
the intelligence.
d. Obtain information that normally will not
be available to the
intelligence units.
2. The CI interrogation operations are carried
out to obtain the
maximum amount of information about the enemy's intelligence
operations in the
least possible time.
B. Determine the
types of scrutiny operations necessary to satisfy
search requirements and CI operations.
196
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #1
VARIED
CATEGORIES OF PERSONS THAT ARE OF INTEREST TO CI
1. REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS
2. BORDER
CROSSERS
3. ENEMY UNITS DESERTERS
4. CIVILIAN
PRISONERS AND WAR PRISONERS
5. CONCENTRATION CAMP CAPTIVES
6. RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS MEMBERS WHO ARE
INTERESTED IN JOINING OUR
LINES
7. ENEMY COLLABORATORS
8. CI TARGETS, SUCH AS THOSE APPEARING IN
BLACK, GREY AND WHITE LISTS
9. VOLUNTARY
INFORMANTS
10. PERSONS WHO HAVE TO BE INTERVIEWED BECAUSE
THEY ARE UNDER
CONSIDERATION FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE DEFENSE FORCES OR WITH
THE CIVILIAN
AFFAIRS OFFICE.
197
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
1. You must establish operations with a
central scrutiny focus
normally in the area of collection of war prisoners. This
central scrutiny
point:
a. Has as purpose to receive, segregate,
investigate and classify war
prisoners, border crossers, refugees, etc.
b. Receive persons captured by combat troops,
support and logistics
within the operations area.
2. Fixed checking points, are permanently
occupied by combat troops
or military police with the support of interrogation agents
or CI personnel,
in the entrance to towns, crossing of rivers, and in other
similarly strategic
areas.
3. Mobile checking points, (in vehicle, or on
foot) are used as a
mobile system for choosing persons of interest at random.
This point must be
located in various places and should not be fixed in the
same place for longer
than a day.
4. Wall in and search operations are used to
segregate the town, area
or valley, investigate the inhabitants and search residences
and public areas.
D. Determine the personnel requirements: The
normal investigation
equipment are Military Police, combat troops, civilian
affairs personnel,
interrogation agents and CI agents.
E. Determine the specific method of
identifying persons of interest
to CI:
1. Carry out initials interrogations of chosen
civilian and military
personnel.
2. Use the black, grey and white lists.
3. Use an informant/source who is infiltrated
in prison cells or
detention centers/war prisoners.
4. Place recording or sound equipment in the
detention areas of
refuges or war prisoners.
5. Distribute a list of CI indicators of
interest among the military
police, interrogation agents, civilian affairs personnel and
any other
personnel involved in investigations. (SEE EXAMPLE #2).
198
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
EXAMPLE #2
CI INDICATORS OF INTEREST
1. PERSONS IN
MILITARY AGE
2. PERSONS WHO
TRAVEL ALONE OR AS A COUPLE
3. PERSONS WITHOUT
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
4. PERSONS WITH
STRANGE DOCUMENTS
5. PERSONS WHO HAVE
GREAT AMOUNTS OF MONEY, JEWELS IN THEIR POSSESSION.
6. PERSONS WHO SHOW
UNUSUAL ACTIONS
7. PERSONS WHO TRY
TO AVOID DETENTION OR INTERROGATION
8. PERSONS WHO USE
ENEMY'S METHODS OF OPERATION
9. PERSONS KNOWN AS
ENEMY SYMPATHIZERS
10. PERSONS WITH A
SUSPICIOUS HISTORY BACKGROUND
11. PERSONS WITH
RELATIVES IN THE ENEMY'S AREA
12. PERSONS WHO HAVE
TECHNICAL SKILLS OR SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE
13. PERSONS WHO HAVE
COLLABORATED
14. PERSONS WHO
DISOBEY THE LAWS IN THE ENEMYS AREA
199
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
E. Examine the files of the data base from the
infrastructure of the
enemy's intelligence so as to become familiar with:
1. Operation methods
2. Procedures/rules
3. Objectives
4. Offices and sub-offices
5. Known agents
F. Study the areas under the enemy's control
so as to become familiar
with:
1. The geography
2. Points/historical or tourist areas
3. Distances and road conditions
4. Political situation
5. Social and economic traditions
6. Traditions and customs
7. Racial problems
G.
Analyze the operations area to determine:
1. Curfews
2. Movement restrictions
3. Rationing
4. Obligatory service for army
5. Labor civilian programs
6. Requisite to become a member in political
organizations
7. Other restrictions that have been imposed
by the population
200
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
8. Acquiring knowledge of all the restrictions
that have been imposed
to the population could help you to:
a. Detect discrepancies
b. Recognize changes in enemy activities
c. Maintain control
H. We
must study the situation and the files of the order of battle
to become familiar with:
1. Enemy units in the area of operations
2. Enemy units adjacent to area of operations
3. Dispositions
4. Capacities
5. Weaknesses/vulnerabilities
6. Composition
7. Training
8. Equipment
9. Activities or recent operations
10. History
11. Personalities and commanders
I. Analyze the intelligence priority requirements
of the commander to
recognize, detect, explore and report the facts of the Order
of Battle (OB).
NOTE: THE CI AGENT
DOES NOT QUESTION THE SUSPECTS WITH THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM OB; NEVERTHELESS, EACH CI AGENT
MUST FAMILIARIZE
HIMSELF WITH THE COMMANDER'S RPI/RI TO RECOGNIZE PERSONS WHO
POSSIBLY HAVE THE
OB INFORMATION.
J. Prepare a list of indicators to help the
investigations personnel
in identifying the hostile infiltrators/enemies.
201
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
L. Coordinate WITH:
1. The commander in regards to the segregation
of refugees and war
prisoners in your area of operation.
2. The military police for the control of
evacuation of refugees and
war prisoners.
3. WITH the G5 for the support of civilian
affairs and psychological
operations.
4. The civilian authorities if the control of
the area has been
returned to them.
5. WITH the interrogation agents to:
a. Agree on the categories of persons that
will be transferred to CI
control for further questioning.
b. Decide where to place the CI interrogation
agents and the methods
use to transfer the detained from one place to another.
M. To carry out the initial investigation of
the persons:
1. You must segregate the detained, if they
are more than one,
according to the following manner:
a. Civilians from military men
b. Officers from troop soldiers
c. You must segregate them even more if
necessary according to:
1. Nationality
2. Sex
3. Rank
4. Branch of military service
NOTE: YOU SHOULD
SEGREGATE PERSONS IF THERE IS ENOUGH PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO
CARRY OUT THIS OPERATION.
202
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2. Determine the apparent level of knowledge
of the person evaluating
the following:
a. His physical appearance.
b. All documents, arms and equipment held that
was captured WITH the
person.
3. Select personnel of CI interest, comparing
the person WITH the
indicators in Example #2 and the type of persons in Example
#1.
N. Carry out the interrogations of specific
persons
O.
Make a disposition of the persons:
1. Exploit persons who have access and are
settled in areas of
interest.
2. Transfer these persons to the central point
of investigation to be
reintroduced to the flow/group of war prisoners and refugees.
P. Complete the required reports.
Back to Top 203
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 22
LN324-91
CI INTERROGATION OF SUSPECTS
INTRODUCTION:
The CI
(espionage) agent in combat could only have a minimum amount of
information with which to conduct the work or have minimum
knowledge of the
situation and the area. In spite of his conclusions been
based in that minimum
amount of information, he must be impartial in the search
for facts. As a CI
espionage agent you must have two things in mind in working
as an
interrogator, the detection and prevention of a threat and
the security of the
armed forces and the collection of information of interest
for the departments
of intelligence.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Carry out an exhaustive study of all the
material available in the
case under investigation:
1. The interrogation is the art of questioning
and examining a source
to obtain the maximum quantity of useful information. The
goat of
interrogation is to obtain true and useful information in a
legal manner and
in the minimum amount of time possible.
2. To do effective work and carry out a
logical sequence of
questions, you must always have in mind all that you know to
that moment about
the case under investigation.
a. Identify yourself to all persons involved
in the incident,
including witnesses, victims, and investigations.
b. Identify the exact circumstances of the
incident occurred.
c. Determine where each incident happened or
activity.
d. Identify how it happened.
e. Identify why it happened.
2. Pay particular attention to all the details
of the case,
especially those details that are not of public knowledge as
yet.
204
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. Become familiar WITH the legal aspects and
procedures that apply
to the case.
a. Identify the elements of the crime that
could help you determine
the objectives of the interrogation.
b. Identify the illegal or prohibited methods.
Do not use force,
mental torture, threats, insults or exposition to cruel or
inhuman treatment
of any sort.
NOTE: IN CASE THAT
THERE IS DOUBT IN REGARDS TO THE LEGALITY OF A METHOD,
CONSULT WITH AN AUTHORITY IN A HIGHER ECHELON TO CLARIFY THE
DOUBTS.
B. Identify possible suspects for
interrogation:
1. Become familiar completely WITH the history
of the suspects.
History data of particular interest during the interrogation
include:
a.
Age, place of birth, nationality and race.
b. Rank, or position in the community.
c. Level of education.
d. Present and past occupations.
e. Habits.
f. Associates (business partners)
g. Criminal history.
NOTE: IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION BEFORE
THE INTERROGATION,
OBTAIN IT FROM THE SUSPECT DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE
INTERROGATION.
3. Use the history of the suspect information
to:
a. Develop the best method of questioning
b. Prove the truthful intention of the suspect
205
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Impress the fact to the suspect that the
detailed fact is the
investigation of the case.
3. Determine the available information, what
type of attitude is
expected from the suspect.
a. Cooperative and friendly: Offers little
resistance and he will
talk freely about almost any theme.
b. Neutral and non-sharing: Will cooperate up
to a certain point.
Direct questions and to the grain of the matter will have to
be used to obtain
the answers.
c. Hostile and antagonistic: Frequently, will
refuse to talk and will
offer much resistance.
4. Classify the suspects according to the
following:
a. Persons WITH previous offenses and whose
guilt is almost certain
according to information already available.
b. Persons whose guilt is doubtful or
uncertain due to the weak
evidence available or the lack of essential facts.
5. If possible, carry out a visual observation
of the suspect before
the interrogation takes place to identify weaknesses that
could be exploited
during the interrogation.
C. Prepare an interrogation plan:
1. Identify the objective of the
interrogation:
All interrogation
must have a defined purpose. This purpose must be kept
in mind during the entire preparation process and when the
interrogation is
carried out. But, it must not be concentrated so much in the
objective as to
allow another valuable information to be overlooked during
the interrogation.
2. Identify the type of interrogation:
a. Direct interrogation: The suspect knows
that he is been
interrogated. Nevertheless perhaps he does not know the true
objective of the
interrogation. This method takes less time than the other
one.
206
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Indirect interrogation: Obtain information
through deception. The
suspect does not have any idea that he is been interrogated.
This method
requires a careful planning, extreme discretion, and must be
applied WITH much
skill.
3. Identify and obtain the helpful things
required for interrogation:
a. Files
b. Documents
c. Maps/charts
d. Pencil, notebooks, tape recorder, etc.
e. Any other equipment that could facilitate
the process of
interrogation.
4. Identify the approximation methods that
will be used during the
interrogation:
NOTE: SELECTING AN
INITIAL APPROXIMATION IS NECESSARY, BUT YOU MUST KEEP THE
FLEXIBILITY OF MOVING FROM ONE APPROXIMATION METHOD TO
ANOTHER.
5. APPROXIMATION METHODS:
a. DIRECT APPROXIMATION: Do not try to hide
the purpose of the
interrogation. It works better when it is used WITH persons
whose guilt is
almost certain and WITH those persons that have little
knowledge of what
security is. It is a
good method to interrogate persons of low level or rank
in organizations. This method takes little time and is
simple. This method
offers the best opportunity to demonstrate empathy and
understanding to the
suspect. Act as if the offense is something that the suspect
will not commonly
do. Treat the suspect as a rational person who was only
exposed to the
circumstances of the case.
207
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. FILE AND DOSSIER: Prepare a file that
contains all the information
collected about the suspect. A careful arrangement of the
information in the
file could give the appearance of having much more
information than it really
has. Put additional papers, although they do not contain
information to just
give the appearance of an enormous file. Mark the file WITH
different
sections/areas of interest about the history of the suspect.
Confront the
suspect WITH the file and warn him that it contains detailed
information of
his background history and activities and that it is useless
for him to refuse
to cooperate in the interrogation. The triumph of this
method depends upon the
immaturity of the suspect, the amount of information
available, and the skills
used by the interrogation agent to convince the suspect.
c. WE KNOW IT ALL: Make questions based upon
information that is
already known to us. When the suspect refuses to answer,
hesitates, or
provides incorrect information, you yourself provide the
information or
correct answer. If it is used correctly, you may convince
the suspect that we
know it all and that his answers are not of real importance.
When the suspect
starts to answer truthfully, weave other questions, of which
we do not have
the answers. Always verify the truthfulness of the suspect
starting to make
the questions of which we know the information. This method
could be used WITH
or without the files and dossier method.
d. FUTILITY/USELESSNESS: You must convince the
suspect that resisting
to answer to the interrogation is useless. Present true information
to the
suspect in a persuasive and logical manner to exploit the
psychological and
moral weaknesses of the persons.
e. QUICK SHOT: Make a series of questions to
the suspect in a way
that he will not have time to answer one before the next one
is made. Since
the suspect does not have time to formulate his answers he
will get confused
and could contradict himself. Confront him WITH the
inconsistence of his
answers, so that perhaps he may reveal more information than
he wishes. This
provides leads to further questions. Prepare all questions
beforehand. Use a
competent experienced interrogator. Use this method
immediately after his
arrest to take advantage of his state of confusion.
208
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
f. INCENTIVE: To reward the suspect's
cooperation and the fact of
telling the truth, this is attained normally by providing
him WITH some
physical commodity, (cigarettes, sweet, coffee, etc.) that
normally is not
given to him. Do not make promises or commitments that are
beyond your ability
to fulfill. Use caution to avoid that the suspect gives
false information WITH
the intention of getting the article he wishes. Never deny
the basic articles
of human needs. Do not use the threat of taking food so as
to obtain his
cooperation.
g. REPETITION: Make a question, wait for the
answer, and repeat the
question and the answer several times. This is done WITH all
questions until
the suspect is totally bored and starts to give unexpected
answers so as to
break the boredom. This method works better WITH a hostile
person. Generally
it does not work WITH an introverted or timid person.
h. MATT AND JEFF: You must use two experienced
interrogators that
could develop two different personalities towards the
suspect. The first
interrogator acts very formal, little sympathetic, and at
times rude, noisy
and aroused. The second interrogator appears when the suspect
feels lost and
alone. The second scolds the first interrogator for his poor
professional
conduct and orders that he leaves the interrogation room.
The second
interrogator apologizes WITH the suspect and tries to calm
him. He shows
empathy WITH the suspect and tries to establish some common
ground between the
two, for example: both are intelligent and sensitive, while
the first
interrogator was not. The idea is that the first
interrogator could return to
the interrogation and help if the suspect stops to
cooperate.
i. PRIDE: This method could be used in two
ways. Attack the pride of
the suspect accusing him of being weak or insinuating his
poor ability to do
anything. The suspect who is proud will hurry to defend his
abilities.
Frequently this will explain why he did or did not do
something just to defend
his honor. You may obtain important information from his
answers. The other
way to use this method is to praise the suspect until you
get him to admit
certain information as a way of reclaiming
responsibility/credit. This brings
the suspect an opportunity to boast what the has done.
209
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
j. SILENCE METHOD: Do not say anything to the
suspect, but look at
him fixedly in the eyes. Do not move your gaze, but make him
break the eye
contact. As the suspect gets nervous, he will start to make
questions, but do
not break the silence until you are prepared to do so. Keep
this method for
some time and the suspect will get nervous. When breaking
the silence you must
question the suspect WITH questions that indicate his guilt.
k. CHANGE IN SCENARIO: Take the suspect out of
the interrogation room
environment. Take the suspect to a more peaceful but
controlled area that
could give the opportunity to have a peaceful and nice
conversation during
which you may pull the necessary information from the
suspect.
1. ESTABLISH HIS IDENTITY: It is alleged that
the suspect is not the
person he claims to be, but that he is a person who the
police authorities are
searching for political assassinations and acts of terrorism
and treason, or
any serious accusation. In his intent to establish his identity,
the suspect
could give valuable information and leads for further
investigations.
m. EMOTIONAL: Determine what emotion motivates
the suspect (hate,
love, vengeance, desire to make money) and exploit that
emotion. This method
is very effective when you use immature and timid persons.
5. Develop detailed questions to use during
the interrogation:
a. Develop questions that guarantee that the
area of interest is
exploited.
b. Develop questions that establish all facts
(who, what, when,
where, why and how).
c. Develop control questions of which the
answers are already known.
d. Develop non-pertinent questions if the true
objective of the
interrogation is been hidden from the suspect. Use
non-pertinent questions to
break the suspect's concentration.
210
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e. Develop repeated questions making the same
questions but in a
different way.
f. Develop direct questions that require a
narrative answer.
g. Develop follow-up questions that allow the
expansion of
themes/areas as they become necessary.
D. Select the interrogation personnel based in
the selected
approximation, type of suspect, and the ability of the
interrogation agents.
1. Select an interrogation agent that has
personality characteristics
that are adequate and an interest in human nature. Personal
qualities desired
in an interrogation agent are:
1) Motivation
2) Be alert
3) Patience and tact
4) Objectivity
5) Credibility
6) Adaptability
7) Perseverance
8) Linguistic skills
2. Select an interrogation group, if possible.
It is necessary to
have a group to successfully use much of the approximation
methods already
discussed. Additionally, an interrogation agent could notice
that he cannot
obtain the necessary information after having used various
approximations and
techniques, or is tired in the middle of a long
interrogation. This could
cause the loss of control of the interrogation and another
interrogation agent
must replace the first.
E. Guide the interrogation group in the
approximation methods already
selected and the role that each one will play in the
interrogation.
211
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
F. Make all the arrangements in regards to the
suspect:
1. Coordinate the arrest of the suspect.
a. Make arrangements WITH the police to detain
the suspect.
2. Make the arrangements to locate the suspect
and give him board
after the arrest.
3. Coordinate the use of facilities to give
food to the suspect.
4. Coordinate the services of an interpreter
if necessary.
5. If the suspect is of the opposite sex
coordinate the presence of a
witness of the same sex if necessary. It is also good to
coordinate the
presence of a witness to observe how the information is
obtained; and so as to
avoid that the suspect accuses us of using ilegal tactics
such as torture,
coercion and mental abuse.
a. Obtain the authorization of the commander to
use a witness
in the interrogation.
NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT
IS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX, INFORM HIM OR HER OF HIS OR HER
RIGHT TO HAVE A WITNESS OF THE SAME SEX PRESENT DURING THE
INTERROGATION. IF
THE SUSPECT DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE A WITNESS OF THE SAME SEX
PRESENT, OBTAIN A
SIGNED SWORN DECLARATION, INDICATING THIS WISH. (ALTHOUGH
THE SUSPECT REFUSES
TO USE A WITNESS, PLACE A WITNESS OF THE SAME SEX AT A
DISTANCE THAT COULD
LISTEN TO WHAT GOES ON DURING THE INTERROGATION WITHOUT BEEN
SEEN BY THE
SUSPECT.
G. Select and prepare the interrogation room:
1. Select a room that gives privacy during the
interrogation.
Eliminate all distraction possible.
2. Select a room that allows you to control
the physical environment.
212
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3. Select a room that has a nice constant
temperature.
4. Arrange the furniture in the interrogation
room. The furniture
must be only a small table to write, but that does not give
an area in which
the suspect could hide under, and three chairs.
5. Place all material necessary during the
interrogation in the room.
Materials such as paper, pencil, reference manuals and other
interrogation
aids.
NOTE: DO NOT HAVE A
TELEPHONE OR ANY ARTICLE THAT COULD BE USED AS AN ARM IN
THE INTERROGATION ROOM.
H. Install and test the recording equipment.
Use the recording
equipment so that you could keep your concentration during
the interrogation.
Taking notes during the interrogation could break the rhythm
of the
questioning and it could cause you to loose the sequence of
the questions and
the concentration.
1. Install the recording equipment so that it
is looks as if it is
part of the furniture of the office.
NOTE: TO USE THE
RECORDING EQUIPMENT, FIRST CONSULT WITH THE SUSPECT AND GET
HIS PERMISSION.
2. Test the equipment to make sure that it is
functioning correctly.
I. Receive and identify the suspect:
1. During the initial contact keep a
professional posture and try to
gain the trust of the suspect.
2. Verify the identity of the suspect and
examine his personal
documents.
J. Identify yourself and the other members of
the interrogation
equipment. Use your official badge to make sure that the
suspect knows your
identity as a member of the military intelligence.
K. Explain to the suspect that the nature of
the accusation is
against his behalf.
213
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page Missing
w/L-M-N-O LN324-91
b. Try to identify contradictions and
weaknesses in the history of
the suspect.
5. Change interrogation agents if the first
interrogation agent
cannot obtain true information or a confession after having
used various
approximation techniques.
6. If all the approximations fail with the
suspect, confront him with
crime witnesses if possible.
7. If necessary, make a final convincing
appeal against the suspect's
continuous resistance.
a. Insist in appealing the existence of all
evidence against
him.
b. Confront the suspect with the contradictions
and weaknesses
in his history.
Q. If the suspect admits culpability, obtain a
sworn declaration
signed by him.
R. CLOSING PHASE OF THE INTERROGATION:
1. Close the interrogation for any of the
following reasons:
a. If the suspect is sick, wounded, or
advanced age and needs medical
attention.
b. Various interrogations are necessary to
obtain all the necessary
information.
c. The suspect is bored and denies to
cooperate.
d. All the questions have been answered and
the requirements of the
interrogation have been satisfied.
e. The initiative has been lost and you as
interrogation agent decide
to close the interrogation.
2. When the interrogation is closed, always
consider the
possibility of interrogating the suspect again.
a. Finish the interrogation in a nice manner.
214
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Re-emphasize the approximations used to
gain confidence from the
suspect.
c. Give opportunity to the suspect to add
additional information to
the one already given.
3. Use the time dedicated to the Closing to
try to obtain information
that may have not been discussed during the interrogation. A
suspect could
relax a little more after knowing that the interrogation has
been finished and
he could reveal additional information.
S. Disposing of the suspect:
1. Have the police put him under custody.
2. Give the suspect to pertinent civil
authorities.
3. Give the suspect to the commander's
custody.
T. PREPARE THE REQUIRED REPORTS
Back to Top 215
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 23 LN324-91
EXTRACTING CI INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION:
Wheedling is
applied always with a specific purpose in mind. The
objective, or the information desired, is the SUBJECT'S
determining factor, of
the wheedler, and the environment.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Definition of WHEEDLING: Wheedling is the
technique of obtaining
the greatest amount of information/useful intelligence, from
a person or
source, so that the person does not know our purpose.
1. Before starting the wheedling there are
requirements of CI
collection to be reviewed:
a. Identify the required specific information.
b. Identify the wheedling objective.
2. Select the SUBJECT of the wheedling
according to his access to, or
knowledge of, the information desired.
3. Obtain and evaluate all information
available in regards to the
SUBJECT in the wheedling:
a. Carry out the review of files and try to
obtain the following
information about the SUBJECT:
1) History
2) Motivations
3) Emotions
4) Psychological nature
5) Habits or patterns
6) Favorite visiting places. (bars,
restaurants, discos, etc.)
7) Favorite hobbies
216
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
8) What level of knowledge he has about
security that person has.
9) If he has been previously used in other
wheedling intents by other
CI agents.
4. Determine in what place/specific
environment the wheedling will
take place.
a.
Select the place where the approximation to the SUBJECT/Source
will take place.
NOTE: A SUBJECT must be approached in a natural environment
to avoid raising
his suspicion.
b. Obtain al the information about the place
selected:
1) Identify all the place's irregular traces or
facts.
2) Identify what type of clothes will be
required to enter that
place. (Formal: shirt and tie; Informal: shorts, jeans,
etc).
3) Identify the money requirements. (It is a
place where food or
products are expensive or cheap).
4) Identify possible security problems
5) Identify if the place has been used
previously as a wheedling
place.
c. Select the date and time more desirable for
the approximation.
5. Select for yourself a logical story
(cover), one that could be
credible and is according WITH the situation. The history
must explain:
a. The reason you have to be in the chosen place
for the
approximation.
b. The agent's actions during the
conversation.
6. Carry out the approximation using one of
two approximation
techniques: Flattery and Provocation, or any variation of
these two techniques
as mentioned below:
217
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. Use the flattery method:
1) Appeal to the ego, pride of the SUBJECT.
Give him (SUBJECT)
the opportunity to show pride or so that he flatters himself
about his
triumphs and gains.
2) Insinuate that the SUBJECT is an expert in a
specific area,
topic or theme. In this manner you will give him the
opportunity to feel as if
he is the teacher and you are the pupil.
3) Offer him (SUBJECT) valid and honest
assistance.
4) Discuss areas of mutual interest. (Hobbies,
work, sports,
etc.)
NOTE: The agent must have a good knowledge of the theme he
thinks he will
choose to show mutual interest (that is to be able to follow
the conversation
professionally)
b. Use the approach method of provocation to
open the conversation
WITH the SUBJECT:
1) Adopt an attitude as if you do not believe
what the SUBJECT
says:
"What you
say, is very difficult to believe, you have to explain it to
me in more detail to see if it is true".
2) Insinuate that the SUBJECT really does not
know anything of
what he is talking about.
7. Once the approach has taken place, take the
conversation to the
area of interest:
a. Try to obtain more information give him
answers that the SUBJECT
finds obscure and that require more information to clarify
them.
b. Ask the SUBJECT for more. information when
his answers are not
clear enough: ("I agree WITH you, although, what does
it mean....").
NOTE: Be persistent
without being abusive, bored or insolent.
218
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Present a hypothetical situation that could
be associated WITH an
idea or thought expressed by the SUBJECT.
NOTE: Many persons
that normally do not make comments about a real situation,
will give his opinion about hypothetical situations.
d. Use your imagination and initiative to keep
complete control of
the conversation at all times.
8. Finish
the (unclear]a. Use the flattery method:
1) Appeal to the ego, pride of the SUBJECT.
Give him (SUBJECT)
the opportunity to show pride or so that he flatters himself
about his
triumphs and gains.
2) Insinuate that the SUBJECT is an expert in a
specific area,
topic or theme. In this manner you will give him the
opportunity to feel as if
he is the teacher and you are the pupil.
3) Offer him (SUBJECT) valid and honest
assistance.
4) Discuss areas of mutual interest. (Hobbies,
work, sports,
etc.)
NOTE: The agent must
have a good knowledge of the theme he thinks he will
choose to show mutual interest (that is to be able to follow
the conversation
professionally).
b. Use the approach method of provocation to
open the conversation
WITH the SUBJECT:
1) Adopt an attitude as if you do not believe
what the SUBJECT
says:
"What you
say, is very difficult to believe, you have to explain it to
me in more detail to see if it is true".
2) Insinuate that the SUBJECT really does not
know anything of
what he is talking about.
7. Once the approach has taken place, take the
conversation to the
area of interest:
a. Try to obtain more information give him
answers that the SUBJECT
finds obscure and that require more information to clarify
them.
b. Ask the SUBJECT for more information when
his answers are not
clear enough: ("I agree WITH you, although, what does
it mean....").
NOTE: Be persistent
without being abusive, bored or insolent.
219
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Present a hypothetical situation that could
be associated WITH an
idea or thought expressed by the SUBJECT.
NOTE: Many persons
that normally do not make comments about a real situation,
will give his opinion about hypothetical situations.
d.
Use your imagination and initiative to keep complete control of
the conversation at all times.
8. Finish the wheedling as soon as you obtain
all the
information desired:
a. Change the conversation theme to others
before leaving and bidding
goodbye to the SUBJECT.
b. Present various non-pertinent themes to
avoid that the SUBJECT
discovers its true purpose. (Wheedle intelligence
information).
c. Finish the conversation in a normal manner.
9. Take notes of all the official funds
expenses.
B. Prepare the required reports.
Back to Top 220
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 24
LN324-91
DETECTING CI TARGETS
INTRODUCTION:
The
identification of CI targets are done through the intelligence
rules. A data base WITH a line and block box, used in
connection WITH existing
black, grey and white lists, intelligence reports and
additional information
from the police agencies, army and other agencies, provides
us WITH basic
information required to identify the potential CI targets.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Review the CI estimate to determine the
hostile threat:
1. Identify those threats to security that are
of an immediate
nature.
2. Identify anticipated future threats.
NOTE: The selection
of CI targets must be based in an evaluation of a
complete hostile threat.
B. Identify the specific CI targets of the
local area:
a. The CI targets are of interest due to the
threat that they
present, or the usefulness to the Armed Forces. CI targets
include:
a. PERSONALITIES (SEE FIGURES #2, 3 and 4):
that could or not be
friendly or hostile.
b. INSTALLATIONS (SEE FIGURE #5): that
represent a threat to the
national security.
c. ORGANIZATIONS AND TeamS (SEE FIGURE #6):
that represent a threat
to the national security. Its threat perhaps is not openly
detectable due to
their undercover operation methods.
d. DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS (SEE FIGURE #7):
WITH value to the
intelligence or the counter intelligence.
NOTE: Use the CI Work
Sheet (SEE FIGURE #1) as the principal paper to assist
in the development of the targets:
221
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3. Obtain information about the potential CI
targets in the local
area:
a. Extract the local targets from the CI target
lists at
national level.
b. Extract information from the existing Black
lists (SEE
FIGURE #2), White (SEE FIGURE #3), and Grey (SEE FIGURE #4).
c. Extract information from the intelligence
files, CI data
base, and similar files.
d. Obtain information from:
1) Civilian Affairs and Psychological
Operations (G5)
2) Local intelligence units
3) Police elements
C. Categorize the CI targets identified by the
specialty or function.
Examples:
1) Espionage agents
2) Sabotage specialists
3) Messengers
4) Camps or bases
5) Communications and link routes
NOTE: To categorize
the targets in this manner, it is essential that the
history detailed information is obtained from the same
source that was used to
identify them.
D. Assign priorities to the targets:
1. Determine the priority of each Target based
on:
a. The threat to the national security that the
target
represents.
b. The urgency or the need to neutralize or
exploit the target.
c. The future capacities that await the target.
d. The capacities of the units responsible to
neutralize or
exploit the targets.
222
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2. Assign a numerical priority to each target:
a. The numerical designations are always
expressed in roman
numerals (I, IV, XI).
b. The numerical designation emphasizes the
relative importance
or the value of the CI targets.
c. The numerical designation expresses the
level of interest of
the target.
NOTE: If a target has
been assigned a priority at a level higher than the
Command, you at your level cannot alter this priority
designation. The local
CI elements will assign priorities to targets locally
developed.
E. Assign the responsibilities of the units to
neutralization or
exploitation of each target:
1. Determine the capacities of the units to
carry out
neutralization or exploitation missions based on:
a. Amount of personnel
b. Equipment available
c. Specific experience
2. Identify the need, if any, to request
support from the
military police, infantry, national police, etc.
NOTE: The tactical
effort, except in special cases, takes precedence over the
neutralization and exploitation of the targets.
F. Notify the units of their mission(s).
223
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #1
CI TARGETS WORK SHEET
REFERENCES TO CHARTS, MAPS DATE:
_________________________________________________________________
KEYS TO CHART:
1. Target
2. Target
classification
3. Priority
4. Localization
5. Team task
6. Team mission
(Comments)
7. An administrative
number that is written down in chronological order.
8. The
classification identifies the target by type, name and provides
specific data for identification about the target.
9. The priority is
designated WITH roman numerals and is assigned based
upon the target classification.
10. The localization
will identify the place where you may find the target
or if this is not known, it is identified where the target
was found the last
time.
11. The team's task
of identifying the CI team whose mission is to
neutralize the target is based in the number of persons
available and could
include tactical forces, military police and para-military
forces.
12. This column is
used to make a list of the coordination requirements,
communications, specific details of the mission or other
specific information
required so that the team could fulfill its mission.
224
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #2
BLACK LISTS
THESE CONTAIN THE
IDENTITIES AND LOCALIZATIONS OF PERSONS WHOSE CAPTURE
AND DETENTION ARE OF FOREMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE ARMED
FORCES:
EXAMPLES
a. Enemy agents known or suspects, persons
involved in espionage,
sabotage, politics, and subversive persons.
b. Hostile para-military guerilla team
leaders, known or suspects.
c. Political leaders known or suspected as
hostile toward the Armed
Forces or the political interests of the National
Government.
d. Known or suspected leaders of enemy
governments whose presence in
the area of operations represent a threat the national
security.
e. Collaborators and sympathizers of the
enemy, known or suspects
whose presence in the area of operations represent a threat
to the national
security.
f. Military and civilian enemies, known or
suspected of having
participated in intelligence activities, counter-intelligence,
security,
police or political indoctrination between the troops or
among civilians.
g. Other personalities identified by the G2 as
of immediate
detention. This could include local political personalities,
chiefs of police,
and municipal leaders or leaders of the enemy's government
departments.
225
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #3
GREY LISTS
CONTAINS THE IDENTITIES AND LOCALIZATION OF THOSE
PERSONALITIES WHOSE
INCLINATIONS AND ACTIVITIES TOWARD THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT ARE OBSCURE (THAT IS, NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT
THEM). THEIR
INCLINATIONS OR ATTITUDES DOES NOT MATTER, IF THEY HAVE SOME
INFORMATION OR
SKILLS THAT ARE OF INTEREST TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
THOSE PERSONS WHOSE
INCLINATIONS OR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS REQUIRE MORE
EXPLORATION OR EVALUATION
BEFORE THEY COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY BY THE GOVERNMENT
CANNOT BE INCLUDED.
EXAMPLES
a. Defectors or potential defectors of the
enemy cause whose
motivation or loyalty has not been yet established.
b. Persons that have resisted or are believed
to have resisted the
enemy government and that perhaps are willing to cooperate
WITH the Armed
Forces of the National Government, but their motivation or
loyalty has not yet
been established.
c. Nuclear scientists, physicists and technical
personnel suspected
of having participated in development of nuclear projects
for the enemy, or
nuclear missile programs, against their will.
226
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #4
WHITE LISTS
CONTAIN THE IDENTITIES AND LOCALIZATION OF PERSONS IN AREAS
CONTROLLED BY THE
ENEMY WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS OF INTEREST TO THE
INTELLIGENCE OR TO THE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY COULD
PROVIDE INFORMATION
OR ASSISTANCE IN THE ACCUMULATION OF INTELLIGENCE OR IN THE
EXPLOITATION OF
AREAS OF INTEREST. NORMALLY THESE PERSONS AGREE WITH, OR
FAVORABLY BEND
TOWARDS THE BELIEFS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS ARE BASED
IN A VOLUNTARY AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE. THE DECISION TO
PLACE A PERSON IN A
WHITE LIST COULD BE AFFECTED BY THE COMBAT SITUATION, THE CRITICAL
NEED FOR
SPECIALISTS IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELDS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE
NEEDS.
a. Ex-political leaders of a hostile
government that were deposed by
the hostile political leaders.
b. Intelligence agents employed by the
National Government.
c. Key civilians in the scientific development
areas could include
members of university faculties, whose loyalty has been
established.
d. Religious team leaders and other
humanitarian team leaders.
e. Other persons who could give significant
material support to
political objectives, scientists and military personnel of
the National
Government and whose loyalty has been established.
227
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #5
INSTALLATIONS
1. COMMAND POSTS.
2. COMMUNICATION
CENTERS.
3. INVESTIGATION AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTERS, LABORATORIES.
4. INSTALLATIONS
THAT FORMERLY OR AT PRESENT ARE OCCUPIED BY ENEMY
ESPIONAGE AGENCIES, SABOTAGE, AND INSURRECTION, OR ENEMY
POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
INCLUDING PRISONS.
5. INSTALLATIONS
OCCUPIED BY ENEMY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OR SECURITY.
6. BELLIGERENT
DEPOTS.
7. EMBASSIES OR
HOSTILE GOVERNMENT CONSULATES.
8. MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS.
9. PARA-MILITARY
Team CAMPS
FIGURE #6
ORGANIZATIONS AND TeamS
1. Local or national political party teams, or
parties that have
goals, beliefs or ideologies contrary or in opposition to
the National
Government.
2. Para-military organizations including student
teams, police,
military and veterans, or ex-fighter teams that are hostile
towards the
National Government.
3. Teams or hostile organizations whose
objective is to create
dissention or cause restlessness among the civilian
population in the area of
operations.
4. The central offices of these hostile
organizations according to
what the Commander of the Armed Forces says will be
immediately neutralized.
Personalities related WITH these offices will be arrested
and detained.
5. Teams that operate undercover or
clandestinely and their
infrastructure.
6. Intelligence networks.
228
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE #7
DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
1. Files at bases, training centers and enemy
intelligence schools.
2. Court files (Judicial), prisons, police,
and the political
administrative executives.
3. National intelligence agencies' files,
para-military
organizations, and the enemy's secret police agencies.
4. Products or other materials that, if left
unguarded could provide
support to the enemy guerrilla in the area.
5. Special war materials:
a. Chemical war products
b. Harmful materials
c. New combat products
d. Rockets and rocket control centers
e. Airships
f. Charts and maps warehouses
g. Communication equipment, including radios,
radars and electronic
equipment.
Back to Top 229
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 25
LN324-91
NEUTRALIZING CI TARGETS
INTRODUCTION:
When identifying
the potential CI target, those are categorized by their
corresponding types. It is imperative to know not only the
identity of the
target or the team, but also all the possible history
information and
functions of the target. Experiences have shown us that a
follow-up of a
specific target, the best methods are traps and intercept
tactics.
GENERAL FACTS:
A. Determine what Target is going to be
neutralized.
B. Analyze the CI target work sheet (SEE
FIGURE #1) to be able to
identify:
1. The target that has been assigned to your
CI team (columns 2 and
5)
2. The target localization (column 4).
3. The necessary requirements for this
coordination (column 6).
C. Determine the method for neutralization of
personalities:
1. Select the method to neutralize
personalities:
a. Place the identity of the target in the
black grey and white
lists (REFER TO CHAPTER XXIII).
NOTE: Placing the
target identity in the above-mentioned lists do not
neutralizes him if the target is "undercover" or
"clandestine", but it
constitutes the first phase of this type of neutralization
and allows the
friendly forces to detain the target if they find him in the
area of
operations.
b. Carry out the investigation operations and
or approach and search
and review to segregate, identify and detain the target
personalities.
[REFER TO CHAPTER XXIV, DETECTING CI TARGETS, FIGURE #1--CI
TARGET WORK SHEET)
230
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Carry out the psychological operations
against the personalities:
1) Carry out the propaganda operations to
discredit the target.
NOTE: Operations of
this type must be prepared in detail and coordinated
through the G5 (Civilian Affairs).
2) Carry out operations so as to make the
target supervisors
loose trust in him.
3) Carry out operations so that the enemy
believes that his
agent(s) has been uncovered or committed.
d. Carry out Deceit/conceal operations.
Neutralization through
deception could work WITH the use of false information to
confuse the target.
e. Neutralize the personality target through
the capture, detention
or the exile.
f. Use the population control and other resources:
1) Use controls to locate and capture the
target, such as:
a) Search all persons in the
target's area.
b) Give identity badges to the
population.
c) Impose rationing of resources,
such as, provisions,
the food, etc., and give the population rationing cards.
NOTE: The targets
that are of CI interest will try to avoid all these
controls so as to avoid been captured or identified. Persons
that do not have
the badge in their possession or the rationing card,
automatically will become
suspicious.
2) Use controls to limit or slow down the
movements of the
target, such as:
a) Requiring official passes to
access specific areas.
231
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b) Implement a curfew which
will restrict all movement
during specific hours of the day.
c)
Use restricted areas to deny the target to have access
to certain activities.
2. Select methods to neutralize the teams. The
same methods
that are used to neutralize the personalities could be used
for the teams. An
additional method is to infiltrate an agent within the
infrastructure a team
to spread rumors and false information.
3. Select a method to neutralize the
installations:
a. Carry out approach, search
and review operations to:
1) Segregate and contain the persons or teams
in the particular
installation or area.
2) Investigation, identification, and detention
of a CI target.
b. Carry out combat operations
to:
1)
Segregate and contain the installations.
2) Detain the occupants.
3) Destroy the installation.
c. Carry out deception and
conceal operations that cause
the CI target to change the direction of his intelligence
collection and to
prevent him to concentrate WITH his main mission.
3) Select methods to neutralize documents:
a. The two basic methods to
neutralize documents are:
1) Capture
2) Destruction
b. Any of the two methods could
be carried out using the
operations of review, investigation and combat mentioned
above to effectively
neutralize the documents and so prevent the enemy from using
them.
232
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
D. Determine the operational requirements:
1. Determine the personal requirements (How
many persons you
need for the operation):
a. Determine the number of persons
b. Determine what qualifications and skills
will be needed to
fulfill the mission (interrogation agents, interpreters, etc.)
c. Determine what special support you need for
the mission:
1) Support from the combat
troops to close the area where
the search and review operations will take place.
2) Military police to give
support during the review
operations.
3) Determine (if possible) if
the installation area is
mined or if it has traps (booby traps).
4) Determine what other
additional support you may need.
2. Determine the team requirements:
a. Identify the arms that the teams will need
to carry out the
review and detention.
b. Identify what type of communications you
will use.
c. Determine if you will need any codes or
special key words.
d. Identify what transport support you will
need.
e. Identify how you will transport the targets,
or how you will
evacuate the area.
3. Determine the time frame:
a.
Determine how much time you will need to carry out the
neutralization.
b. Identify the ideal time to carry out the
attack against the
target.
233
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Determine if vigilance is needed and if
there is enough time
to carry out the same.
d. Determine on what date should the mission be
completed.
E. Prepare the operational plan:
1. Coordinate WITH the appropriate commanders
to get the support
personnel.
2. Arrange the procurement of the specialized
team.
3. Procure the official funds for the
operation.
4. Procure the communication equipment.
5. Coordinate WITH the combat commanders in
the area the whereabouts
of the target.
a. Inform the commander when, where, what and
how the operation
will take place to avoid conflicts in your responsibility
area.
b. Make arrangements for any assistance you may
need while in
that area.
c. Coordinate the support of (short and long
arms) in case it
would be necessary.
6. Guide the team over the concept of the
operation. Make sure that
all the members of the team are aware of their
responsibilities.
7. Guide the support troops:
a. Explain in detail the role they will play in
the operation.
b. Indicate if they need arms or specialized
equipment.
c. Emphasize the need to fulfill the time frame
requirements.
F. Carry out the operation:
1. Move towards the target.
a. Carry out a final check to
make sure that all the
participants understand their responsibilities.
234
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN 324-91
b. Carry out a final coordination if necessary.
1. Safeguard the target:
a. Make sure that the troops are in their
assigned positions.
b. Carry out the review and detention.
2. Dispose of the target:
a. Arrange the transfer of the target personnel
and or the
documents.
b. Destroy the target installations.
Back to Top 235
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 26
LN324-91
OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION
INTRODUCTION:
Our ability to
perceive depends upon our innate ability, experience and
the training in regards to our surroundings and the
environment. You must keep
in mind that the word perceive means to see and understand.
GENERAL FACTS:
a. Definition: OBSERVATION: Is the ability to
recognize what is
happening around us and the environment. This is attained
through the maximum
use of the five senses. Carrying out a detailed observation
allows a person to
remember any object, or situation in a complete, clear and
exact manner.
b. Observation requires a mental effort to
identify, analyze and
relate what as happenang an our surroundings and the
environment.
c. It is a normal thing that a person
perceives or understands only
that which interests him or what does not require much
effort. Example:
(1) Women, in general, are more interested in
colors, since
their physical appearance depends on the exact combination
of colors,
therefore, a woman, may have more knowledge in describing
something she saw,
although only for a few seconds. She knows the different
colors better and
could bring an exact description of what she saw.
236
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(2) In contrast, men normally do not know colors
well, or do not
pay much attention when they observe them. Men normally
remember the basic
colors. If a man observes an automobile involved in an
incident and wishes to
describe it he will probably say "it was a blue
automobile", but if a woman
makes the same description about the same automobile, maybe
she will do it in
this manner: "it was a light blue automobile, WITH
black and white trims".
This does not mean that all mean and women are the same, but
it is something
that happens often and could be considered as a patter in
regards to
observation.
d. To train in observing WITH exactness the CI
Special Agent (SA)
must:
(1) Practice continually and in detail to
recognize what happens
in his surroundings and environment and in that manner try
to observe and
understand the personalities, situations, objects and
incidents.
(2) Replace the casual observations wit the
studies and detailed
observations.
(3) Train yourself and practice estimating:
a.
The time (hours)
b. The speed of an object that
is moving
c. The distance
(4) The SA must be familiar WITH colors, the
variety of colors,
and the intensity of the light.
(5) The SA must have the ability to observe
objects and
incidents in such manner that it will become potential
evidence in an
investigation.
e. The SA must keep in mind that his senses
could fail, and he should
know that not all persons will give a detailed description
of what was
observed, although they are telling about the same incident.
The SA must know
that the witnesses are telling the truth, but that each
person sees things in
their own way.
f. To become an expert observer the SA must
learn to pay attention
and concentrate in particular details in the face and
characteristics of an
object or scene.
237
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
g. When the SA questions a witness about an
incident, his questions
could be addressed only about what the person remembers and
not make
suggestions that could influence the description the witness
gives.
h. The power to listen well is also required
in training. The SA
could train his "ear memory" practicing to listen
the conversations intently
WITH the purpose of obtaining the greatest amount of
information possible. One
particular way is to have the ability to listen to sermons
in church, school,
political meetings, or any speech in a way that after
listening to these
speeches the SA could later write down in a paper what he
listened to.
i. The visual observation training does not
require that the SA
intently observes all and remember each face or each scene,
but, he must
concentrate in such details that could be useful in his
investigations.
j. Functions of the senses during the
observation:
The exactness of
an observation will depend upon the senses used to make
the observation. You could trust some senses more that
others, and the SA must
take this into consideration when evaluating their
observations. The senses
that are used during the observations are:
(1) VISUAL: It is considered as the most precise
sense. WITH just
observing some characteristics of a person the SA could
complete the image
WITH known facts.
(2) HEARING: This is the most objective sense.
When making and
observation based in the sound there is not always
precision. Frequently, you
do not know the origin of the sound or the distance from
where it came. The
variety of sounds also are difficult to describe. When
listening to a sound,
the witness normally tries to associate it WITH some other
known sound so as
to make a comparison later on.
(3) TACT: In most people, the sense of tact is
not well developed and
it must be considered as a limited means of perception.
Without the help of a
visual perception the sense of tact could confuse us, in
such way that an
observation in the dark using the sense of tact could be
very doubtful.
Nevertheless, the sense of tact of the blind persons is well
developed.
238
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(4) SMELL: The sense of smell is not to be
trusted much. Many things
have the same smell and for that reason an observation based
on this sense
must not be taken very seriously.
(5) TASTE: The
sense of taste is not very trustworthy since this sense
is very personal and the objective observation of taste is
easily replaced by
the persons s individual sensation.
k. Psychologists indicate that:
(1) 85% of what we learn is through the visual
sense.
(2) 13% is learned through the sense of hearing.
(3) 2% is through the sense of tact, smell and
taste.
l. Psychological elements of observation:
The SA must
know both elements of observation and the
observation's psychological obstacles so as to properly
evaluate an
observation.
m. The observation process in order of
occurrence is:
(1) The SA must have the ability to obtain a
complete physical
description of a person in a few seconds. This ability could
be acquired
through:
a) Knowledge of the meaning of
words used to describe the
characteristics.
b) Practice the description of one or two
characteristics, such as the eyes and the nose, of different
persons and
continue this until all the characteristics have been
completely studied.
c) Train to define the
descriptions in a precise order.
Example: from the head to the feet (hair, forehead, ears,
eyes, etc.)
239
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
n. The SA does not always have time to obtain
a complete description
of a person, in this case he must concentrate in the
following:
(1) Outstanding characteristics, such as moles,
scars, lack of
an arm, leg or other limbs.
(2)
Height
(3) Built
(4) Weight
(5) Age
(6) Race
(7) Sex
(8) Eyes
(9) Hair
(10)
Complexion
(11)
Nationality or citizenship
(12)
Clothes
Back to Top 240
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 27
LN324-91
PLANNING AND
CONDUCTING A MOBILE (ON FOOT) VIGILANCE
FIXED
VIGILANCE AND PATROL CAR VIGILANCE
INTRODUCTION:
As a counter
intelligence (CI) Special Agent (SA) you must know how to
plan and conduct a vigilance. It is probable that during
your career as a SA
you will be assigned to missions to conduct a vigilance. It
is your duty to
establish the personnel, time and equipment that will be
needed to carry out
this mission.
GENERAL FACTS:
1. Determine the vigilance objectives:
a. The vigilance is an investigative tool that
consists of
keeping a person, place or target under physical or
technical observation to
obtain evidence or information pertaining to an
investigation or CI
operations.
b. When more simple methods and financial
expenditures have not
been successful, the vigilance is used to fulfill the
specific objectives of
the investigation. The objectives of vigilance include:
(1) Establish the identity of the person
involved in activities of
interest to CI.
(2) Detecting ilegal activities that fall under
the jurisdiction of CI
section.
(3) Obtain information to use in an
interrogation.
(4) Develop leads for future investigations.
(5) Confirm or refute information.
(6) Obtain admissible evidence in a legal
manner.
241
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
[page missing]
d. Detailed description of the name and
addresses of associates,
contacts and relatives of the SUBJECT.
e. Professional training of the SUBJECT in the
countervigilance
techniques (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
SUBJECT
ACTIONS
COUNTER MOVES
______________________________________________________________________
Using convoy techniques Using reserve personnel so they be
aware of the convoy
techniques
Changing direction many times Constant change of watch persons
in a short time
Re-tracing a course Constant change of watch
persons
Using the reflection on windows Allow quite a distance and
take up
innocent
actions, such as passing
the
SUBJECT and entering a store
Using baits (throwing paper or Use reserve personnel to extract the
similar objects) and observe if articles an hour later
any person picks it up
Changing the pace as you walk Maintain harmony with the area and
act
in a natural way
Using public transportation Maintain at least one watch person
and immediately getting off without climbing on public
transportation
Getting off public transportationMaintain the vehicle or get
off and
in a deserted area walk in the opposite
direction
of
the
SUBJECT
Climbing up various public Using support vehicles
transportation in succession
242
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4. Conduct a study of the area to obtain and
analyze detailed
information of the place where the vigilance took place.
Consider the area
where the SUBJECT lives, works or spends time.
a. Obtain a map and take notes of:
1) Road constructions
2) Police control points
3) One-way streets
4) No outlet streets
5) Other articles of potential interest
(Shopping centers,
markets, etc.)
b. Identify the nature, place, structure and
type of building
that is most frequently found. Put emphasis in:
1) The residence of the SUBJECT.
2) The working place of the SUBJECT.
c. Study the population of the area to identify
particular or
potential problems.
1) Race
2) Custom and cultural habits
3) Religion
4) Language
5) Reaction of the people to strangers
d. Identify the traffic pattern
1) Change of workers
2) Movement of vehicles
a) One-way streets
b) Changing directional lines
c)
Congested areas
d) Zone considerations (commercial, residential
or industrial)
e. Identify the public transportation systems
including:
(1) Type (bus, taxi, railroad)
(2) Tolls (cash or special
coupons)
(3) Timetable
(4) Loading and unloading places
243
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
f. Review the local laws
(1) Identify the local laws and
their impact in the
personnel and method regarding vigilance.
(2) Identify the application
methods.
(3) Identify the local police
agencies, including their
appearance.
g. Obtain the weather reports during your
vigilance.
h. If possible, conduct a search of the area.
5. Prepare a
vigilance plan that includes all the operational
considerations and instructions to make sure that the
objective of the watch
is achieved. The plan must be detailed to avoid wrong
interpretations, but it
must not be so restricted that it eliminates flexibility and
the initiative of
the individual watch person.
NOTE: The vigilance
plan could be formal or informal, oral or written,
depending upon the circumstances and time availability.
a. Identify the personnel requirements.
(1) Identify the number and type of persons that
would be required.
(2) Select qualified personnel to participate in
the vigilance. Main
qualifications include:
(a) Previous experience in conducting a
vigilance.
NOTE: It is essential
that a maximum number of personnel have previous
experience in conducting a vigilance, because operational
and technical
methods cannot be learned completely from a book. A person
without
qualification could harm the vigilance.
(b) Physical appearance that does not attract
curiosity.
(c) Ability to stay without being recognized and
ability to mix WITH
his surroundings or environment.
244
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: Select persons
from the area to be used in the area where other persons
will attract attention. These other persons must be used to
control and
supervise the vigilance of a place from a safe distance.
(d) Expedients (ability to adapt quickly to any
situation)
(e) Physical vital strength and patience
(f) Detailed perception
(g) Retentive memory
b. Determine the
requirements of the logistics and administrative
supports.
(1) Relief vigilance personnel from other duties
(2) Obtain special documents, if required
(3) Provide financing to cover the project and
for contingent
financial expenses
(4) Arrange to obtain the vehicles
(5) Obtain and examine the support equipment
(6) Arrange for food and other commodities, if
appropriate, for
the vigilance personnel
(7) Prepare one or more cover stories to explain
each presence
and activities of the watch persons in a particular place
(8) Plan the relief for the watch crew
(9) Give them arms, if necessary
c. Determine the control and communication
procedures
(1) Establish the control procedures
(a) Establish a central control point to direct
the vigilance
operations
(b) Clearly tell the watch personnel what is the
chain of
command from the watch man to the control point.
(2) Establish the procedures for communication.
(a) Establish radio
communications, when possible, as the
foremost method of communication between the operative
elements and the
control
245
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
point.
246
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
NOTE: The use of the
safe communication systems could be necessary in some
circumstances.
EQUIPMENT AND PROVISIONS
Radios
Cameras and
accessories
Binoculars
Tape recorders
Books and pencil
Maps
Small transmitter
in SUBJECT'S car
Receiver for the
transmitter
Change of clothes
(b) Establish visual signals when the radios do
not work or there are
no radios available.
1 Limit the number of signals and keep them
simple.
2 Visual signals must be natural gestures
that do not attract
attention to the watch person (Example: taking a paper from
your pocket,
lighting a cigarette, etc.)
(c) Establish the procedures for emergency
communication.
d. Determine the specific mission that will be
assigned to each
group or individual watch person.
NOTE: The planning
and preparation must consider all the possible
contingencies that could develop during the vigilance.
6. To direct the members of the team about
vigilance.
NOTE: The watch team
must know as much as possible about the case so that in
such way they could interpret the SUBJECT'S actions.
a. Inform the participants of the vigilance
objectives.
b. Inform the participants of the type, methods
and techniques
that will be used in the vigilance (Figures 3 and 4).
247
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Inform the participants of the role they
will play in the
vigilance.
d. Provide the participants WITH the target
information and the area.
Use photographs, maps, sketches to familiarize the
participants completely
WITH the target aspects and WITH the area that will be
watched.
e. Provide additional training and preliminary
training in the
vigilance and counter vigilance methods.
VIGILANCE METHODS
a. A fixed vigilance is when a watch person(s)
is kept in a place or
fixed position to observe the activities of an specific
place.
b. A vigilance in action is when the watch
person(s) follow the
SUBJECT from one place to another to keep the continuous
observation of his
activities. The vigilance in action could be:
(1) A mobile vigilance (feet)
(2) A car patrol vigilance
c. A technical vigilance is when technical
visual equipment,
electronic bugging equipment, and photographs are used.
d. A mixed vigilance is when there is a
combination of methods
mentioned above. This method is more expensive in money
terms and personnel,
but will give us the best result.
248
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
FIGURE 4
VIGILANCE TECHNIQUES
DISTANCE: The
distance between the watch person and the SUBJECT will depend
upon the circumstances and the watch person's judgement and
must vary during
the course of the vigilance. Normally, the more people there
are in the street
the closer the watch person will be from the SUBJECT.
TURNING ON CORNERS: Do not make immediate turns after a
SUBJECT in corners. A
suspicious SUBJECT could "examine and observe" a
watch person by just standing
in the corner and observing attentively these persons that
turn around the
same corner. Making a wider turn will help keep our pose and
will allow us to
review the area.
CONVOY: Valuable SUBJECT(s) to a vigilance could use convoys
while conducting
important activities. The convoys will keep a position in
the back of the
SUBJECT, keeping him on view, and is alerted about watch
persons. Be attentive
and alert about the utilization of convoys and take
appropriate action to
prevent the commitment of the vigilance.
DECOYS: The SUBJECT
uses a substitute of similar physical appearance so as
to act as a decoy and to confuse the watch person. This is
an efficient method
when it is used in the residence or work place of the
SUBJECT.
CLIMBING BUSES AND TAXIS:
If the SUBJECT climbs a bus or taxi, the watch
person "A" must try to climb the bus or taxi, but
always keeping a distance
behind the SUBJECT if possible.
RESTAURANT:Obtain a chair out of the direct SUBJECT'S view
range, but so as
you can see the SUBJECT, if possible, in a place where you
could listen to the
SUBJECT. Order according to the type of service ordered by
the SUBJECT to be
sure that you can pay the bill and leave the restaurant
without looking track
of the SUBJECT.
RADIOS: The use of
communication equipment must be without attracting
attention to the public's curiosity. Do not bend to approach
the microphone.
RECOGNIZING THE SUBJECT:
The SUBJECT must be physically shown to the
watch person, if possible. Study and be prepared to
recognize the appearance
and the SUBJECT'S mannerisms. Do not depend in the SUBJECT'S
dress manner.
249
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
VIGILANCE TECHNIQUES
COMING INTO A BUILDING:The size, nature and surroundings are
significant
considerations to determine future actions. Small buildings,
if any, could be
kept under vigilance, it is not necessary to follow the
SUBJECT to this
building unless the SUBJECT made a contact WITH other
persons there in the
past. In large buildings, follow the SUBJECT and use the
inside of the
building to your advantage. Keep in mind that lazy persons
attract attention.
ELEVATORS: Follow the SUBJECT to the elevator only if there
are other persons
and if the SUBJECT does not suspect he is been observed.
Stop in the floor
above or below the SUBJECT and use the stairs to get to the
same floor as the
SUBJECT'S. In department stores or similar buildings, the
watch person could
leave the elevator on the same floor as the SUBJECT. If the
SUBJECT enters an
elevator alone, stay in the lobby and determine the
direction the SUBJECT went
to by observing the floor indicator of the elevator. Use the
stairs and
another elevator to reach the same floor as the SUBJECT'S.
Figure 4 (cont.)
7. Conduct the vigilance using one of the
methods mentioned below:
a. The method of a watchman
NOTE: Avoid this
method in a moving vigilance, if possible, because it does
not allow flexibility.
(1) Operate in behind the SUBJECT and in the same
street.
(2) Operate in the street adjacent to the SUBJECT
when it is
operationally necessary to avoid the commitment of the
vigilance. The
circumstance will dictate if we must operate in front,
behind or next to the
SUBJECT. (EXAMPLE: Operate next to the SUBJECT when he turns
around the corner
to observe if he makes contact or enters into a building).
(3) Keep
close to the SUBJECT to observe his actions.
250
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(4) If the SUBJECT turns around in a corner and
the area is not too
crowded continue crossing the street in the intersection.
Observe the street in
the direction of the SUBJECT, write down the position and
action of the person and
act according to the situation.
(5) If the SUBJECT turns around in a corner that
is crowded, stop in
the corner, in a casual manner and observe the SUBJECT'S
actions. Unless the
SUBJECT is stopped in a corner, continue the vigilance in
the same street.
b. The two watchmen method ("AB"
method)
(1) A watchman is kept in position "A"
directly behind the SUBJECT.
(2) A second watchman is kept in position
"B" behind "A" or in the street
next to the SUBJECT and next to him.
(3) The distance is kept according to the
situation.
(4) If both watchmen are in the same street and
the SUBJECT turns around
in the corner, watchman "A" continues to walk in
the original direction and
crosses the street at the intersection. From the adjacent
street, watchman "A"
points out the appropriate procedures of following the
SUBJECT to watchman "B".
(5) If watchman "B" is operating in the
adjacent street and the SUBJECT
turns around in the same corner that he is at, watchman
"B" must cross the street
behind the SUBJECT and take watchman "A"s
position. It is not necessary to use
signals because this arrangement must be established
beforehand.
(6) If watchman "B" is operating in the
adjacent street and the SUBJECT
crosses the street in the direction of watchman
"B", watchman "B" must limit his
step to avoid contact WITH the SUBJECT. Watchman
"B" must enter in a store or
continue walking straight ahead, keeping visual contact WITH
watchman "A" to look
for a signal indicating his next move.
251
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. The three men method (The "ABC"
method).
(1) A member of a group is placed in position
"A" at a short distance from
the SUBJECT. Watchman "A" observes WITH detail and
writes down the SUBJECT'S
actions.
(2) The second watchman is placed in position
"B" behind watchman "A".
Watchman "B" keeps the constant observation of
actions of both watchman "A" and
the SUBJECT and prepares to assume the position of watchman
"A" when it is
required. Watchman "B" also observes to see if
there are any convoys and takes
appropriate action against these convoys.
(3) The third watchman is placed in position
"C" in the street adjacent
and next tQ the SUBJECT. Watchman "C" directs the
actions of watchman "A" and "B"
WITH signals arranged beforehand and prepares to assume the
watchman "A"s position
if the SUBJECT crosses the street and leaves watchmen
"A" and "B" alone.
NOTE: If the group of
watchmen have more persons, they will follow behind
watchmen "B" and "C".
(4) If the subject turns around the corner
directly on the side he is
walking (out of watchman "C"), watchman
"A" crosses the street in the intersection
and assumes the position of watchman "C" and
watchman "B" places himself in
position "A" and watchman "C" crosses
the street and places himself in position
"B".
(5) If the SUBJECT turns around the corner and
crosses the street in the
direction of watchman "C", it is not necessary to
change positions.
(6) If the SUBJECT simply crosses the street in
which he is walking,
without turning around any place, then watchman
"C" is placed in position "A", and
watchman "A" assumes the position of watchman
"C" and watchman "B" crosses the
street and places himself in position "B".
NOTE: All position
changes must be directed depending upon the circumstances and
the watchmen judgement and they will be done in a way so as
not to attract the
attention of the population or the SUBJECT'S attention.
252
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d. The progressive vigilance is used when the
SUBJECT has counter-
vigilance experience and it is expected that he will use any
technique to avoid
the vigilance.
(1) Locate the SUBJECT'S place to start
(residence, office, etc).
(2) After locating this point, start to pick up
the SUBJECT from any place
outside out of his sight.
(3) Continue and observe the SUBJECT only at
short distances on the first
day.
(4) In the following days, pick the SUBJECT at
the time and place where
you left him the last time, and again follow him at a short
distance to a new
point.
NOTE: This method
will be painful and slow if the SUBJECT changes his daily
routine occasionally, but will eventually take the watch
persons to the places and
contacts that the SUBJECT wants to keep secret.
8. Write down all the observations regarding
the SUBJECT and his
activities. Write down in a manner that does not attract
attention. The small tape
recorders are a valuable tool during vigilance. Writing
notes in maps or
newspapers also works.
9. Carry out the fixed vigilance.
a. Establish an stationary position to avoid
the SUBJECT'S
detection or the curiosity of other persons. Conduct the
vigilance in one of these
positions:
(1) A fixed place could be used during a short
term or during a stop in a
mobile vigilance.
(2) WITH a parked vehicle in the vicinity of the
target.
a) Do not park in the same place for a long
time.
b) Warn the police agency if the vigilance
involves parking a
vehicle for a long time.
253
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c) Do not keep the vehicle's motor running
while parked. It is very
dangerous (carbon monoxide could enter inside the car) and
will attract attention.
d) Unplug the light inside the vehicle.
e) After parking the vehicle, you must open
the door and close it,
many persons unconsciously listen to determine if they open
and closed the
vehicle's doors right after parking.
(3) In a room or an apartment located next to the
SUBJECT.
(a) This place must be one or two floors above
the SUBJECT'S place.
(b) This place must be accessible to entrances
that are not visible by the
SUBJECT.
(c) This place must be occupied all day to avoid
the entrance of non-
authorized persons.
(d) The observer must seat in a dark room away
from direct view of the
window to get the best advantage that the shade in the room
offers.
(e) Limit the number of watch persons to two or
three in a position,
because a larger number could attract attention.
(f) Frequently relieve the personnel to avoid
fatigue.
10. Carrying out the
vehicle's vigilance method:
a. The vehicle's method.
NOTE: Avoid this
method in the mobile vigilance, if possible, because it does not
allow flexibility.
(1) Prepare the vehicle.
(2) Operate in the back side of the SUBJECT'S
vehicle.
254
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(3) Maintain close to the SUBJECT to observe his
actions.
(4) If the SUBJECT'S vehicle turns around in a
corner follow him or
continue crossing the intersection and make a "U"
turn and continue following him.
Observe the street and the direction of the SUBJECT, write
down the position and
persons's action, and act according to the situation.
b. The two vehicle method ("AB"
method)
(1) Prepare the vehicle.
(2) The first vehicle is kept in position
"A" directly behind the
SUBJECT, while this vehicle must be kept at least two or
three vehicles behind the
SUBJECT'S vehicle.
(3) The second vehicle is kept in position
"B" directly behind "A"
or in the street parallel the SUBJECT'S vehicle and at his
side, while receiving
directions, by radio from vehicle "A".
(4) The distance is kept according to the
situation.
NOTE: It is possible
to keep the vigilance through the back mirror of the watch
person's vehicle when traveling in front of the SUBJECT'S
vehicle.
(5) Change positions of watch person's vehicles
frequently to avoid
that the SUBJECT recognizes these vehicles.
c. The three vehicle method ("ABC" method)
(1) Prepare the vehicle
(2) In a vigilance through vehicles using the
"ABC" method, the
watch person's vehicles are lined in the same manner that in
"ABC" techniques for
mobile vigilance (on foot). Vehicle "C" operates in
a known parallel route.
(3) If the circumstances dictate it both
vehicles "B" and "C" could
operate in the SUBJECT'S parallel route. Change vehicles
"B" and "C" frequently
WITH vehicle "A".
255
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(4) A watchman's vehicle could be placed in a
position in front of
the SUBJECT'S vehicle to avoid that the SUBJECT could
recognize the watchmen's
vehicles.
11. End the vigilance when:
a. The vigilance objectives have been
attained.
b. The SUBJECT of a discreet vigilance knows
that he is under
vigilance and takes actions that indicate that he recognizes
that he has been
watched.
12. Prepare the vigilance reports using the
Agent's Report. The report
must have the following information:
a. Introduction paragraph
(1) Date and time when the vigilance started and
ended.
(2) Identify the person under vigilance, if he
is not the SUBJECT of
the investigation.
(3) Complete identification of other agencies or
person(s) that
provided assistance during the vigilance.
(4) Type of vigilance
(5) Specific place or general area involved.
b. Detailed description of the SUBJECT,
including his mannerisms, and
defined habits.
c. Chronological details of events or
activities in a narrative form or
tabulation, identifying each contact and building by number
(For example, Contact
1); a summary of all the conversations that were heard about
the SUBJECT.
Including an exact transcript, if possible.
d. Description of each contact.
e. Description of each building implied.
256
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
f. If there is a formal report, include the
date, time and reasons for
which the vigilance was discontinued.
g. The SA in charge of the vigilance team signs
the report.
Back to Top 257
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 28
LN324-91
TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION:
In this chapter
you may describe terrorism, the phases of the conflict under
low intensity, who were the terrorists, the characteristics
of the terrorist
operations, the terrorist organization, the arms used by the
terrorists, the
security methods of the terrorist's groups.
GENERAL FACTS:
QUESTIONS TO BE COVERED IN THIS CHAPTER:
1. What are the
phases of the low intensity conflict?
2. How is terrorism
defined?
3. Who are the
terrorists?
4. What are the
characteristics of the terrorist's or rebel's operations?
5. How is the
organization of a terrorist's movement?
6. What are the
methods to provide security to a terrorist organization?
7. What arms are
used by the terrorists?
8. What are some of
the targets that are most attacked by terrorists?
9. What are some of
the most common terrorist activities ?
10. What is the
terrorist's goal?
258
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
BASIC
DATA ABOUT TERRORISM AND REBELLION
THE REBELLION OR
CONFLICT PHASES OF LOW INTENSITY:
1.
PHASE I: (Latent or Incipient Insurrection) This phase rotates between
the circumstances of the subversive activities is only a
potential, latent or
incipient threat, and situations in which the subversive
incidents and activities
occur frequently and in an organized way. This does not
include a violent burst of
activity or chaotic activity.
a. EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES THAT COULD BE
CARRIED OUT IN PHASE I:
1) The rebels starting from a relatively weak
position, plan and organize
their campaign and select urban or rural areas of
objectivity.
2) The open or clandestine organizations are
established. If the
insurrection party is ilegal, the organizations will be
clandestine.
3) Psychological operations are carried out
WITH the purpose of
exploiting complaints and people's wishes.
4) Then the organization starts WITH a ghost
government.
5) Once the party is established, they
concentrate in gaining the
influence of the population and infiltrating in the
government, economic and
social organizations, and in presenting a threat to the
administrative ability of
the government.
6) During the last stage of Phase I the
importance of recruiting,
organizing and training the armed elements is emphasized.
7) The police forces are attacked, other
activities terrorist (groups)
and some other military operations of less importance to try
to influence
additionally over the population, or to provide arms for the
movement and
confronting the government's ability to keep peace and
order.
2. PHASE II: (Guerrilla warfare) This phase is
reached once the
subversive movement has gained sufficient local and external
support and starts to
conduct an organized guerrilla warfare, or forms of violence
against the
established authority.
259
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES THAT COULD BE CARRIED
OUT DURING PHASE
II:
1) Phase I is continued and expanded. The
rebel's political and military
control is intensified over the territory and the
population.
2) Guerrilla warfare is used in a great scale
and in some areas a limited
defense is mounted.
3) According to what the situation allows a
rebel's government is
organized in areas they dominate, and in areas that have yet
to be under their
control.
4) The most important military goal is the
control of the greatest area.
The rebels try to understand the government troops in static
defense and
interdiction operations and they try to destroy the
communications lines and take
or destroy the government's supplies and resources.
3. PHASE III: (Movement war) The situation
advances from Phase II to
Phase III when the insurrection has mainly changed to a
movement war between the
organized rebel's forces and the government forces.
a. EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES THAT COULD BE CARRIED
OUT DURING PHASE
III:
1) The activities that were initiated in Phases
I and II, are continued
and increased.
2) The largest units in size are used to combat
the government forces and
gain key geographic and political objectives that will help
overthrow the
government forces.
3) If the rebels try to win the military sector
over and the government
is overthrown, immediately they will initiate their
consolidation activities. This
includes removing the potential enemies, establishing
additional control
mechanisms and the re-structuring of society.
260
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 261 Missing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(4) Additional information and summary of the
terrorist's personality: In
general, a terrorist is a determined person who thinks that
he or she is
participating in a dynamic political process but that cannot
distinguish the
difference between the actions and moral principles; to them
the objectives
justify the tactics. The true terrorist is not a crazy
fanatic as is commonly
thought. They are hard-working persons that are prepared to
give their lives for
the cause. Most terrorists desire to live to see that their
goals are fulfilled or
carried out; to attain that objective they use persons WITH
mental problems (crazy
people) or common criminals to carry out risky missions such
as murders.
b. AGE: In general the age of a terrorist is
between twenty and thirty
years of age. For the local groups is even adolescents. The
leaders of any type of
organization is commonly older (58, 40, 35).
c. SEX: For the most part in the terrorists'
history, they have been
predominantly males. During a period of a decade (1966 to
1976), 80% of the
operations were addressed and executed by men. The role of a
woman in those times
was to recount (collect) intelligence, such as messengers,
nurses, and the
operation of safe houses. From that era on there was a
dramatic change in the
feminine participation in the terrorist acts. At present, the
greatest part of the
terrorists are still men, but WITH a great women
participation. The participation
of women in terrorist movements is due in part, to social
changes, female
liberation and youth's rebelliousness.
d. CIVIL STATUS: The greatest part of the
terrorist organizations have a
majority of single members. The accepted general figure is
between 75-80% single.
This reflects that marriage is considered as an operational
problem for the group.
Frequently the members of a terrorist group that are married
break up WITH their
family once they find themselves convinced in their group's
beliefs and they
follow them.
e. ORIGIN: The urban metropolitan areas
constitute the source of the
greatest part of the terrorist numbers.
262
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
f. SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY: Normally they come
from liberal party member
parents. There is a preponderance of professionals, such as
lawyers and doctors,
but the other occupations include clergy, business
executives, diplomats,
government employees, police and members of the armed
forces. The terrorist groups
usually come from middle and high classes.
g. EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION: There is a vast
majority of students and
intellectuals within the revolutionary movements and their
directors. The majority
of the leaders have received some university education or
have taken higher
education courses and then some. The social and humanity
degrees seem to attract
many; the students rarely come up as leaders, but the
universities are a field for
the revolutionary movements.
h. RECRUITMENT: The universities play an
prominent role in the
recruitment of terrorists. They introduce anarchist and
marxists doctrines and
many of the student federations are controlled by radicals.
The jail adds another
element, although it does not play such an important role as
the university's.
i. RELIGION: The terrorist tend to be atheists,
devoted to violence. This
does not mean that all terrorist are atheists. In Latin
America's case, the
catholic priest's and the nuns have carried out active roles
in the terrorist
operations of both sectors.
263
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
COMPARISON
BETWEEN THE TWO CATEGORIES OF TERRORISTS:
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGICAL
[millennium-oriented]
Personality:
Educated leader Same,
preponderance of
Idealist
socially unadjusted youth
Activist
Age: From
adolescence In their twenties,
thirties
to
the 30's (leaders
in
their 40's)
Sex:
Masculine (a few activeDivided almost 50%
ones
from the feminine sex)women have very active roles.
Civil Status: Single Single
Origin:
Metropolitan area Metropolitan
areas
Socio-economic Low
and middle class Middle and higher
classes
history: (leaders
middle to high
classes)
Education and
Varies greatly
University and Professional
Occupation (Leaders are professionals)
Recruitment Varies greatly in cities City, University, Prisons
Religion
Varies greatly None
264
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
TWO MAIN TERRORIST CATEGORIES: WITH the considerable changes that have
taken
place during the last twenty years, there has come into play
two main terrorist
categories:
a. Nationalist: They take power or cause a
national revolution. The
control of specific territory is their common denominator.
These groups have as
principal goal to take a territory as a sovereign entity.
They have objectives
defined in a short term and frequently make do in a
practical manner to attain
them.
b. Ideological: Revolutionaries and anarchists
of an indefinite ideology
that try to destroy the existing system. As a general rule
they try to avoid to
arouse any definite substitute government because this tends
to divide the
organization through dissention.
METHODS OF OPERATION: Terrorist operations are being carried
out in a
professional manner and are executed by well-trained
specialized clandestine
elements, particularly by international groups. The
terrorist organizations are
becoming bureaucratic institutions and their members are
specializing in diverse
areas. There is evidence of one transnational affiliation
and assistance between
the groups. The terrorist groups generally operate as
clandestine organizations.
a. To avoid penetration and information loss
about the organization,
operations, techniques and plans, groups practice strict
security measures. A
leader is designated and guided about the mission and the
support requirements.
b. Procuring even more security, frequently the
members of the team do
not meet but until the last rehearsal and shortly before leaving
towards the place
where the mission will take place. In such manner, the
members of the team and the
support personnel will not know the location of the target
until it is necessary
to carry out the mission. The identity of each member of the
team will be kept in
secret, even from the member themselves, by using names and
false identification.
265
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. To increase security, a special intelligence
team will carry out a
detailed search of the area or the target. To increase the
security even more,
many targets that have been recognized will not be attacked
by a reason or other,
so the fact that a search has taken place does not mean that
the target will be
attacked. Additionally, to make the hamper or prevent the
detection, they plan a
greater number of attacks than they will actually carry out.
d. Urban local groups carry out their operations
as an initiative of
their local cells or their movement's central command.
e. Terrorists normally look to exploit the
vulnerabilities, attacking
targets that have a weak security stand. Terrorist
operations are characterized
by: "THE VIOLENCE", "SPEED", AND
"SURPRISE". Terrorists reduce their own
vulnerabilities to reduce the risk of the operation. If the
original target is
well protected, they take into consideration the degree of
risk and vulnerability
of the group, select another target. This does not mean that
terrorist groups will
not attack a high security target and risk a suicide mission
if they think that
could be the last resource.
TERRORISTS TARGETS:
The terrorists targets are generally of two types:
Symbolic or pragmatic. Targets that could serve both
purposes are selected if they
are available. Targets are more symbolic when terrorists are
weak and vulnerable.
As the movement grows, targets are more pragmatic. The
definition of the two types
of targets is as follows:
a. SYMBOLIC TARGETS: Symbolic targets are
normally prominent members of a
regime or an institution. The terrorist's acts against the
target are committed in
highly visible places to attract the greatest degree of
attention possible and
they serve as principal instrument to reduce the trust,
inflict fear and provoke
the repression of the latter psychological use by the
movement.
b. PRAGMATIC TARGETS: Pragmatic targets include
multinational corporation
executives, key members of the opposition, whose selection
has the purpose of
coercing the group's objective so as to support the
movement; to obtain resources,
such as, money, supplies and arms.
266
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 267 Missing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: The activities of the terrorist groups
include:
a. Murders
b. Bombs (including the use of letters and
explosive packages, and fire
bombs)
c. Kidnapping and taking hostages
d. Pre-meditated fires
e. Ambushes
f. Armed attacks
g. Street tactics
h. Robberies
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORISM:
a. Terrorist goals:
1) Guide the masses not to support the
government and support their
movement.
2) Terrorism will give the urban insurgent a
method to develop the
potential for mass uprising and give the rural insurgent a
method to oblige them
to reduce the control of the government and to force them
into the desired
behavior.
3) These goals constitute the fundamental
terrorist threat for
governments.
LOCAL LEVEL ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART
COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT COMBAT
SECTION
SECTION ELEMENTS
________________
NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
COMMAND
SUB-COMMAND
SUB-COMMAND SUB-COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT COMBAT
SECTION
SECTION SECTION
Back to Top 268
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 29 LN324-91
COUNTER TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION:
In the previous
chapter "Terrorism" was discussed in the most important
points in regards with the matter of terrorism. Now let us
see what must be the
government's and the Security Forces answer to the threat of
terrorism.
GENERAL FACTS:
There is no
country in the world that does not have or could have the threat
of terrorism. The act of terrorism is very simple to carry
out, but the operations
of counter terrorism are not so simple. Counter terrorism
requires preparation,
training and a special execution: A failure will result in
the loss of innocent
lives and possibly a victory for the terrorists. Above all,
the counter terrorist
operations demand good military intelligence cooperation.
THE FIVE COMPONENTS OF A COUNTER TERRORIST PROGRAM:
a. In this space we will discuss the government
actions against the
terrorist activities. Before we start to discuss the
components of a counter
terrorist program we must mention the terrorists' goal and
the fundamental threat
of terrorism to governments.
269
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
1) Question: What is the terrorists' goal? And
what is the government's
goal?
Answer: Terrorists wish to obtain the popular
support for their
movement. The government wishes to keep the popular support
on their side.
2) Question: Taking this terrorists' and
government's goal into
consideration, Who could remember what is the fundamental
threat of terrorism to
governments?
Answer:
Terrorism will give the urban insurgent a method to develop the
potential for mass uprising and give the rural insurgent a
method to oblige them
to reduce the control of the government and to force them
into the desired
behavior.
b. A government's answer to the acts of
terrorism could cause even more
problems if the government does not follow the procedures of
a good program of
counter terrorism. For that reason it must analyze carefully
the needs of a good
program of counter terrorism to avoid making exactly what
the terrorists wish.
c. Basically, there are five components of the
counter terrorism program:
1) PREDICTION: It includes the intelligence
operations, and the work of
analyzing the threat, the terrorists' power, and the most
vulnerable targets. Our
knowledge of the characteristics of terrorism and
terrorism's strategy will be key
parts in this job. EXAMPLE:
"From our
study of terrorism we know that there are many possible targets.
We also know that it is not possible to know WITH certainty
what will be the next
terrorist's targets, but using our intelligence about the
terrorists and their
goals, we could make a prediction about the most probable
targets and this will
give us more possibility to protect these targets or react
quickly against the
terrorists.
2) PREVENTION:
a. Eliminate the causes: It will not be
possible to eliminate all the
terrorism causes, but at least a government that could show
the population that
they are trying to better the society's condition will
create an environment in
which it will be difficult for the terrorists to gain much
popular support.
270
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. DIPLOMACY: This will have much value because
it will eliminate the
foreign support of terrorists and their sanctuary---but it
is very difficult to
imagine that all governments will like to eliminate
terrorism because some
governments are the biggest sponsors of terrorism. (What
could give examples of
some countries that sponsor terrorism?)
3) DISSUASION: Block the target. Remember that
terrorists like to attack
targets that are not protected. As we have discussed there
are so many possible
targets for terrorists that we cannot get complete
protection. But the analysis of
terrorists could show the most vulnerable targets and then
we could give our
priority to those targets. Also, frequently, only in few
security actions could
dissuade the terrorists.
a. Physical security
b. Personal security
c. Security Operations (OPSEC)
d. It is very possible that the best way to
dissuade terrorists is to
find a high proportion of their detection, conviction and
punishment.
4) PREPARATION: Preparing the government forces
to react. INCLUDES:
a.
Determining authority and jurisdiction
b. Planning the counter terrorism operations
c. Training the counter terrorism personnel
5) REACTION: The appropriate answer to the
incident.
4. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER TERRORISM:
a. We already know the five components of a
counter terrorism program. In
each one of the components the military intelligence actions
are essential.
271
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE
COUNTER TERRORISM
COMPONENTS:
1) Intelligence collection
2) Intelligence analysis
3) Intelligence dissemination
c. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES:
1) Initiate investigations
2) Confirm information
3) Obtain information sources
4) Give advice to the Commander
d. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE JURISDICTION:
1) Each country is different and you must
study the laws of the
country in which you work.
e. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NEEDS:
1) The military intelligence needs in regards
to terrorism are infinite.
You need to obtain all the information possible about the
terrorists, their
targets and the surroundings in which they operate.
f. The legal aspects in regards to the
terrorism acts and terrorists have
to be considered taking into account that the terrorist is a
criminal and that he
wishes that the authorities initiate repressive actions.
This is one of the
tactics used by them to obtain a reaction to the government
and therefore
strengthen their movement.
5. TAKING HOSTAGES AND THE RESCUE OPERATION:
Since hostage
taking is the most difficult type of situation, we will
discuss a rescue operation in a hostage taking situation to
show some details of
the government's reaction to the acts of terrorism.
272
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
In this
situation it is very important that the government have an
appropriate reaction. The use of too much force could be
worst than any reaction.
Remember that often the terrorist's goal is to provoke the
government to use
inappropriate force. This is especially important in hostage
taking cases. In such
a situation the government will have to react very carefully
to prevent that the
terrorists could attain their goals.
There are four
rules for a rescue operation:
a. The objective is a rescue mission to save
the lives of the hostages--
without giving into the impossible demands of the
terrorists. In any action taken
by the security forces, this objective has importance, even
when one has to escape
from some terrorists.
b. The rescue team must be of an adequate size
and must only use adequate
arms to combat the situation. Having too many people in the
rescue group will only
difficult the operation and give more targets to the
terrorists. Always try to use
arms that are not lethal, if possible, to avoid killing the
hostages.
c. It is important to obtain and use all the
intelligence possible from
the terrorists, the hostages, the area, etc.
d. The rescue team must have a high degree of
professionalism. It must be
well prepared to fulfill its mission.
NEGOTIATION WITH THE TERRORISTS:
a. In entering in negotiations or considering
entering in negotiations
WITH the terrorists, the following are some options the
government has:
1) Give into all the terrorists' demands
2) Deny all the terrorists' demands
3) Controlled negotiation so as to get
additional time to take
appropriate actions.
273
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. There are varied opinions and philosophies
in regards to negotiations
with terrorists; the following are among them:
1) Not to negotiate under any conditions
2) To negotiate to obtain the freedom of the
hostages
3) Negotiate WITH the purpose of gaining
additional time to take
appropriate action.
CONCLUSION:
The counter
terrorism operations are some of the most difficult and
frustrating to military personnel. But they are also some of
the most common types
of operations today and could have great impact in the
national life. It is
important for you, as members of military intelligence
corps, to understand the
terrorist's operations their possible effects in the
insurrection's war and the
counter terrorism programs that the governments could carry
out to effectively
control the terrorist's threat.
Back to Top 274
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 30
LN324-91 PHYSICAL
SECURITY
INTRODUCTION:
Security, as we
apply it to our classified information and defense material,
is a very complex theme. In order to better understand the
complete theme of
security, we have subdivided the theme in three parts:
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PERSONAL
SECURITY, and DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION SECURITY.
None of these
three parts could exist by themselves. During the last
chapters we introduced the other two securities; personal
and documents. In this
chapter we will discuss what is physical security in itself,
but we wish that you
always keep in mind the other two securities so that you may
be aware of the
relationship that exists between the three.
So that you may
fulfill your security function, you may have to be better
prepared for the enemy.
GENERAL FACTS:
1. EXAMPLES OF SECURITY:
a. Physical
b. Personal and anti-terrorism
c. Information security
d. Operations security
e. Communications security
f. Transmissions security
2. DEFINITION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY:
Physical
security is defined as "The barrier system that is placed between
the potential intruder and what you wish to protect. These
barriers could be of
five types: (NATURAL, STRUCTURAL, HUMAN, ANIMAL,
ENERGY)."
275
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
a. NATURAL BARRIERS: Are those natural
topographical characteristics such
as rivers, mountains, seas, ravines, cliffs, etc., that by
themselves slow down or
difficult the entry or access of an intruder to an
installation.
b. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS: Are those barriers
constructed by man, without
consideration to its original intention, that could delay
the intruder. Some
examples of structural barriers are: walls, floors, doors,
windows, locks, fences,
etc.
c. HUMAN BARRIERS: The guards, managers in
charge of lodging, office
workers and workshops workers who intercept the intruder and
what he wishes to
protect.
d. ANIMAL BARRIERS:Generally dogs such as the
German Shepherd, are
trained and used as guards.
e. ENERGY BARRIERS:Alarms, protective
illumination, any electronic
devise that serves to protect an installation.
3. PRINCIPLES IN WHICH THE APPLICATION OF
PHYSICAL SECURITY IS BASED:
a. The enemy's agent must have access to the
information or material that
interests him. The type of access depends in a number of
factors, and could be
done in different ways:
1) When you are considering protecting
information, you should not only
consider protecting the physical access, but the access to
discussions about these
material through the use of clandestine devices to listen
[bugs]. If the enemy
tries to tape a conversation about an specific theme, this
is so useful to him as
the original document in paper.
2) You must be careful also WITH the use of
long-range photographic
equipment to get access through openings in structures.
3) The themes discussed above could be
considered also for sabotage. The
sabotage agent does not have to place the device or
destructive material in the
place he wishes to cause damage. He could, in many ways,
throw an explosive device
against its target, (riffle, grenade launchers, rocket
launchers, camouflaged
explosives sent through the mail or WITH supplies), or could
contaminate the fuel
or oil deposits to cause damage to machinery, although they
keep away from him.
276
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4) You may consider all available resources
that the enemy could access,
and all these must be evaluated to determine how we could be
able to counter
arrest it.
b. IS THERE ANY IMPENETRABLE BARRIER?
1) ANSWER:
There is no barrier that is impenetrable. If a hostile
government is set to dedicate sufficient time, money,
personnel, materials and
imagination to cross a barrier, they may succeed.
c. SECURITY WITH DELAY DEFENSE SYSTEM:
1) Although no barrier could totally exclude an
intruder, it could give a
determinate delay time. It all depends upon the intruder's
ability.
2) Instead of trying the exclusion through the
use of just one barrier,
the security could be based in a security in-depth system or
accumulated delay.
3) To get optimum results it is necessary to
add barrier over barrier,
delay over delay, until sufficient delay time is accumulated
that will allow us to
control any possible penetration. This delay should be
enough so that the
available personnel could neutralize the intruder.
4) A fence without guards allows a short delay.
If that fence is
patrolled by trustworthy guards that keep it under
observation within the delay
time, the total delay time increases significantly.
5) In some cases it is necessary to
differentiate between the need of
denying access and the need to have knowledge that access
has been gained. This
refers to the neutralization, if a material is committed,
you may take action to
void its value for the enemy.
6) Physical security must be applied not just
as a dissuasive means
against the stealing property but also as a dissuasive means
against espionage.
7) The spy only
partially satisfies his purpose when he acquires
information. Information looses value if the persons
responsible for its custody
know about the leak. Espionage does not have any value if it
is revealed.
277
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
8) These considerations make the surreptitious
entry the greatest danger
from the CI's point of view. This makes the creation of two
types of barriers
necessary. One to protect those things that could be stolen
and could not be
neutralized and another to protect those things that could
be neutralized.
9) To protect those things that could be
neutralized a barrier that shows
evidence of having penetrated is created. Example: (Broken
window, etc.).
d. Each installation must be treated as an
individual entity when
planning security. The location of an installation alone
will bring problems that
differ from those aspects of other installations. Each one
must be considered as a
separate problem.
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY ASPECTS:
DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT
BARRIERS:
a. NATURAL BARRIERS
1) ADVANTAGES OF
NATURAL BARRIERS
a) They provide a protection system without
additional cost to the
installation.
b) The difficulty to penetrate an installation
increases according to the
barrier.
2) DISADVANTAGES OF
NATURAL BARRIERS:
a) Trees, ravines, vegetation, could serve as a
hiding place to any
possible intruder.
b) Installations that have as barrier a body of
water could be subject to
penetration through a team of divers.
3) BODIES OF WATER
AS BARRIERS:
a) ADVANTAGES:
(1) When the surface of the water is calm, it
offers the guards or
security personnel a very extensive field view range.
(2) Water offers much resistance to a vehicle
used by intruders by
making it almost impossible to have rapid access to the
installation.
278
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(3) To gain access, the task of hiding a vehicle
or boat without
been detected by the guards or security personnel will be an
obstacle to the
intruder.
b) DISADVANTAGES:
(1) When the water is agitated it reduces the
field of vision of the
guards or security personnel.
(2) It is possible to control the movement of a
vehicle or boat to
keep it hidden between waves.
(3)
The surface of the water reflects the light given by the
illumination system. An intruder may use this situation in
their favor when trying
to penetrate an installation.
4) THE LAND AS
BARRIER:
a) The land where the installation sits must be
evaluated and considered
as much from the surface access point of view as from below
the surface.
b) Points to consider when evaluating the land
as barrier:
(1) The looser the ground the more noise it will
cause when the
intruder walks.
(2) Muddy soil without vegetation is very
difficult to cross and at
the same time the intruder leaves their footprints.
(3) Light colored soil provides reflection and
contrast so as to
allow the most efficient use of natural and artificial
illumination.
(4) Land that is uneven such as cliffs and
ravines are difficult to
cross and limit the amount of equipment and material that
the intruder could
introduce in the exterior perimeter area.
b. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS:
1) As explained earlier, structural barriers
are man-made constructions.
To remove the vegetation around an installation is also
considered as an
structural barrier.
279
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) FENCES: Fences are independent structures,
generally in a vertical
plane, designed for the physical and or visual control of
access to external
areas.
a) General facts about fences:
(1) Define the area they protect
(2) Reduce the number of guards required and
facilitate the tasks of
the patrol corps.
(3) Cause delay in case of an intent to
penetrate
(4) Although they don't deny the access in
themselves, they are a
psychological obstacle to a possible intruder
(5) They deny accidental access to innocent
persons to the protected
area
(6) They help control the flow of vehicles
towards those entrances
controlled by guards
3) TWO TYPES OF FENCES:
a) SOLID: They are used to deny visual and
physical access to non-
authorized persons. The materials normally used are bricks,
concrete, wooden
boards, stone, etc.
(1) ADVANTAGES OF SOLID FENCES:
(a) They are useful when you wish to hide certain
activities within the
installation.
(b) They avoid the possibility of passing small
items through the fence.
(c) They could be built in such manner that it
would be difficult to cross
them without being detected.
(d) For the most part, fences are built of stone,
brick and concrete and
they extend below the ground and make it difficult to the
intruder to penetrate
below.
(2) DISADVANTAGES OF SOLID FENCES:
(a) It is difficult to illuminate the zone around
the installation because
of the shadow caused by the fence.
(b) They do not allow patrols within the
installation to observe the
activities in the external perimeter.
(c) The installations that use solid fences have
guards in towers. Tower
guards are a disadvantage in itself. The towers confine the
guard in a very
limited area. Since the guard cannot move for a long time in
the tower he does not
stay alert.
280
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b) COMPLETE VISION FENCES: Are built in such
manner that they al]ow
visual observation through the entire fence. It is designed
only for the control
of physical access between two areas.
(1) ADVANTAGES OF COMPLETE VISION FENCES:
(a) They allow the effective use
of illumination since
they do not cast a shadow.
(b) They allow the effective use
of guard patrol, since
they could keep the installation's surrounding area in
watch.
(2)
DISADVANTAGES: They allow a possible intruder to carry out a
reconnaissance of the camp and could establish the
installation's pattern of
internal security guards.
3) PENETRATION: It is the main objective of all
enemy or terrorist to
attain access to the internal perimeter of an installation
to carry out his
mission.
4) THREE WAYS OF PASSING THE FENCES:
a) ON TOP: Most fences are not high and are
easy to climb.
b) THROUGH THE MATERIAL: (If it is not a solid
fence).
Many
fences are built in such manner that it is easy to break or
separate them in such manner that it will allow the enemy's
access without leaving
evidence that there was a penetration.
c) BELOW: If the fence is solid and very high,
digging and
penetrating below is possible.
5) CHARACTERISTICS OF FENCES:
a) The minimum height of a fence is eight (8)
feet. This is due to
the consideration that an average man could jump or climb
that height.
b) It must be extended below the ground level.
c) If it does not extend below the ground
level, the minimum space
between fences and the ground must not be over two inches.
281
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d) Support posts:
(1) Wood: Must be the best wood
quality and measure at least 4
inches wide.
(2) Metal: Must be at least 2
inches in diameter. They must be
placed over concrete or firm ground at a depth of three
feet.
e) Protection - Upper part of the fence:
(1) All fences must have in the
upper part, additional
obstacles that could prevent or delay the enemy's
penetration.
(2) Complete vision fences:
(a) Barbed wires are placed in
metal arms that extend
outward, at a 45 degree angle.
(b) Place barbed wires in metal
arms in "V" shape.
(c) The arms must be two feet
long WITH three rows of
barbed wire over them.
(d) You may also use folding
wiring.
(3) Solid Fences:
(a) You may use the same system
as complete vision.
(b) You may add glass in the
upper part.
(c) You may place sharp metal
bars.
(4)
DISADVANTAGES: You must understand that the barbed wire
system in the upper part of a fence does not completely
prevent an intruder s
entry. What this system provides is delay to the intruder
and is another obstacle
that he should pass through.
f) GATES IN THE FENCES: The number of gates in
a fence must be limited to
the minimum necessary for the efficient and safe operation
of an installation.
Although all the gates must have the ability to be locked,
when locked they must
provide the same level of security that the fence itself
provides. When there is
considerable traffic on foot and vehicles it is preferable
to provide separate
gates for each type.
282
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
g) OPENING IN THE FENCES: All the openings
within or below the fence
(gully, sewage) that measures over 96 square inches must be
sealed in such manner
that they could only be penetrated from within. In the case
of rivers or ravines
that flow in the surroundings of the fence do not allowed
this to extend over the
water and it must be built parallel to the ditch. In case
that fences are built
through rivers or ravines, these must be dug to the river
bed so as to avoid
penetrations below the water.
h) MULTIPLE FENCES: Multiple fences are formed
by two or more parallel
fences used in conjunction to form a perimeter barrier. In
addition to increasing
the delay time, they tend to trap the intruder and prevents
our personnel from
accidentally coming in contact WITH the alarms or security
measures imposed around
the fence.
(1) The minimum rules for a fence also apply to
each multiple fence
unit.
(2) The multiple fences must be at least 10 feet
away.
(3) The maximum distance allowed between two
fences is determined by
the ground, the illumination, and the guard's abilities, but
it must not exceed
150 feet.
(4) A greater distance than this, prevents the
fences from being
completed and could be attacked by the intruder as they
treat it as a separate
obstacle.
6) CLEAR ZONES: The clear zones is the area of
the external or internal
perimeter of the installation which is free of obstacles,
structures and
vegetation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLEARED ZONE:
a) Must extend throughout a minimum of 20 feet
in the external perimeter
of the installation.
b) Must extend throughout a minimum of 50 feet
in the internal perimeter
of the installation.
c) Must remain free of vegetation, structures,
trash or any other
material that could allow the enemy to use it as hiding
place.
d) There should be no trees next to a fence.
The enemy could use a tree
to reconnoiter the installation and to try the access over
the fence.
283
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e) It is important to keep the grass mowed
around the cleared zone so
that there will be no possible hiding place for the enemy.
f) Do not use the cleared zone as a storage
area.
g) If you do not have an adequate cleared zone,
you must increase the
height of the fence.
h) If a fence is used to protect a large area,
if possible, build a
perimeter road that allows the car patrols and the quick
delivery of
reinforcements to any point of the fence.
c. HUMAN BARRIERS: (THE GUARDS AND THE GUARD
SYSTEMS)
1) The physical security depends upon the use
of guard systems in such a
way that natural and structural barriers could be used to
control and avoid the
access of non-authorized personnel.
2) The guard system is the most important
element of the security program
of an installation.
3) FOUR BASIC FUNCTIONS OF THE GUARD SYSTEM:
a) Detect the intruders
b) Sound an alarm
c) Capture non-authorized personnel
d) Identify authorized personnel
4) TWO GUARD CATEGORIES:
a) Those whose only mission is to serve as
guards in the
installation. These men are trained specifically to carry
out this task.
b) Those who carry out this task as a
punishment or as additional
task of their normal work, or it is the job that they have
been properly trained
for.
5) RECRUITING THE GUARDS: Due to the important
role that they play,
security guards must be very carefully chosen.
ELEMENTS TO
BE CONSIDERED WHEN SELECTING GUARDS:
a) Experience
b) Training
c) Must be strong
d) Must be in good physical health
e) Must be trustworthy
284
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
6) TRAINING THE GUARDS:
THEMES TO INCLUDE IN TRAINING:
a) A general orientation that includes the
orders and the authority
b) Instructions about the traffic control
c) Riot control
d) Personal defense
e) Arms handling including maintenance and
security
f) First aid
g) Communications
h) Use of special arms
i) Plans and emergency procedures
j) Counter espionage
k) Counter sabotage
NOTE: The
responsibility of the training generally falls upon one of the
members of greater seniority of the guard's forces.
7) THE USE OF GUARDS:
a) The guards' barracks must be located where
they could enforce maximum
control over the guard's posts and the sensitive areas. They
must use the
following rules:
(1) In small installations WITH one only
entrance, the barrack must
be near the entrance.
(2) In large installations a centrally located
barrack is preferable
to facilitate the quick deployment to any dangerous point.
b) For the perimeter's security, the most
effective use of guards is in
fixed points that support themselves mutually. These require
that each guard be
visible to the one next to him, sharing therefore the
responsibility of the area
they protect. These posts must also be protected by the
elements; such as: wind,
rain, cold weather and the sun.
c) It is less costly to use the guards on foot
or mounted guards. The
guards could verify the barriers at irregular intervals and
will make it more
difficult for the intruder to penetrate the barrier.
285
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
d) No matter what method you use for the
guard's service you must prepare
orders for each post and patrol. These must:
(1) Must be brief and easy to understand
(2) Include instructions about all the possible
contingencies in
regards to actions during emergency situations
e) A guard must have sufficient time to rest if
the job must be done
effectively. Must, at least, be relieved every eight (8)
hours. The guards in
fixed posts must be relieved each four (4) hours.
8) SUPERVISION OF THE GUARDS:
a) The
continuous supervision is necessary to make sure that the guards
are in their posts and carrying out their security tasks.
The supervisors must
keep in contact WITH each post, at least four (4) times a
day.
b) A characteristic guard force must consist
of:
(1) A commander
(2) His assistant
(3) Administrative personnel
c) If guard services are given 24 hours, three
shifts must be needed.
Each shift has a similar organization.
d) The supervision starts WITH a personal
inspection of all the guards
before the start of their shift. Each inspection includes:
(1) Personal appearance
(2) The equipment
(3) Knowledge of special orders
9) THE GUARDS' EQUIPMENT:
a) Distinctive uniform
b) Credentials and or appropriate
identification as a guard.
c) Appropriate arm
d) Additional equipment: notebook, whistles,
flashlights
286
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
10) COMMUNICATIONS AMONG GUARDS:
a) Fixed posts and patrols joined by a
communications network.
b)
Direct telephone may be used.
c) Portable radio.
d) Emergency communications depend on
messengers.
e) The vehicles must be equipped WITH
radio-transmitters,
receivers.
f) The central station must be in charge of a
supervisor.
g) The patrols on foot could use radios.
d. ANIMAL BARRIERS:
1) An animal barrier consists of an animal that
is used as guard system.
2) In theory, you may use many types of animals
but we have limited the
use to a dog, almost exclusively a German Shepherd.
ADVANTAGES OF USING DOGS AS BARRIERS:
1) Their sense of smell and hearing are much
more developed than in
humans.
2) They have an incorruptible character.
3) They are loyal.
4) They are plunderers by instinct, their
qualities as guards are natural
in him, and take precedence over their own welfare.
5) The man-dog team is the most effective
method in the use of dogs as
guards.
6) You may place dogs in open areas where it is
necessary to limit
movement.
DISADVANTAGES:
1) They lose their effectiveness if they work
where there are many
people.
287
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) You could not use it near a road, since the
traffic noise will
distract him and cause him to lose concentration and
effectiveness.
3) They must work at least 75 to 100 yards from
a road, or from areas
with frequent traffic.
e. ENERGY BARRIERS:
1) An energy barrier is the use of mechanical,
electric, or
electronic energy to prevent or alert about an intruder-s
entry.
2) Two important energy barriers are:
a) Protective illumination
systems
b) Protective alarm systems
3) PROTECTIVE ILLUMINATION:
a) It is used to increase the guards- field of
vision, providing a visual
field during the night in areas of poor or any natural
light.
b) DISTINCTION OF SILHOUETTES:
(1) When the possible intruder uses dark clothes,
he may hide behind the
structure-s shadows. To aid the guard in distinguishing
these silhouettes you may:
(a) Direct additional illumination to the
structure-s grounds and
walls.
(b) You may paint stripes or angles on the
walls, fences and
structures, that will allow the guard to detect movement.
c) ILLUMINATION OF ENTRANCES: This is a
special task since:
(1) Provides illumination to:
(a) Inspection of passes
(b) Inspection of Identification cards or badges
288
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(c) Inspection of vehicles
(d) Inspections of trucks and loads
(e) Illumination of the area surrounding the
sentry box
(2) There must be illumination in an area
approximately 50 feet around the
sentry box, 25 feet as a minimum.
(3) The area inside the sentry box must be kept
as dark as possible. In
that manner the guard could see the persons, and the persons
could not see who is
the guard, nor how many guards there are inside the sentry
box.
d) SENTRY TOWERS:
(1) The sentry towers must not be
over 1,000 feet of distance
from one another. The reason for this is that a person WITH
normal vision only has
a field of vision of 500 feet in which he could distinguish
silhouettes.
(2) The sentry towers must have flood lights, in
addition of
providing illumination, they must also blind and surprise
the intruder,
disorganizing therefore the possible attack plan.
e) ILLUMINATION OF VITAL AREAS:
(1) Examples of vital areas:
(a) Communications
(b) Warfare equipment
(c) Water tanks
(d) Energy plant
(2) The vital areas that are
considered vulnerable from a
large distance must be kept dark.
(3) Vital areas that are
vulnerable at short distance must be
kept well illuminated.
(4) Other areas that must be kept
well illuminated are:
(a) Inactive areas: where there
is no night work, areas
that provide hiding places to intruders.
289
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
(b) Buildings: Illumination
around the buildings is
necessary to avoid that intruders come in through low
windows on the first floor.
(c) Parking area: In addition to providing a good
hiding place to the intruder, is a good area for assault to
employees of the
installation.
f) EMERGENCY ILLUMINATION:
(1) There must be an
independent-backup system of illumination
when the normal energy source is interrupted. This may be:
(a) A system of floodlights that operate on
batteries.
(b) A generator
(c) A central battery system
5. PERSONNEL CONTROL AND IDENTIFICATION:
a. IDENTIFICATION:
1) The most effective manner
will be if the guards could
personally recognize all the persons authorized to enter the
installation.
2) A modified identification
system could be used only at the
military installations where only military personnel work. A
commander could take
his unit to the door and become responsible for them.
3) The artificial identification
is the most widely used at
present. The authorized personnel receives passes or cards
where access to a
determined installation or activity is authorized. These
could be falsified and
therefore they must be laminated and prepared WITH a complex
background so as to
make falsifying difficult.
4) They must have the photograph
of the person, name, and
date of birth, height, weight, hair color, color of eyes,
sex, name of the
installation, rank, title, and signature of the authorizing
official.
5) When artificial
identification is used, this must execute
a rigid control over the devices used.
290
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. USING THE ARTIFICIAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM:
1) The employee receives a card or
identification that they keep.
When they enter the installation they show the card and come
in. This system is
used widely but it has its flaws. These are the loss of
cards and possible
falsifications.
2)
In another system, two cards WITH the same information is
prepared.
a) When the person comes to the
installation, they give the
card that he keeps and he receives another one to be used
inside the installation.
If one of the two has been altered, the guard could detect
the change when he has
the two cards in his hands.
6. CONTROL OF VISITING PERSONS:
a. The control over the visitors depends in
how sensitive the
installation is.
b. Possible visitor's controls:
1) Escorts
2) Programmed visits
3) Visitor's registry
4) Passes for visitors
7. CONTROL OF PACKAGES:
a. You must provide for the search of packages
that come in or that
are taken out of an installation.
b. If necessary, you may prohibit carrying
packages to the
installation all together.
8. PHOTOGRAPHS:
a. You must be careful in the areas where
classified material is
kept to avoid the taking of non-authorized photographs.
b. Generally, only photographers authorized by
the information
office, or by the commander of the installation could carry
cameras to the
sensitive areas.
9. VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION CONTROL:
a. Jointly WITH the personnel control, there
must be a control of
vehicles.
291
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. An identification system which identifies
the vehicles WITH
authorized access to the installation.
c. It is required that the entire personnel
registers their
vehicles WITH the guard's general headquarters.
d. When the registry is done, you may give the
vehicle's owner a
decal that must be placed in the vehicle's windshield.
e. The declass must be renewed annually and
must be rigidly
controlled.
10. FIRE-FIGHTING INSTALLATIONS:
a. Fire is one of the most effective tools
used by the sabotage
teams.
b. Without knowing the cause, a fire could
neutralize an
installation completely.
c. The security program must include the
adequate installations to
fight fires and a program for the prevention of fires.
d. COMPONENTS OF A FIRE-FIGHTING INSTALLATION:
1) PERSONNEL: They may civilians or military
men. They must be trained
adequately in combat and fire prevention.
2) ORGANIZATION: It is a function of engineers. The engineer of
an installation serves as commander of the firemen's corps.
3) THE EQUIPMENT: The firemen's ability depends
upon the equipment they
have. To determine the type of equipment necessary, you must
understand the
classification of the fires:
a) CLASS A: Are those which consist of common
fuels such as wood,
paper, and similar materials. Water is the best element to
fight such type of
fire.
b) CLASS B: Are those of the oil or gas type.
Water does not work
to put out this type, since water spreads this type of fire.
Carbon dioxide is
appropriately used to put out this type of fires. Foam
extinguishers are
recommended.
292
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
4) ALARMS: There are two types of alarms:
Central and local. They could
be automatic and manual. Their placement serves to alert the
fire fighters corps
and the personnel at the same time.
5) RESERVE FORCES: It is advisable to have a
reserve force that consists
of personnel trained in the same manner as the main corps.
6) PREVENTION OF FIRES: The entire personnel in
an installation has the
obligation to participate in a prevention program. You must
have a training
program so that everyone is conscious of their
responsibilities.
7) PLANS IN CASE OF FIRES: You must prepare
specific instructions for the
entire personnel. You assign specific responsibilities to
the entire personnel
that is present at the time the fire breaks out.
11. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. A security program must include provisions
about communications
security.
b. The communications center must be designed
as a restricted area
and must enforce strict control over the access to this
area.
c. The communications center must be located
in an area or building
that could be easily defended, WITH some type of protection
against aerial
attacks.
d. The maintenance and service personnel have
a very sensitive
position and therefore must have the security authorization
according to the
sensitivity of the installation.
12. GENERAL
SERVICES:
a. There must be provisions that guarantee
that electricity and
water services are protected adequately and there are
emergency sources available:
1) ELECTRICITY: If an installation has its own
energy plant this
must be located in a restricted area and only authorized
personnel should be
allowed inside. A barricade system must be built to prevent
the entrance of non-
authorized personnel.
293
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) WATER: If the installation has its own fire
fighting station,
you must give the same protection as to the energy plant.
You must protect the
water from contaminations.
SUMMARY:
We have
discussed some of the measures that could apply in an installation
or activity to prevent non-authorized access to these. You
must not suppose that
these are the only available measures when making a
recommendation to a commander
during the course of an inspection or carrying out a study
of physical security.
The minimum rules that have been presented are preferred but
are not always
possible. Frequently, you may improvise to compensate for
the lack of security
that results when the minimum rules are not carried out.
Keep in mind
that there is not such thing as an impenetrable barrier. One
must not depend solely upon natural and structural barriers.
The key to the good
functioning of any security system is personal efficiency.
The barriers that are
used only serve to improve the effectiveness of the guards
and make the detection
of intruders more possible.
The physical
security is not the only answer to the commander's problems in
regards to security. Unless he has a good personnel security
program and a good
information security program he would not be successful in
his intents to
safeguard the information and the classified material of his
installation. If
there is a flaw in the security system, the intruder takes
the necessary key to
neutralize the whole security program. Remember this when
analyzing an
installation during a security inspection.
Back to Top 294
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNEX A PHYSICAL SECURITY REPORT LN324-91
(Name of the group preparing the study)
TITLE: SECURITY
STUDY OF (Name of the installation)
I. HISTORY:
A. The study of security was conducted during
the period between (the
times and dates)
The following
agents from (designation of the unit that conducted the
study).
1. Last name, first name of agent(s) in charge
2. Name
3. Name
B. MISSION OF THE UNIT OR INSTALLATION:
1. The unit ______________has the following
mission.
2. Factors that affected the level of
security.
a. Discuss the mission of the
unit as it affected the
required security level.
b. Discuss the location of the
unit.
c. Discuss the number and the
name of similar installations.
d. Discuss the security
classification for information and/or
material.
e. Discuss the general
importance of the unit studied.
C. LAST STUDIES AND SECURITY INSPECTIONS:
1. Security study: (Date)
2. Security inspection: (Date)
295
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
D. UNIT MAPS:
1. Sketches of the unit or installation.
2. Map of buildings (Annex "A"
convincing document number _____)
II. MILITARY SECURITY SITUATION:
A. PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL SECURITY:
1. Natural barriers and exterior influencing
factors:
a. Topographic description
1) Location of the installation
or unit.
General limits:
a) North
b) South
c)
East
d) West
2) Ground characteristics
a) According its shape (flat, mountainous,
etc.)
b) According to its coverage (clear, etc.)
c) According to its contents (clay, etc.)
3) Type of terrain:
a) Natural:
(1) Hills (location, height,
characteristics,
photographs)
(2) Ravines
296
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b) Artificial:
(1) Canals, (location, width,
depth, photograph, etc.)
(2) Water collectors
b. Immediate areas:
1) Unit, location at
__________________________areas pertaining to
___________________surrounded by the following inhabitant
groups.
a) Inhabitant groups
-- Population (distance, characteristics, etc.)
-- Settlement (main characteristic of the
sector)
b) Educational establishments
-- Schools
-- Colleges
c) Social organizations
-- Number (location, distance, objectives)
--
Leaders (names, last names, identity number, place, address,
telephone, etc.)
d) Industries
-- If any (description)
e) Entertaining places
-- Restaurants, billiard rooms, taverns, etc.
(characteristics)
f) Crime rate in the zone
-- Common crimes in the zone
297
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
-- Police history (rubbery, crime, etc.)
g) Groups WITH ideologies contrary to the
constituted order or power.
-- Investigations to ideologies that could
affect the security of
the National Unit.
h) Foreigners
-- Names
-- Occupation
-- Nationality
c. Critical zones
1) Are the following
installations:
a) Generators
b) Electricity control
c) Water measures
d) Fuel deposits
e) War materiel
2. Artificial barriers
a. Perimeter barriers
1) General Facts
a) The unit borders WITH walls
from north, south, east
and west, extension, fencing, type of concrete.
b) The limits of the
installation are:
-- North
-- South
-- East
-- West
298
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) Fences
-- The unit has barbed wire
fences, etc. to the north, south,
east and west, etc., describing direction, extension, type
of fencing or barriers
they have (include a photograph).
3) Entrances
-- There are the following
entrances in the unit:
-- A door (characteristics, measures, role)
-- An entrance (characteristics, measures,
role)
-- Other doors (characteristics, measures,
role)
3. Human barriers:
a. Guards and security systems
1) Guard personnel
a) General description
b) Guard service
2) Inspection and control of the
guard
a) Inspection system
b) System for its control
3) Use of guards
-- Positions, if there are or
are not enough
4) Guard's equipment
--
Disposition of armament, ammunition, equipment, etc.
b. Control and identification of persons
1) Personnel in charge of
control
299
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) Systems for control of
persons
3) Identification cards for
persons
4) Plant personnel (working
inside the installation)
5) Visitors
6) Authorization to access the
installation
7) Schedule of access
c. Control of identification of vehicles
1) Registry and control of
vehicles
2)
Visitor's vehicles (parking area)
3) Systems for inspection of
vehicles, entering and exiting)
4) Illumination of perimeter (if
enough, photograph)
d. Security of the inside area
1) There is no security
2) The unit has _______
(description of installations)
3) Built by_________
(description of rooms, floors, etc.)
4) The main doors to buildings
are
5)
The windows ________________
6) The upper part, doors,
windows, etc., (in regards to
security)
4. Animal Barriers
a. If any (type and description)
300
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
5. Energy barriers
a. Illumination system
1) If any (characteristics)
b. Alarm system
1) If any (characteristics)
c. Services
1) Electricity
a) Who supplies it
b) Is it enough or not, etc.
c) Water pressure
d) If water supply is enough or not
e) Uses
f) Water tanks
-- Description, characteristics,
use, location, etc.
g) For emergency cases, if there
are any other sources
or own places for collection of water.
d. Special cases
1) Fire fighting systems
a) Fire personnel
-- Plan to put out fires
-- Distance from firemen
-- Composition of firemen corps
-- Equipment used
-- Time to reach the unit if
notified of a fire.
301
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b) Fire-fighting equipment
available at unit
-- If any (description and
location)
c) Fire alarms
-- Description, auxiliary, etc.
d) Water
-- If the unit has water
hydrants in case of
fire.
e) Counterintelligence plans
-- If any
2. Plan for defense of the camp
a) If any
B. PERSONNEL SECURITY:
1. Main personnel in the unit
Infantry, military intelligence, administrative, civilians, etc.
2. Number of persons
a. Plant personnel
1) Plant number
2) Troop personnel
3)
Recruited personnel
3. Civilian employees. (identification and
authorization cards, schedule
of entrance and exit)
a) Doctors
b) Nurses
302
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c) Secretaries
d) Workers
e) Etc.
4. Others
a. Address of personnel in the general area.
b. Use of mobilization. (If there is any plan
for mobilization of
personnel in general in case of emergency)
c. Investigation
1) If there have been any
suspicious sinister activity, that
is, sabotage.
2) If there have been intention
to cause fire.
3) Any illegal authority that
has been registered.
d. Moral
1) Moral problems that affect
the security
2)
Military personnel accusations (when a military man
reports to his superior about any comrade)
3) If there is a registry of
damages or lost material
4) Hatred among military or
civilian personnel
e. Personnel identification control
1) Personnel identification
method
-- If none, if they intend to
have one
2) Visitor's control
-- If none, if they intend to
have one
303
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
C. DOCUMENT SECURITY:
1. Existing situation
Summary of
percentage (%) of documents and classification (ULTRA-
SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL). If there is no existing
classification of
documents, if they wish to establish a system.
a. Preparation and reproduction:
1) The sections create sensitive or classified
material
2) Precautions WITH paper ribbons, carbon
paper, etc.
3) Document file. (location, adequate or not)
4) Destruction of documentation
5) Access to sensitive dependencies or secret
documents
b. Classification and marking:
1) Markings should be placed in documents
classified as:
a) Photographs
b) Film
c) Recordings
d) Letters
e) Drawings
f) Maps
2) They are properly stored
3) They are of easy access
-- Manner in which they are
stored
304
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
c. Re-classification of (classified documents)
1) If they have a higher echelon in each one
of the cases
2) Registry and file of classified
documentation
3) How the material is filed; ULTRA-SECRET,
SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL.
4) Description of building where it is filed
5) Who files in each dependency
6) How long does it take for a person to do
that work
d. Transmission
1) Verbal or written communications
2) Using military mail or other mail
3) Stations and telephone numbers and
extension numbers
4) They use wire methods, such as telephone,
radios, etc.
5) Messengers
a) Who are they
b) It is always the same person
c) They receive instructions for
the fulfillment of their
work.
e. Dissemination
1) Who authorizes the handling of classified
documents?
2) If documents are taken out of the office.
Who gives the
authorization.
305
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
3) They keep the key to the files when they
leave the office.
4) Who has that key?
5) If classified documents are taken out, if
they need a receipt.
If they require previous authorization from their chief.
f. Message center
1) If there is:
a) Description and functioning
b) File description
c) Well or poorly attended
2) Facilities for storage of documents
a) Manner of storage
b) File style
c) Security keys
3) Receipts:
-- System for receiving
documents
4) Incineration:
a) There are systems for
incineration
b) Where does the incineration
takes place?
5) Evacuation:
a) Evacuation plan
b) Vehicles
c) Assigned personnel
d) Priorities
306
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
e) Evacuation place
f) Security measures
g) If the classified material is
identified
D. SECURITY OF TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT:
1. History
a. They is a topographic chart of the place.
b. Transportation of the installation's
personnel
c. Capacity for military transportation or
supplied civilians.
2. Aspects to consider:
a. Coverage measures
1) If identity of installation,
unit, or part of the vehicles
is known
2) Has signs, direction signs or
posters
3) Vehicle or continuous transit
and uniformed personnel
4) Principal or alternative
roads
5) Main roads:
a) _______________towards unit
b) _______________towards unit
6) Alternative roads:
a) ________________.
b)_________________.
b. Personnel and or security or protection
means
1) If any
307
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
2) Technical transportation
security measures
3) Vehicles that are used in
transporting the installation's
personnel.
a) Vehicles
b) Buses
c) Civilian buses
III. PHYSICAL SECURITY
A. Deficiencies found in the Study of Physical
Security, conducted
previously, that could have effect over personnel security
and the security of
documents.
1. Deficiency:
______________________________________
Recommendation: _________________________________
2. Deficiency:
_______________________________________
Recommendation: __________________________________
B. PERSONNEL SECURITY:
1. Deficiency:
____________________________________
Recommendation: __________________________________
C. DOCUMENT SECURITY:
1. Deficiency:
______________________________________
Recommendation:_________________________________
D. SECURITY OF TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT
1. We recommend to give the installation:
a. Transportation vehicles
1) Buses
2) Ambulances
3) Jeeps (trucks)
4) Loading transportation
308
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
b. Coverage.
1) How could the unit cover the vehicles and
their movement through
a false story if possible.
2) Access roads to the installation.
-- Main entrances for vehicles,
pedestrians, etc.
3) Helicopter room
-- Where it could be possible
4) Parking room
-- Owned vehicles
-- Visitors' vehicles
-- Civilian vehicles
5) Security and protection personnel for the
vehicles.
IV. ORIENTATION FOR
EXIT
A. All the findings and recommendations were
discussed during an
orientation WITH unit members:
(Name the
participants in the group, WITH rank, last name, name, initials,
role)
1.
_______________________________________
2.
_______________________________________
3.
_______________________________________
V. ANNEXES:
"A"
Convincing document no. 1 Photograph
Convincing
document no. 1 Legend
309
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LN324-91
"B" Physical Security:
Convincing
document no. 1 Photograph
Convincing
document no. 2 (Description)
"C" Personnel Security:
(Name the
documents in the same manner than the ones above).
"D" Document and
information security:
Convincing
document no. 1 XXXXXXX
"E" Security of
Transportation and Movement:
Convincing
document no. 1 XXXXXXX
_________________________________________________________________
1. SUMMARY: (Study
of Physical Security)
2. CONCLUSION:
Back to Top 310
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------