

Order No. S/0906

IN THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT

Old Bailey,
London E.C.4.

Friday, 24th September 1993

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD

REGINA

- v -

MICHAEL SMITH

MR. D. SPENCER Q.C. (The Solicitor General, MR. J. NUTTING and MR. J. KELSEY-FRY appeared on behalf of the prosecution.

MR. R. TANSEY Q.C. and MR. G. SUMMERS appeared on behalf of the defendant.

Transcript of the palantype notes of D.L. Sellers & Co.
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. GORDIEVSKY

A

Friday, 24th September 1993

OLEG GORDIEVSKY, continued
Cross-examined by Mr. Tansey

MR. TANSEY: Mr. Gordievsky, you are trying to be fair and impartial, are you? A. Yes.

BQ. Your opinion is in no way influenced by any matters at all other than, you say, your experience? A. No, my opinion is based on my experience, my knowledge and the knowledge I acquired also in the last eight years as well.

Q. How much money have you been paid by the security services since 1985? A. I haven't been paid any money. I am paid a pension by the British state.

C

Q. How much do they pay you? A. It is a question which I'm not prepared to answer.

Q. How much are you being paid? A. I regard the question of material order(sic) is not something which is supposed to belonging to the (Inaudible)

D

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr. Tansey I can see the reason for this but I think it may be invidious for any sum to be mentioned in open court, that anybody's salary is mentioned in open court, but I think you are entitled -- I mean, you can certainly argue that point.

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, I want to know -----

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MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: But I think you would be entitled -- because you are saying -- you are putting that Mr. Gordievsky's evidence is tainted.

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, yes.

F

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think therefore you are entitled to ask Mr. Gordievsky to write it down, so that at the moment at any rate it is confidential.

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, certainly, if that is acceptable.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: You better ask Mr. Gordievsky if it is.

G

MR. TANSEY: Mr. Gordievsky, will you write it down then.
A. To write it down, what?

Q. Write down the money you receive from the security services of the state of this country.

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MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: What you are being asked is to write down the amount of your annual pension or what you get from the security services per year, which at the moment will be confidential to the people involved in this case.

A THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: I wonder whether the jury might retire.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, members of the jury, would you mind retiring. There is a point of law to consider.

(The jury retired from court)

B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Wait a second, Mr. Gordievsky.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Might the Court sit in camera?

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, sorry, you will have to go out again gentlemen.

C THE CLERK OF THE COURT: The Court is now in camera.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: It may be advantageous for it to be dealt with in Mr. Gordievsky's presence.

MR. TANSEY: I want to put my propositions to your Lordship not in his presence so far as the amount is concerned.

D MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: You would like him to retire for a moment. As to whether Mr. Gordievsky is to be present here or not, what is your view, Mr. Solicitor?

HE SOLICITOR GENERAL: It is evenly balanced from our point of view. I think it is probably better that he is not.

E MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: It is probably better, as a matter of law -- if anything arises that I will have to inform you about before the jury comes back, I will do so. Would you mind retiring for a moment so that we can discover what is happening in your absence.

(The witness withdrew)

(Discussion in the absence of the jury and witness)

F

(The witness returned into court)

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Before the jury come back, I have been asked to rule on how much of your financial affairs with the United Kingdom government the defence are properly entitled to ask you. I have limited the questions. The ones that are being asked are questions I have authorised. G If the defence go further than I have authorised, I shall interrupt and tell you that you have no need to write the figures down. A. So the message is for me to do what now?

H Q. Would you please, when Mr. Tansey asks you the question, write the figures down. The questions he is going to ask you are ones that have been discussed, and I have

A authorised that he can ask a limited number of questions.
A. Ah, so I am supposed write -----

Q. Not at the moment; when the jury come back.

(The jury returned into court)

B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Members of the jury, we have gone into camera again for the next few questions which relate to Mr. Gordievsky and his finances.

MR. TANSEY: Mr. Gordievsky, you told us you received a pension. Would you please write down -----

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: To the nearest thousand pounds.

C MR. TANSEY: To the nearest thousand pounds. A. To the nearest what?

MR. TANSEY: Thousand pounds, the figure that you receive.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Per year. A. Yeah.

D MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Could he put 'A' against that. You may have some other figures. (To counsel) You may want to look at them. The jury and I will wait till you have finished and he has written down anything else you want to ask him.

MR. TANSEY: If I see that first

EMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes (Shown to counsel)

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: If I am going to look at it, I do not want to at the moment; I will wait till you finish your questions.

MR. TANSEY (To the witness): Is that what you have been receiving in the last three years or so? A. Yes, it's what I have been receiving in the last couple of years, after my escape from the Soviet Union.

F Q. So from 1985? A. Yes.

Q. Have you agreed a fee for giving evidence in this case?
A. No.

G Q. Have you discussed a fee? A. No, it has not been discussed and I presume I am doing it without any fee paid for it. I even pay for my own transport from the south of London coming here.

Q. So there has been no discussion about paying you for giving your evidence? A. No.

H

AQ. Has there been any discussion of an additional fee or additional money being given to you, having given evidence?
A. No.

Q. So is the position this that, so far as your giving evidence in this case is concerned, no-one has discussed the question of money at all with you? A. No, the money has not been discussed at all with anybody about this court proceedings and my participation in it. By the way, returning to your very first question about my pension, that modest pension which I get, I get it not from any security services but from the British state, and I can argue and I can quarrel with any of the security authorities and it will not reflect in any way on my pension, because it is in the law-based state. It is just the privilege which I happen to receive.

C

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, at this stage I have no further questions on the money.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: If you want to raise it again, I think you will have to let us know how you want to raise it before asking any further questions.

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MR. TANSEY: My Lord, yes. The position is a figure is written down.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, let the jury and I see that. (Handed) That document must remain with the court papers because the only other people who would be entitled to see it would be a higher court, if this case should ever get there; but it will be put in an envelope and sealed.

E

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: May I see it before it is sealed.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: So sorry, Mr. Solicitor, of course all your team can see it. (Handed) Right, may we get the public back in now?

F MR. TANSEY: My Lord, yes.

THE CLERK OF THE COURT: We will now sit in open court.

MR. TANSEY: So, Mr. Gordievsky, I just put this question to you so that you understand it: you told the Court that in fact you are paid a pension. I am not going to go into the details of it. You are paid a pension by the state. A. Yes.

G

Q. Have you exaggerated your evidence in order to keep in the good books of the British state and/or the security services? A. Are you asking if I have -----

Q. Exaggerated your evidence. A. Ah, my -----

HQ. Your evidence. A. Ah, my evidence.

AQ. That you have exaggerated your evidence. A. Yes, in the matter of fact I had -- not only I haven't exaggerated the evidence; on the contrary I tried to be as low key and unbiased as possible in order to remain objective, cool and somehow in the British way not making emotional or exaggerated points because, if I had and if I were in the position to play it and to give space for my emotions, my feelings, and my -- all my thoughts about the evidence, I would have said that I have not the slightest doubt -- I have personally -- as a former KGB officer, I have not the slightest doubt that those notes which I have seen yesterday -- they were made on the dictation -- dictated by a KGB officer to a competent and well-disciplined KGB agent working well for them.

CQ. Mr. Gordievsky, you have shown yourself in the past to be a skilled liar, have you not? A. No, I haven't.

Q. Is it not right that from 1972, as I understand it, to 1985 you led a double life? May I put that clearly: you pretended to all your colleagues in the KGB that you were loyal to the KGB, and at that time you in fact were betraying your friends in the KGB; is that not right? You were living a lie for over 13 years, to your colleagues at the time in the KGB. A. I am terribly sorry to tell you one thing, your Honour, that in the Soviet Union until the dissolution and the crumbling and the end of the communist -- the Soviet Union two years ago, every citizen in the Soviet Union had to lead a double or treble life, and everybody in that country was, and particularly in the state institutions, like Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB and in the General Staff, had to lead such a life, telling one thing for himself or herself, another thing for the spouse, a third thing for the children, another for the office, a fifth for the party organisations and the sixth for the KGB. So the people in the Soviet Union, they all had to lead such lives.

F In my case I had a great relief, and I'm so honoured and so thankful to the British state and generally to the western democratic society, which gave me the possibility in those 11 years of co-operation, that I was honest and open and sincere with them, telling them the real things and letting my soul -- relieving my soul to them, and telling them the real thing about the threat from the East, about the KGB intrigue against the British state and against the West generally.

G But it was not necessary to lead such a sophisticated double life like you imply because, apart from the interrogation, everyone -- they caught me in Moscow and interrogated for five hours -- nobody asked me whether I was co-operating with somebody or doing something else. It was just a normal life of the Soviet man, a homosovietic these were called, which more than 2,300 million people had to live all the time. So there is no special skills really

A to be honest. I was honest, and it was my great relief to be honest to my British friends, British officers, members of the British intelligence organisations, and I remained loyal, but also open and sincere towards the British society.

Q. Is it correct? Let us look at that a little more carefully. For example, how often would you meet your let us say MI5 contact in Moscow a week?
B

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: We are in public dealing with those parts of the case that did not refer to public interest.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think if you are talking about how MI5 was effectively dealing with Mr. Gordievsky

C MR. TANSEY: I shall leave that. I shall try and put it hopefully in another way. (To the witness) Most of your life, 1974 to 1985, you were working with your colleagues, were you not?

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr. Tansey, you are making the point, as I understand it, for Mr. Gordievsky to consider -- not at the moment; you may want to come onto it -- not that he was necessarily lying to the British, but he was lying to his Russian colleagues.
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MR. TANSEY: Exactly, yes.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Could you make that absolutely clear.

EMR. TANSEY: I am sorry. Mr. Gordievsky, the position is this that I know not what you were saying in fact to British Intelligence or in fact what you were saying to your KGB colleagues -- I have no idea -- but the one thing you did not want to do was to let your KGB colleagues know that you in fact were co-operating with the British Intelligence; that is right, is it not? A. That's right.

FQ. And so day in and day out you concealed from them by word and action what you were actually doing; that is right, is it not? A. It's absolutely true that yes, for those 11 years secretly, clandestinely collaborating with the British service, I had to imply or even to tell something else to the KGB, it is true, and many -- and millions of Soviet officials and Soviet citizens leading such a life, they actually forget -- used to forget and somehow ignore that they were living double and treble life, while I actually felt it. And when I was in freedom in July 1985, escaping from Russia, the first thing I said to a very senior British official, who is still there in Whitehall and can actually confirm it -- the first thing I said to him, I said, "Now, listen, I am so relieved because from today I don't have to lead any double life, or tell or imply something different from what I am and what I think and what I feel." It was in 1985, and I still I see no
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A reason, when I risk my life for the British society, I should lie to the British court of law and to your honourable members of the jury in the British court of law.

Q. No, my question was very simple. You can answer questions very briefly, Mr. Gordievsky, can you not? A. I can answer questions, yes, in the -----

BQ. You have given interviews on Panorama and answered questions very briefly. You did not make long speeches. You answered them very briefly, did you not? A. The long speeches have been cut out!!

Q. Mr. Gordievsky, it would be very helpful if you would try and do it in this court. A. Okay, I will try to do it.

CQ. You did it very easily with the man in your long Panorama interview, did you not? Your answers were short and to the point. Please do the same with mine.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Has my learned friend seen the original takes, or has he just seen what was put out on public?

DMR. TANSEY: I have the text of the Panorama programme.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: The original?

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Let us get away to from there. (To the witness) If you can keep your answers short, at least it will mean you will not be in the witness box so long.

EMR. TANSEY: From 1972 to 1985, you lived a lie, did you not, with all your colleagues and friends? A. I did in those 11 years. I didn't live a lie with my British friends, which was the crucial thing.

Q. Most of your life -- was it 1974? A. 1974, yes.

FQ. From 1974 to 1985, you spent most of your time with your KGB colleagues and other Russians, did you not? A. Yes, it was a great burden, yes, if -----

Q. It was a great lie as well, day in and day out, was it not, to them? A. It was a normal life of a homosovietic, which is well known to people who read about Russian Soviet Union.

GQ. But never to a British citizen? You say you were interrogated by the KGB. For how long were you interrogated? A. Five hours.

Q. Five hours. Is it right that you said on Panorama that they gave you drugs? A. Yes, it's right.

HQ. Drugs to make you speak the truth? A. Yes.

AQ. Despite all those drugs, you said not one word to them about your dealings with British Intelligence; is that right? A. It's true.

Q. That required some considerable skill to deceive them, did it not? A. Yes.

Q. Good liar, are you not? A. Pardon me?

B

Q. You were a good liar then. A. I used to be a good liar in the defence of the British interests.

Q. I suggest -- you see, you said this on Panorama as well, did you not: "I was psychologically prepared for a KGB interrogation for a long time, because my brain was programmed in a way for a situation. So even on the drugs I think I didn't reveal anything"; is that right? A. It's right.

C

Q. That is the truth? A. Yes.

Q. You were psychologically prepared to lie? A. I am not psychologically prepared to lie against the British interest or on British soil even.

D

Q. What I suggest Mr. Gordievsky is that clearly you do know a fair amount about the KGB by virtue of your position. A. Yes, I do.

Q. But what I put to you is you are exaggerating the evidence. I think I have made that clear to you, but just to make that quite clear. I want to ask you before I deal with that about your motivation for leaving Russia. You say that it was the Russian invasion and destruction of the Dupczec regime in Czechoslovakia in Spring 1968 that turned you away; is that right? A. No, it was -- what I was saying: it was the last straw that -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia is 21st August 1968. It was a kind of a trigger, but already I was prepared ideologically, philosophically to turn against the Soviet communist state.

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Q. Why did you join the KGB in the first place? A. I joined in 1962. When I joined the KGB, Mr. Krushev who was the predecessor of Gorbachev as a kind of author/architect of the earlier Perastroyka and Glasnost. He was speaking of the democratisation of the -- he regarded cleansing KGB as instrument of democratisation of Soviet society. As a young man, immature then, I believed and wanted to believe that it was true. A few years after joining the KGB, the first point I realised: it was an impossibility; secondly, even Mr. Krushev, that fairly liberal leader, had been removed, and a new Stalinist regime came to power in the Soviet Union, and it became clear communism was impossible to correct.

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- AQ. Were you not aware of the gulag when you joined?
A. When I joined the KGB, I was aware the gulag had been destroyed, and at that time something happened which didn't happen even under Gorbachev: commissions(?) of the public, of the general public were permitted into the jails and camps, while in the -- under the neo-Stalinist -- under Brezhnev, new gulag was created: (Inaudible) prisoners, one thousand political prisoners and one thousand prisoners of conscience.
- B
- Q. Did you take any action to help Mr. 'S' and Mr. Daniel in 1966? A. Yes.
- Q. Did you take any action to help them, yes or no? A. I can tell you that -----
- C
- Q. Can you answer it yes or no. A. Yes, I did. I spoke to Danish communists, trying to explain the situation to them and to make for them -- the position easier to criticise the Soviet regime.
- Q. Did you seek to influence the Russian leadership at all? A. Pardon me?
- D
- Q. Did you, yes or no, seek to influence the Russian leadership? A. Yes, I did, but if you will continue on that line -- we will speak about very interesting new matters in the life of the KGB -- then I will have to tell how I tried -- before I started to collaborate with the West, how I tried first to influence the Soviet government by KGB report, putting some undesirable truth about the western -- reaction of the West in the KGB report. If you want to know, we can discuss it for hours.
- E
- Q. I want to ask you: did you do anything to help 'S' and Daniel in 1966 in Russia? Did you do anything? A. I was posted in Denmark at that time. The only way to influence the situation was to do something about the Danish public and about my KGB reporting -- first of all I had to report on the KGB line to Moscow, what was the reaction of the Danish public of different political parties, particularly communist party, because they were listening to the reaction of the fraternal communist parties.
- F
- Q. Did you take action to help Ginsberg(?) and Gladzkev(?) in 1968? A. No, I didn't. At that time I didn't hear about that, but later I realised; later I learned quite a lot about the dissidents in Russia, and what faith they had, and how they were viewed, and how they were given medicine in order to make them confess on television and so on.
- G
- Q. Did you play any part in 1969 in the formation of the initiative group for the defence of civil rights in Russia?
- H

- A Did you do anything? A. No, I was posted abroad then, yes?
- Q. In 1970, when Mr. Zacrov(?) and Mr. Mezhnev wrote to Brezhnev, did you take any action to assist them, yes or no? A. No, I didn't. There was one person in the whole Soviet system -- in the whole Soviet system there was the only person who, in the conditions of brutal persecution, control, indoctrination, dared to resist it was General Pytr Grigorian(?). As a result he was put in a mad house and kept there for several years until he lost his health. I am watching all those developments and what it meant for a KGB officer to openly resist. The dissidents -- I came to the conclusion the only way for me to resist the system was to clandestinely help the cause of democracy and freedom in the West and through the West to support the important cause in Russia.
- Q. This was happening when you were an active KGB officer from 1966 to 1970. You did nothing, did you? A. Even then in my KGB reporting -- I put quite a lot in my reports to Moscow in order to explain, which of course -- I later realised it was all futile because in the KGB and central committee undesirable information never reached the level of the politburo and -----
- Q. Did you protest when Solzhenitsin was deported from USSR? A. Of course I didn't, because already I was in touch with the British Intelligence. It was more important for me to help the British state rather than to participate as intelligence officer, and a person nominally with a military rank, in open protest. I was involved in much more important things and much more important things clandestinely with a risk to my own life to help the British Intelligence service.
- Q. You see is this what you say about 1966 and Czechoslovakia: that was the turning point, but you did nothing until 1974, on your account; you did nothing to protest about dissidents and for liberty in Russia, did you? A. No, I didn't because I was preparing myself to do much more important and much more essential things for the cause of freedom and democracy.
- Q. I want to ask you about a few other matters. You did not protest when Solzhenitsin was deported? Did you protest at the trial of another dissident Sharansky, in 1977? A. Of course not because I was already having monthly meetings with the -- where I was able to tell the western intelligence community a great amount of details about the intrigues of Soviet Union, about its military build-up and deployment of SS20 missiles in Europe directed against targets in Britain and others countries.
- HQ. The position is that you never protested any liberal, caring position at all, did you? A. No, obviously it's

- A logical, it's clear, absolutely logical, when I was clandestinely working with the British Intelligence organisation, I didn't protest. It was the essential thing for the western intelligence community for me to survive as long as possible.
- Q. Did you defect not because of liberalism but because you had something to hide? A. No, I escaped from the territory of Soviet Union in July 1985 because I was in mortal danger, and two months later a death sentence was passed in absentia, which is still valid today. Here a persons stands who is under death sentence. As soon as I appear on the territory of Russia, I will be shot, as a person who dedicated my life to freedom and democracy of this country.
- B
- C Q. Did you defect because you were being blackmailed? A. I escaped. I had to escape from the territory of Soviet Union because I knew I was going to be arrested in three or four weeks' time and executed.
- Q. Did you defect because you had been found in a compromising position in Denmark? A. No.
- D
- Q. And you were being blackmailed? A. No.
- Q. What happened to KGB officers who misbehaved on duty; what happened to them? A. KGB officer who misbehaved on duty, they -- if they were on the foreign posting, they would be recalled.
- EQ. And? A. And get a reprimand by the leadership of the KGB.
- Q. Tried? A. If it is a criminal offence from the point of view of the Soviet law, some of them would be tried. In the time between 1986 and 1989, a number of KGB officers who co-operated with the American intelligence services were shot.
- F
- Q. Is the position that you did not defect because of your love of liberty and freedom; it was because you were being blackmailed? A. No, I was not blackmailed. I was just accused of being a British agent, very simple, I was directly accused -- during the interrogation which took place in May 1985, I was accused by my -- one general and one colonel that I was a British agent. I knew they knew; they had found out about it, and the only thing for me was, point one, to save my life if I can and, secondly, to save the tremendous knowledge which I had in my head and the tremendous knowledge which already was there in the notes in the possession of the British intelligence community, which would be passed to America and other members of the western intelligence community, to the governments and to the presidents, because if I had been arrested and shot the tremendous knowledge would have been kept for years and
- G
- H

A years because nobody would have known about it, and it would have been lost. So I was saving my life but also I was saving -- escaping with a tremendous amount of useful information, crucial, vital for the independent sovereignty, freedom and security of Britain and other western countries.

Q. Finished? A. Yes.

B

Q. I want to move on. A. Pardon me?

Q. I want to ask you about tradecraft in general. A. Yes, please.

Q. It is practised by all sorts of intelligence agencies at all sorts of organisations; do you agree? A. Different practices, did you say?

C

Q. It is practised by all sorts of organisations and activities, intelligence agencies, people involved in criminal activity, lovers? A. The tradecraft and methods of KGB and GRU, two intelligence organisations of Soviet Union, has been formed -- has formed itself through the 70 years and became an extremely distinct and unique type of tradecraft.

D

Q. Well, I shall deal with that, but I cannot deal with that in open court. But what I am going to put to you is this: tradecraft is a universal form of spycraft, is it not?
A. Not quite, no.

EQ. In fact, one of the best books about it, giving details, is a children's book, and I would like you to look at it please. I want to take you through it. If I can just assist, it is called the Know How Book of Spycraft, published by Usborne, and it is described: Know How books, best value in non-fiction for children 7-12.

F MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Who wrote it? Are you putting this forward as somebody who is an expert? How are we to deal with this if there is a dispute about it? Are you calling the author of this?

MR. TANSEY: No, my Lord, I am saying -----

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: The fact that something is published does not make it authoritative.

G

MR. TANSEY: No, it does not make it authoritative, but what it does show is that a lot of the material in fact is in here, the public domain; that is the relevance.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: If that the reason

H MR. TANSEY: Oh, my Lord, yes.

AMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: That is all right.

MR. TANSEY: What I propose to do is to give the witness the book and I will refer him to pages, direct him to certain passages. (Handed)

B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Before we get into it, would you hand it to the jury. They can just look so that they have a brief idea; otherwise it is very difficult to follow the cross-examination. Do not for heaven's sake read it through, members of the jury, or we will be here all day. If I may persuade the two of you ladies, I think you have seen enough; it is just to get a bird's eye view, if you would not mind. The temptation is then to get interested in it. Can I a brief glance please. (Handed)

C MR. TANSEY: May I say I have two copies. I could give one to your Lordship and one to my learned friend.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: No, as far as I am concerned, that is quite sufficient. It may be - have you had a chance to glance at it?

D THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: No.

MR. TANSEY: We have a copy. Mr. Gordievsky, you see it is called the Know How Book of Spycraft? A. Yes.

E Q. Would you turn over to page 2, please. Have you got page 2? At the bottom you see it has got about this book -- have you got that part there? -- and it reads: "This book is all about keeping secrets. It shows you how to set up secret meeting places and a secret post office, and how to disguise your messages. It shows you lots of secret codes and signals." All right? That is what the book says, does it not? This is for 7-12 year olds. Mr. Gordievsky, would you answer my question and then look at the page. A. Page what?

F Q. I was reading page 2. A. Yeah.

Q. Then we look at the contents and what it says -- this is page 3 -- carrying secret messages; is that an important part of intelligence, carrying secret messages? A. Yes.

G Q. Spy post office covers a number of matters to which I will refer; codes, quick codes, part of a spy's ----- A. Yes.

Q. Mystery codes, invisible writing? A. Hmm.

Q. Dot code messages -- is that part of it -- disguises, yes? A. (Nodded)

H Q. Silent signals? That is what it refers to. So if we turn over then to page 4, and there the heading is "Carrying Secret Messages". A. Yes.

- AQ. And if you look at the diagrams at the bottom; it shows you how in fact to write a message on a strip; you see, at the bottom: carrying messages in false shoe bottoms; is that right? A. Yes, it is here.
- Q. Concealing messages inside a pen, at the bottom; pen messages part of tradecraft? A. (Nodded)
- BQ. Then we come to the next page and it is called "The Spy Post Office". This is what I want to ask you about in particular, Mr. Gordievsky. A. What page is it?
- Q. Page 6 at the bottom. A. Yeah.
- Q. Now tell us -- just read it out first: "A park is a good place to set up a secret post office." Spies often meet or leave messages in parks; do you agree? A. To some extent, of course.
- C
- Q. It goes on: "... because you can wander or dawdle in a park without looking too suspicious." It then goes on: "Most parks have open places where you can have a good look around to see if you are being followed ...". That is rather important, is it not, to be able to see if you are being followed, is it not? A. As a general statement, it is correct.
- D
- Q. "... and your meetings with other spies can look very innocent and accidental", correct? A. Yes.
- Q. We then go further across and further down the page: "Where spies can hide messages: for example a crack in the wall"; agreed? Do you see the bottom of page 6, where you can hide things, the crack in the wall? A. Yes, it is a great simplification obviously.
- E
- Q. Yes, and if you go to the left-hand side: messages left in an umbrella. A. First time I hear it.
- FQ. Yes, but you know of -- well, I had better not ask you for particulars, but messages are concealed in various forms of containers, are they not? A. Yes, nowadays. About umbrella, the point is very interesting because the Bulgarian dissident living in this country was assassinated by the secret service, Bulgarian in 1978, not too far from here, with the help of a poisonous umbrella, and the umbrella -- and the poison was brought to Bulgaria in 1978 by General Budanov(?) -- he was my main interrogator in 1985. So it is very interesting that you speak about an umbrella. Mr. Budanov, he instructed the Bulgarians how to use the umbrella and Mr. Marcov, the famous dissident was killed. by it. So it is not a trivial matter; it is a serious matter, where the security of people and nations are concerned.
- G

H

AQ. "Spy picks up umbrella, takes it home, when he is alone, he unscrews the handle and finds the message inside." Such things are common; do you agree? A. No, umbrella -- I know how the umbrella was used once.

Q. You get different types of containers, yes. Then look down the middle of the page: "The spy sits down on this bench and finds a message stuck under the bench with a drawing pin." Is that not the sort of thing that happens? A. Oh, yes it happened once in the Brompton Cemetery. I found a dead letter box for one spy which actually never came to Britain after, but yes, similar things do happen.

Q. There is a dead letter box mentioned in a church, mentioned in one of the well-known novels, is there not? A. Yes.

CQ. So that is there; the parks and meeting and surveillance; watching that you cannot be seen; that is all clearly set out there, is it not? Invisible writing; is that one of the general tools of intelligence? A. Used to be used quite a lot, yes.

Q. And if you are being shadowed, being followed, how you try and conceal things; is that right? Is that what you do? D A. Yes, identifying the surveillance behind you. Each intelligence officer is supposed to do it, and the agents are instructed how to do it, or checked by the KGB whether they are under surveillance.

Q. Page 28, silent signals; important part of intelligence, is it not? "If you and your contact can see each other but cannot speak or get close enough to pass a message, signal with the silent alphabet shown on the page on the right." That is one way but you have silent hand and leg signals, do you not? E A. This is a fantasy, piece of fantasy.

Q. No, just a minute; silent hand and leg signals are the ones -- it gives here: one hand in your pocket, yes; two hands in pockets, no. It is all there: silent hand and leg signals, is it not, yes? F A. Not exactly like this, but sometimes identification signals include elements of it, like I mentioned yesterday.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Will you stop a moment, Mr. Gordievsky. My Lord, questions about a child's book -- obviously it would be ridiculous to have them in camera, but that is just one side of the coin. It appears it is eliciting information which, if it were asked about direct, we would be dealing with in camera. G

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, it is.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: In my submission, we must be consistent in view of the rulings that have been made.

H

AMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I follow that, Mr. Solicitor. We are getting perilously close. Mr. Gordievsky, pause in your answer there and, if you remember, take it up once we go into camera. This is the difficulty: you show him things; it jogs Mr. Gordievsky's memory and he brings out something that really

B MR. TANSEY: What I am trying to show is that all the tradecraft we know about is all well in the public domain.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I certainly got that a few minutes ago.

C MR. TANSEY: The concern, you see, is that it is not merely in a book for 7-12 year olds, but it is all well set out in novels in this country, so that anybody can pick up great details about it. (To the witness) Do you read spy novels at all? A. I don't read spy novels, but I read sometimes memoirs and serious books on espionage, and it is -- of course it is clear that in the West there are numerous books about it. I have got an American friend who has got personally in his own library four thousand books on espionage, four thousand!

DQ. So it is indicative of how much in the public domain there is about spycraft or tradecraft. A. Yeah, but it does not mean anything because -- I can't understand where you are getting, because it has nothing to do with all the stuff we have discussed here.

Q. Do not worry where I am getting; just answer the question. A. We can make a comparison with for example medium-range missiles, Russian and American. There are many principles are very basic but a specialist will always be able to tell if the SS20s are Russian missiles or American U-boat based missiles, because the specialists are very -- because there are always a number of small signs and indicators which tell you what it is, and the American division of troops, Russian troops -- it's also a military unit but there are differences and they can be told.

F Q. Is this a KGB way of trying not to answer questions? A. What is your question then, please?

Q. Well, if you listen and answer the question, it would make it much simpler. A. Yeah, I can tell you that this book which you showed to me is just a trivial -- very -- trivialisation of a serious subject, which is the subject of British security.

G Q. I have got books here; would you accept this: dead letter boxes are mentioned in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy by John Le Carre? Would you accept that? A. Oh, yes, yes.

Q. Would you accept that safety signals -----

H

AMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Tansey, but I am sure you are right and I am sure it can be put in evidence, but at the moment Mr. Gordievsky has told us he does not read spy novels. So whether he agrees with what you are putting does not make it evidence, because he has not read the book. Frankly, does it matter whether he agrees or not? It is there. On the face of it, it does not have to be a subject of cross-examination. I mean nobody is going to dispute it; if it is in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, it is in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy.

MR. TANSEY: Yes, well, my Lord, I will not go into the books.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: This is what I mentioned yesterday. Surely a schedule -- if you want to point out, to emphasise the point to the jury, that plenty of aspects of tradecraft in either general or specific terms are mentioned in particular novels

MR. TANSEY: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think that point is clear to all of us and, if you want to produce particular novels and particular passages that show it, I am sure it can be done.

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, yes. Mr. Gordievsky, I shall put it in this way: the details of tradecraft are all in the public domain. A. Yes, they are.

Q. Do you agree it would be very easy for one intelligence agency, if so minded, to set up a false flag to implicate another; do you agree? A. Hypothetically speaking, it's possible.

Q. Do you accept -- and do not answer this in case I should not put this question in open court, but let me put the question -- thousands of spies have been trained by the West and by the East since the early forties at least? A. Yes, that is true, particularly on the eastern side because the Andropov Institute issues each year three hundred fresh spies, three hundred every year.

Q. Do you accept thousands of non-Russians have learned these tradecraft skills? A. It is true.

Q. Do you accept that many of these agents or ex-agents are working for security companies around the world? A. Probably some of them do, yes.

Q. So the people therefore who have acquired their skills working for an agency -- you accept that some of them probably are working for security companies around the world? A. Some former intelligence and security officials do work for security departments of the western corporations quite often, it is true.

- AQ. Do you accept that industrial espionage is a major activity world-wide? A. Yes.
- Q. Do you accept it is big business? A. It is big business for the Russian intelligence services, yes.
- Q. No, do you accept that companies spy upon companies in the West, on each other? A. As far as I know -- and I often am invited to consult different corporations, including security departments of the corporations -- fortunately the espionage between the companies, industrial espionage is much lower than foreign espionage against British and American companies.
- B
- Q. Are you aware of recent cases of industrial espionage, for example one that has hit the headlines only in the last two or three weeks: VW Opel? A. Yes.
- C
- Q. The ones we know about: Virgin and British Airways; are you aware of that? A. I heard about the Volkswagen scandal.
- Q. Were you aware of two managers in April 1993 convicted of bribing senior manufacturers of British Petroleum to reveal confidential details about projects the company was planning in North Sea oil fields? A. It may be true; I haven't heard about it.
- D
- Q. Are you aware how, in the case of the National Car Parks v. Europarks, how they planted people on to the staff to become confidential secretaries, to seize and steal documents; are you aware of that? A. No.
- E
- Q. Company against company. A. No, but I suppose it may be true.
- Q. Are you aware of how in a take-over battle with Dixons in 1986, telephone tapping took place, not by the state but by companies; are you aware of that? A. No.
- FQ. Were you aware that, when the Independent was planning its launch of its Sunday edition, a bug was discovered in the office wiring? A. No.
- Q. Were you aware that, in the take-over bid for Laing by PLO(?) in 1990, a bug was found at their headquarters? A. No.
- GQ. Bugging, is that an intelligence ----- A. Yes, it is an obvious expression of intelligence activity, yes.
- Q. Were you aware that, in 1988 at Plesseys, they had confidential documents belonging to British Rail; were you aware of that? A. No.
- HQ. You would accept, would you not, therefore, that many companies spy upon each other for gain? A. For gain.

AQ. Yes, profit. A. Yes, for gain yes, probably it is true -- probably it is true. I know not a lot about it. What I know, working as a consultant for some of the corporations, that it is much less professionally organised than it is by the KGB and GRU, and much fewer people are involved in it and, when they do it, if they do it, they realise they do something illegal, and they are afraid of it, and they don't like it, and they are -- being very western, basic law-abiding people, they do it without confidence and it is a rare occasion. In the KGB and GRU, it was a daily professional activity where hundreds and hundreds of very well-trained officers were involved, after two, three years in the special KGB or GRU school learning the skills.

CQ. Mr. Gordievsky, is it right that James Wolsey is the head of the CIA? A. Yes.

Q. Is it correct that he told the senate select committee: "Some of our friends and allies are involved in economic intelligence operations against United States firms." Do you accept that? A. Yes but -- of course I know very well that he was speaking about the recent developments over the recent months, when I understood from the notes I have been shown here that we speak about nearly 15 years, recent 15 years of activities of some supposedly intelligence services.

Q. Is it correct that the United States companies have been the subject, the target of French intelligence agencies in the United States? A. I have heard a couple of rumours about it and read a couple of articles about it, but I know very well the amount of the KGB officers in the United States, and the amount of the KGB only is more than two hundred, not including the illegals -----

Q. Can you answer the question. A. ----- whilst another hundred GRU officers. So the number of the former Soviet Union officers in the United States is roughly four hundred. It is much -- not comparable with the French attempts.

Q. What has that got to do with my simple question? I asked you about the French intelligence service. A. No, I can't speak on behalf of the French Secret Service, of course.

GQ. Is it right that the CIA advised firms about going to the Paris Air Show because of the French Secret Service? A. Yes, it is very unfortunate, yes.

Q. It is very unfortunate that a western ally, friend, was using its intelligence service to spy on American companies. A. I agree with you entirely.

H

AQ. Were you aware of a matter known as Ill Wind in the United States, involving bribery and corruption in respect of defence contracts? Are you aware of that? A. No.

Q. You accept that HRC -- I know not whether you do -- sorry, before I come to that, do you also know that Israel has in fact used its intelligence services in this country, spying? A. No, I don't know anything about it.

B

Q. Sweden and Switzerland in Western Europe have spied on companies in other parts of Western Europe; are you aware of that? A. It is probably true but the important thing is of course to remember that the Soviet Union used to be a hostile nuclear super-power.

CQ. Yes, I asked you ----- A. No comparison with Sweden or Israel at all.

Q. I am asking you about western countries' intelligence services involved in industrial espionage against western companies; you agree that does take place? A. If it takes place, I don't like it at all, and I think it is wrong to do such a thing, because the allies are not supposed to spy against each other, and I know that British does not spy against the allies.

D

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr. Tansey, you are prefacing your questions and taking it he is agreeing. As I understand it, I think Mr. Gordievsky has gone no further than to say it may well be true, but he has no personal knowledge of it. A. Yes.

E

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: If I am misunderstanding the gist of his answers, maybe you could put it directly.

MR. TANSEY(To the witness): The position is that you have made a great study of intelligence since you came over here. A. Did what?

FQ. You made a study of intelligence. A. Ah, yes. I continue to study the intelligence.

Q. In general terms. A. Yes, yes.

Q. Not peculiar to the KGB but also around Western Europe for example. A. Oh, I learned quite a lot about intelligence in those eight years after my escape, but mostly it was something under the Soviet angle.

G

Q. Since 1985 of course you have been somewhere other than -- you have been outside Russia. A. (Nodded)

Q. Of course, you know that the secret services in those countries are engaged in industrial espionage against the companies in friendly countries? A. Of this country?

H

AQ. No, in friendly countries. A. Ah, in friendly countries. It may be true; at least I read a lot of articles about the French, yes.

Q. Now, GEC is a very prestigious company, is it not; prestigious, very? A. I don't know -- please, I understand the word; I simply do not know the company.

BQ. You do not know the company? A. No, I can't remember what is it.

Q. GEC. A. Doing what?

Q. You have never heard of it? A. No, I might be confusing the abbreviation.

CQ. General Electric. A. General Electric, ah yes, okay.

Q. It is a very big company; you did not know that? A. You see -- it is a German abbreviation; you speak about the German company?

Q. No, no, no, I am talking about the one in England. A. Ah.

D
Q. And do you know anything at all about HRC in the sense that it is a very prestigious research centre; do you know that? A. There's no point to ask me about the abbreviations because I can't remember the numerous different abbreviations for numerous different things.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr. Gordievsky, there is no dispute that
E Mr. Smith, the accused in this case, was working at HRC, and that is the place he was working. So there is no confusion between you and counsel, counsel is asking if you know anything about his place of work. A. Now I

MR. TANSEY: Can I break in -- so far as it is concerned, this
F is the question I am coming to: HRC is a very big research centre. Would you agree it is a natural target for competitor companies to want to get hold of their information and knowledge? A. I can't either agree or disagrees about it. What I can say: that on the KGB list there was a number of companies and corporations in Britain; and on the GRU side, for the GRU residence, there was another list. And they had different lists because they didn't want to overlap in their targeting, and the KGB
G knew exactly what the KGB responsibility was in this country, and the other way round, though sometimes by chance, when looking for people and trying to contact people at the rallies of left-wing organisations or different peace rallies and so on, they would meet people representing companies which are supposed to be target of the KGB rather than GRU and so on. It happened quite a lot. What about who is in this country spying against
H whom, of course it is not for me to know.

- AQ. What I am putting to you is: any company which is one of the foremost companies in the country in scientific research -- would you accept that many of its competitor companies in Western Europe would like to get their hands on its material? A. I would agree with you that it is an extremely important target with the KGB and the GRU, yes.
- BQ. You know my question; why do you not answer it? A. I can't answer on behalf of the British companies, of course, but I know the KGB and GRU quite well.
- Q. You know industrial espionage in these areas by company against company is very big, is it not? A. No, I don't think so.
- CQ. You don't think so? A. No, I don't think so, no, no. What I know -- it comes from my opinion -- is it's much lower scale particularly in the past than the KGB and GRU espionage.
- Q. I have put to you a number of cases of industrial espionage in this country. A. Yes, but through my years on the KGB, I know of scientific espionage of the -- of the KGB in this country -- in 1980 I happened to read the history of the work of the KGB in the scientific/technological sphere on Britain, on Britain. They were writing about the whole world but I happened to get that piece which was made by the directorate, the first chief directorate of the KGB, and it had 70 pages and was extremely concentrated text, dwelling about the history of the KGB activity in this country between the late forties and the early seventies, early seventies, and since it was of course continued.
- D
- E
- Q. Will you answer my question. A. And so if your question is about western companies, I don't think -- I know very little about the western companies, but you mentioned a number of cases. I agree that -- probably they are all taken from the newspapers, yes.
- F
- Q. And one of the processes of industrial espionage, company against company, would involve suborning its employees, would it not? A. Yes.
- Q. You agree? A. You are telling me that, yes.
- GQ. You agree, do you? A. It is probably true, yes.
- Q. Thank you. Are you aware that in November 1992 a former senior officer of the United States national security agency Gerard Burke announced an agreement to set up a corporate security consultancy with a former KGB general Uri Drozdov and Victor Budanov? A. Who?
- HQ. Victor Budanov. A. Oh really? Its an interesting fact!!

A

Q. I asked did you know that. A. I know -- no, I don't know about this but I know very well those two KGB officers, very well indeed.

Q. Setting up a corporate security consultancy in the United States. A. What corporation; where are they now?

BQ. United States. A. Now what company; attached to some company or what?

Q. You know him, do you not? A. What organisation is it?

Q. You know him, do you not? A. I know those two persons, yes.

CQ. Because they interrogated you? A. The second chap, yes. Well, the first was organiser of the service of the illegals, including sending illegals to this country.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Can I have the names again.

MR. TANSEY: Uri Drozdov. A. D R O Z D O V.

D

Q. Victor Budanov, B U D A N O V.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which one was ----- A. The second, Budanov, was the chap who interrogated me. It was he who put the drug into my drink. Drozdov was a prototype of the KGB General by Forsythe.

EMR. TANSEY: What? A. Only external counter-intelligence, not domestic counter-intelligence.

MR. TANSEY: The questions I am now going to put will relate specifically to the exhibits and therefore, in accordance with your Lordship's ruling, the Court should go in camera.

THE CLERK OF THE COURT: The Court will now sit in camera.

F

MR. TANSEY: Mr. Gordievsky, what I suggest to you is that the tradecraft in these exhibits which we have looked at, that tradecraft is common to all intelligence agencies and others. Do you agree? A. Individually, taking elements of the tradecraft, they are common, but in that combination which I have seen and observed they are very much KGB, under the KGB or having a KGB stamp on them.

G

Q. I am going to just ask you about the tradecraft and look at principles involved, please. We really need to have page 273, exhibit 30. You have got the page? A. 200?

Q. 273, please. Maybe we will use the typed copy because that might make it easier. A. Yes, I have got both here.

H

AQ. Now, so far as the tradecraft is concerned, would you please tell us which if any of these you say is exclusively KGB tradecraft, in other words, so you understand the point, that the tradecraft we see here is not the tradecraft of any other intelligence agency. Do you understand? A. Yeah.

B Q. For example the CIA or the French. I want you to tell us please: is there anything here in the tradecraft which is exclusive to the KGB, which we would not find in the tradecraft of any other intelligence organisation the, actual tradecraft? A. If you ask questions like you do now, it's no way to argue, because of course in any intelligence service you will find meeting places, postponement of the meeting places place, agent meeting place itself and so on. It is obvious that it will -- you will find it in any other. What I feel here that -- how it is put here, it is what I recognise, which I have strong and very distinct feeling of recognition from numerous KGB documents, KGB meeting plans by the officers before they go to instruct -- to meet the agent and to instruct him, because I happen to read other books and text books from the other agencies like CIA for example, and of course I know something about the British intelligence community, and I have never seen similar combination of elements on a piece like it is here, because this is combination of -- and the order, how they put here, it is exactly like in my own and my numerous colleagues' documents, and I don't argue with you that the elements of tradecraft -- they are familiar.

C D EQ. Let me make sure -- because this is a most important point in this case -- let us just look at the typed copy, exhibit 44, page 364. That is the typed copy on your left-hand side. A. I speak about page 273 and exhibit 44 in the top.

Q. I am sorry, you are quite right, yes, it is 273 on the right-hand side. A. Yes.

F Q. Now, if we start at the bottom of the page, just tell me please: "Contact break come 2/3 Wednesday each month". Would you agree that could be any intelligence agency in the western world? A. Yes, I do.

G Q. The date we have; Horsenden Hill we have. The date "25/9 Horsenden Hill if not following week". A. It could be anything else, yes, anywhere else; I agree with you, yes.

Q. So in other words that could be any agency. A. Yeah.

Q. Move up one little bit: "vertical line, danger: horizontal line come next day". A. Yes, it can't be -- it's KGB, it's always -- generations of officers have used those.

H I can exclude really that anyone else would come upon that

A combination of "danger" and "come next day", vertical and horizontal line.

Q. Are you saying ----- A. It's what I say, what I believe and feel.

Q. You say that the vertical line is exclusive to the KGB; is that what you are saying? A. No.

B

Q. Oh, sorry. A. I am saying that the vertical line saying danger -- it is -- on the basis of my experience, it is exclusive for the KGB. But it is not about that I was making my point, my main point about the general feeling of recognition of the whole little piece altogether. It is just traditional KGB plan of -- points in the plan of meeting with an agent.

C

Q. Do you accept that vertical lines in fact are referred to in novels? A. Vertical line is what -- pardon me?

Q. Are referred to in spy novels. A. I don't know about anything about spy novels.

DQ.

Let me assist you. Do you say that that is not published, the vertical line? A. Yes, the vertical line, yes, it is a usual signal, yes.

Q. Oh, it is a usual signal? Do you accept that it is well-known? A. A circle or a bird or a horizontal line; they are very usual. They have been making them, signals and signs, both by children and by the intelligence service, but what I say here: the combination of the two signals, the vertical line danger and the horizontal line come next day, is very much KGB, which numerous officers and myself in the past -- that is why I speak about the recognition feeling.

E

Q. Just look at this book. This is the only book. It is called Spy v. Spy by Ronald Kessler. It was published in 1988. Have a look, please. I am just going to read a small part, my Lord. This is the only one I am going to read. I hope you have the bit: "It is stealing the CIA blind". I think the learned clerk has pointed the passage out to you. A. Yes.

F

Q. It has got, "Ismaelov read out a schedule of drops and told him how to signal that he had received his money by leaving a Sunkist orange soda can near a certain stop sign." That is the first thing that is well-known, is it not? A. Yes, I see.

G

Q. Can I just say -----

H

AMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Can you read it out before Mr. Gordievsky says anything. Then the jury and I know what you are talking about.

MR. TANSEY: "If Ismaelov had to meet with Josie urgently ... to tell him that the U.S. was about to invade Afghanistan, he would draw a vertical line with pink chalk on an electric pole, a telegraph at Farmington Road." A. Yes, you see -----

B
Q. Now ----- A. You see, it is such a ridiculous really statement: if the U.S. will in invade Afghanistan, and they would put a pink line on some pole. Actually there are available -- very serious and good intelligent books are available in book shops. I'm not talking about this. I'm talking about the vertical line in this context meaning just danger, but a vertical line with a pink chalk piece telling the U.S. are going to -- tomorrow to invade Afghanistan -- I don't recommend you to read such books!

C
Q. Are you deliberately trying to misunderstand? A. No, I understand you very well. You are making point that the vertical line is a usual signal. I agree with you entirely: both children and intelligence service use the -- most usually vertical, circle, horizontal and the bird -- they do it all the time; no need to read such books as this.

D
Q. So anybody could put in -- any intelligence service, any organisation -- horizontal/vertical line, could they not? A. Yes.

E
Q. Thank you. So that is common, the horizontal/vertical; you get that in all agencies, do you not? A. Oh, yes, yes, yes.

Q. Absolutely, so go further up: "Copy John's contracts list". A. Yes.

FQ. That is just saying, "Copy John's contracts list." A. Yes.

Q. Anybody could say that to anybody. What is special, unique KGB about "Copy John's contracts list"? Tell us what is special about it, that makes it KGB and not any other organisation. A. Of course not; anybody can say it; I agree with you. What I was saying: that seeing the note, the whole context of the note, and particularly all the four -- how many notes -- in the context of those four notes, then the pattern is very clear. It is a KGB pattern and, as a former KGB officer, I was invited here to express my opinion, and my opinion was, as I said it many times before, I have a strong feeling of recognition. I personally am absolutely sure it is a KGB -- those are KGB dictated notes.

H

- AQ. You are a hired gun, are you not? A. If you say, "Copy John's contract list", of course anybody can say it, though of course I feel very strongly about it, that it was a KGB requirement to copy it in order to think about the future access.
- Q. Just tell me this: could not a company spy for another company ----- A. Could, yes.
- B
- Q. Say, "Copy John's contract list"? A. Yes.
- Q. That has got nothing do with the KGB. A. No, it's not KGB at all; in this case I agree with you.
- Q. Then "Lou's Tennis locations" in a park; nothing KGB about that at all, is there? A. If you will see a well-dressed person wearing a tie in Horsenden, going for a walk in the park, you will also say there is nothing KGB about it. Meanwhile he's a lieutenant-colonel of the KGB going there to meet the agent.
- C
- Q. The man in the smart suit walking there could have nothing do with the KGB. A. Yes, and he may -- but also he may.
- D
- Q. You might put him down as being an agent. A. By the way when -- yesterday I didn't tell you that in the KGB, in the KGB main residence, station, room in Kensington Palace Gardens, and in no. 16 Kensington Palace Gardens, which is the building belonging to the services, there are two intercept stations listening to the British communications, including the communications of the surveillance and the police services in London, in the KGB sub-station and the GRU sub-station in the building in Highgate. There were two sub-stations of intercept-signal intelligence, listening to the communications of the British, numerous ministry communications but particularly easily intercepting the police communications. And it was interesting that, in that area which was mentioned in those notes and which we discussed yesterday, there were no other services operating; there was only KGB which usually -- which operated in that area, parts of London, and sometimes when the KGB cars, on the way to the meeting places, were caught by the surveillance -- and it happened -- I remember very well how after two hours of dry cleaning, no surveillance, suddenly surveillance -- and it was in that area the KGB intercept stations were able to identify the activities in the air belonging to that part of London. So
- E
- F
- G
- H
- Q. If you want secret communication, as that little children's book said, you look for a good park; is that right? You look for a good hill, and a good park. Anybody can work that out, can they not? A. Yes.

- A
Q. So there is nothing down there that is exclusive to the KGB, is there? A. Yes, we differ here; I agree.
- Q. I am saying there is nothing individual that you can say is KGB. A. Nothing individual, I agree, yes.
- Q. So "Lou's Tennis locations" -- that could be anything.
B A. Yes.
- Q. "Copy the list" -- that could be anything. The vertical/horizontal -- anyone could do that. A. Yes.
- Q. Horsenden Hill -- anyone could go there, anyone. A. Of course.
- C Q. If you are looking ----- A. It is a free country.
- Q. Everyone is looking for a secret meeting place, a good place to go possibly, yes? A. Yes.
- Q. So anyone could do it; all it requires is a study of locations or a knowledge of locations. Anybody could do it. A. Hmm.
- D
Q. "Contact break" -- common to every organisation, is it not, as you say? A. No, it is usually for the intelligence services because they speak about contact and communications and broken contact or communications because, if it's just two agencies or two persons, they ring each other and say, "Let's meet for lunch". They will not speak about broken contact. But for the intelligence services it's extremely important because they are illegal organisations; they know very well that they operate illegally in the country. So if the contact is broken, it ought to be restored and it ought to be restored with the clandestine means, and it is a problem each time; there is a great problem how to restore the broken contact.
- E
F Q. "Contact break 2/3 Wednesday each month" -- that could apply to any intelligence organisation at all, could it not? A. Yes, any intelligence organisation.
- Q. Or any ex-intelligence officer employed by a company; it could apply to them as well, could it not? A. No, it is -- we can speak about the difference in operational philosophy between the intelligence service and the security department of the company. There is a difference.
- G
Q. Any ex-security officer or intelligence officer employed by a company could use this, could he not? A. Or -- can use it but no need for him to use it.
- Q. It depends. It depends. For industrial espionage, that has very serious consequences for companies, does it not?
H

A A. Not as serious as it is when you collaborate with a foreign state. I'm a witness of it because I'm under death sentence, as I told you before.

Q. But you agree, do you not, the last thing a company committing industrial espionage wants to do is to be caught, correct? A. Yeah.

BQ. Let us look at the top: "Parliament Hill Fields, card at changing room". Is there anything unique KGB about that? A. Anyway, I haven't expressed any opinion of this bit so there's no need to discuss it at all.

Q. There is nothing at all about this anything to do with the KGB or anybody that you can think of? A. No. I have got my opinion about it.

C

Q. Yes, but it has got Parliament Hill Fields, right? That is a place where people can meet. A. I -- what I said about it, I stick to it, and I'm quite convinced that I was right. If you have got another opinion, it's up to you to express it, of course, and I can.

DQ.

Parliament Hill Field is a place where people can meet. A. The best thing to just remain here with different opinions about it.

Q. Because -- well, we have gone through that one and you agree that, as you look at them item by item, they could be written by any organisation at all. A. Taking out of the context, yes, we agree about it, I said from the start.

E

Q. So let us move on then, please, to the next page, South Harrow.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which page are you on now?

MR. TANSEY: 274, and that is the next exhibit, South Harrow.

FMR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Would somebody explain to me: on the back of page 273 we have exhibit 44, and top of 274 we have exhibit 31. A. Yes.

MR. KELSEY-FRY: I can explain.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which is it?

G

MR. KELSEY-FRY: The handwritten exhibit shows the correct exhibit number. The reason you have 44 on all the typescript is because one exhibit produced all the typescripts.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I see, yes.

H MR. TANSEY: So page 274 is exhibit JS/42, the typed on the left-hand side. A. Yeah.

AQ. South Harrow tube station possibly; could be anything, could it not, or station or whatever? A. Hmm.

Q. 2nd/3rd April.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: May I just suggest, Mr. Tansey, that I could ask an individual question because it might save time. (To the witness) Individually, would you accept that each individual piece of information on this document, like the previous document, could have been made by anybody? A. Yes.

Q. Your point, as I understand it, is that it is the combination; you draw attention to -- I am only saying that -- that no doubt applies to the other two pages you are to see. A. Very much so, with some reinforcing small elements like -- very familiar to me: geographical names familiar from many encounters and events where the line, scientific/technological line or branch of the KGB -- where it operated, and I used to see those names there; like reinforcing elements of those items: biosensors and the high temperature superconductivity and so on. Those elements reinforce the great context which looks very much for me like a KGB context, in particular the context of the -- reflecting the work of the directorate T branch of the first chief directive, scientific and technological.

MR. TANSEY: I shall come to that particular exhibit in due course, but let us stick to this one if we may, please. Please tell us what it is on exhibit JS/42 which in any way you say points out that it is KGB exclusive to any other thing. A. Probably it is not hundred per cent KGB exclusive, but there are a couple of elements even of that little piece, just one individual little piece, exhibit number 44, and there are still suggestions, hints for me which make me feel that I do recognise the KGB style, and it is the suggestions of the route to take; it is the geographical names here, parts of London which used to be used by the KGB in London, particularly by the technological line; the word "suggest" so popular by the KGB Russian officers, who didn't know how to say, "Why not to do that" and "Why not for you to do this" and numerous fine, very cultured British ways to express recommendation. Only the Russian officers knew only one word for politely enough -- polite word for the recommendation, "suggest", and they were slightly uncritical agents, making, even writing down in his piece, "I suggest", just "I suggest", exactly putting into the text what the officer had said to him: "I suggest that you go to Perivale, Sudbury Town" and so on.

Q. Let us leave out the word "suggest"; I shall come back to it. It is used a fair bit in England by English people, I suggest. Just pinpoint, please, precisely what is KGB in that. A. Precisely what the KGB is here?

AQ. Yes, just pinpoint, please; tell us what it is there that pinpoints that this is KGB. A. Yes.

Q. Exactly. A. The KGB is here: combination of the recommended place -----

Q. Right, hold on. A. And please listen to the end of my sentence: it is the combination of the recommended place, of the recommended route to take, and transport to take, the contact, fallback contact conditions reminder, and discussion about the future of the contact, professional future -- all on one piece, which is a miniature keyword reflection of the KGB plan of the conversation with the agent. It is extremely typical, extremely typical, the order of it and all the main points in the plan, just the agent making notes.

C

Q. I suggest to you that is nonsense. Let me just -----
A. It is you -- you are free to think whatever you wish of course.

D

Q. Let me put this to you: a recommended place to meet -- every organisation does that; it is not special to the KGB; everybody does it, correct? A. Not -- I wouldn't say every organisation but another organisation -----

Q. For example, a company wanting to arrange a clandestine meeting. A. Another organisation might do it.

Q. Where you meet is very important. It is very important that you know where to meet, is it not? A. Yes.

E

Q. That is set out in all the literature; in every novel you have where to meet. It is set out: recommended place.
A. Yes.

Q. So a recommended place. A. Yes.

F

Q. Every intelligence organisation or anybody else recommends places. A. Yes.

Q. Of course if you want to go to a place, it is no good going to Perivale, if the KGB man might be at Sudbury Town, because that would be a terrible mistake, would it not, you going to Perivale and the other person going to Sudbury Town? So it is not a very smart thing to do at all, is it?
A. Have you finished this piece?

G

Q. I am asking a question. A. Sorry.

Q. Would you agree that a KGB man would say to the person, say, "Well, I suggest that you go to either Perivale or Sudbury Town"? That is useless, is it not, useless?
A. Why is it useless?

H

- AQ. What is the point of the KGB man going to Perivale if the person goes to Sudbury Town? A. The idea behind it is a difference. It's just small suggestions, recommendations which route to take to which tube stations, to take the tube and where from, then to walk to the meeting place.
- Q. What is the point of going to Perivale Station if in fact the KGB man is at Sudbury Town? A. Ah, we do not know where the KGB man is. He comes there; he is driven there by the KGB operational driver, being driven for one and a half hours by dry cleaning against hostile surveillance.
- B
- Q. Forget the dry cleaning, please; just stick to the question. A. Yeah.
- Q. What is the point of putting alternatives? What is the point of it? A. Because probably the original thinking of the KGB officer and his boss -- when they were making together the plan, they had a number of routes and number of stations where from to approach, and they made an assessment what is most secure and purposeful route.
- C
- Q. Why did they not say, "Go to Perivale"? A. I don't know. We do not know that. It would be interesting if the person who is the author of those notes told us about it. It would be very interesting to listen; to know the full answer about it, it would be very interesting.
- D
- Q. The KGB man would not say, "I'll meet you at that station or maybe the other one", would he? A. I think it's a pointless discussion because we do not know what the thinking was exactly behind it, but it is a general point. It's a recommendation for the place and for the route to reach the meeting place; that is it.
- E
- Q. Well, I have made the point. I suggest it does not make sense. Transport, tube stations -- that is in the literature all over the place, is it not; travel by tube or public transport, is it not? A. Oh, yes, it is all in the -- all over the place, only in all the books -- only all those actions were really in the books and never else rather than in the books (sic), while they were things I talk about on the basis it was the real things KGB daily operating in London, in the seventies and the eighties and in the nineties -- actually diminished in size because there was one who was expelled in 1979, one officer and another in the eighties.
- F
- Q. Can you not stick to the question. I do not mean to be rude -- if I am I apologise -- but please stick to the question: going to Perivale ----- A. No, if you are asking me what is in the books, I haven't read those fiction books -----
- G
- HQ. The tube stations, public transport, is set out in books for the CIA, for the French and for this country.

A Everybody knows it, do they not? A. There are a hundred books in this country published every day.

Q. It is all known. Fallback: "If contact lost meet at 12.45" -- you said I believe that 12.45 is not a KGB time; did you say that yesterday? A. No, I said the KGB liked -- used to like this time very much, 12.45. I wouldn't argue it's a usual lunchtime, so it's pointless to argue. It's a normal lunchtime for everybody else, but I know from the papers that it was a popular KGB time to appoint a meeting.

B

Q. So the contact arrangement is normal for all organisations, is it not? There is nothing here about the KGB at all, is there? A. Maybe not for you.

C

Q. Could you please tell me: if an intelligence service, of France for example, was to operate over here or use its agents to get information from this prestigious company HRC ----- A. Yes.

Q. ----- and was to use its intelligence tradecraft, could you please tell us what is here that they would not or could not have written? A. Okay.

D

Q. Or the CIA. A. Yes, I tell you. You ask me to tell you; I tell you. In 1980, I know very well one specific case in 1980: lieutenant-colonel of the KGB, Vladimir Vedrov, got in touch with the French intelligence and started to work clandestinely for them. In the 11 years of the collaboration with the French, he provided thousands and thousands -- several thousands -- of documents, extremely important, which France actually shared with Britain and other countries. Eventually the Lieutenant-colonel Vedrov was arrested and executed; he died. I studied the case very thoroughly and in that case there is nothing at all which has anything -- any resemblance or common with the details we discussed today. So we can't just make just a very simplifying statement: all intelligence services do exactly the same. No, they don't. How they ran Vedrov, it was a completely different story.

E

F

Q. You say 12.45 is a KGB time, do you? A. It was a popular time with the KGB, yes, that is what I said. It is -- the time was very popular to appoint meetings.

Q. Can you explain why, if that is the case, you made no mention of that in your statement? A. Yes, which one, about what?

G

Q. You made a statement ----- A. Yeah.

Q. ----- dealing with these exhibits, on 10th December 92. A. Yes, I made a statement to the police; that is true.

H

AQ. And you were referring to this exhibit here -- my Lord, it is page 177. Does he have the statement there? A. Page what?

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: There is no reason why it should not be handed if my friend wants. This does not have a page number on it.

BMR. TANSEY: It is page 2 at the top. A. Yeah.

Q. It starts at the top, "I have never visited Horsenden Hill." A. Yeah.

Q. Have you got that page? A. I remember that statement.

CQ. No, no, no. Just make sure you have got the page.
A. Horsenden Lane -- the page of which statement?

Q. It has got page 2 at the top of mine and page 177 at the bottom. Does that help you or not? At the top of the page the writing is -- it starts, "I have never visited Horsenden Hill." A. Yeah, I see.

DQ. That is the page I want to ask you about. A. Yes, "I have never visited Horsenden Hill."

Q. I am not going to ask you about that. I want to deal with this question about JS/42, and you have told us today that 12.45 was a typical time for a KGB meet; is that right?
A. A popular time for the KGB to meet.

EQ. A what? A. A popular time.

Q. Can you please look at your statement. A. Yeah.

Q. And tell us: is there a word about 12.45 being a popular time for the KGB? A. In my statement?

FQ. In your statement. A. No, there is no such a word in my statement. I was not able to put everything in my statement.

GQ. You seriously say that, when you looked at this document here, you were unable to say this sentence: "12.45 is a popular time at which a KGB officer has a meeting"? Are you honestly telling this Court that you could not or did not have time to put that in? A. No, because it is a minor point. I don't feel strongly about it. I mentioned yesterday but it is -- you can -- it is not -- I don't pay a lot of importance to it. It is -- of course it is a popular time with the KGB. Numerous KGB lunches with their contacts would start at quarter -- there was another significance why it was quarter to one, because the contact would supposed to be somewhere at quarter to one and some other place at one exactly. But it is not the most

H

A important point at all. I don't know what are you getting at about this time.

Q. What I am asking is: you have dealt in detail with this exhibit. You have said not a word about 12.45 being a KGB popular meeting time, and I am asking you why that was.

A. Because I don't feel strongly about it. I know that it is not a very forceful element at all.

B

Q. Mr. Gordievsky, it is not a case that you are just adding to and embellishing your evidence as you go along, and you have just put it in, just to beef up your case? A. My -- your Honour, when I was asked to be here, I was told that I was not supposed to use my statement, the text of it. I was supposed to just speak from my brain. So in a

C

way it was just to tell what really is my expertise and my feeling; and so I came here not like a parrot, to repeat, to learn by heart my statement, and then just to repeat it here standing in the court of law. I came here as a living man to express my opinion as a person reacting and responding to the questions of the Court. So I'm not repeating every line of my statement. Of course I can make

D

-- there can be discrepancies between some of what I'm saying now or said yesterday and the text of the statement made by the police nearly a year ago; of course it can be; of course it can be. I don't know see the point of it. So what?

Q. Because you went through JS/42 in some detail in your statement, did you not? A. Yes, I did.

EQ. And you considered it line by line, did you not? A. Yes, I did.

Q. But when it came to this 12.45 ----- A. Yeah.

Q. ----- there is not a word in your statement, is there? What I am asking you is: do you make things up as you go along in order to beef up your account? A. To be what; to do what?

F

Q. In order to increase the evidence in this case against him, against this defendant, that you make it up; you add to it; do you understand? A. No, it is exactly what I said just a few seconds before, that I am a living person reacting to the audience and to the proceedings and the events around me, and I'm not supposed to repeat the text which I should have learned by heart. I am just telling what I feel just about now, and I think that the people and the jury is likely to believe me more.

G

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: This is the danger of asking the same question twice: you get the same answer twice, and that does prolong the proceedings.

H

AMR. TANSEY(To the witness): If you thought that 12.45 was a popular KGB meeting time, I suggest you would have put it in your statement when you dealt with this exhibit JS/42; do you understand? A. Yes, I do.

Q. I suggest that you have not done it. It is not in your statement, and the reason it is not in your statement is because you keep on adding, you want to add to prove your point irrespective of the truth. A. No, it is not true. B I have great respect for truth and, if I add something which I feel just about now, it means that it just occurs to me. But analysing the text of the statement or the text of what I said yesterday, of course, can tell you what is the strongest point, what is the weakest point, what I feel strongly about, what I don't feel very strongly about.

C Q. I suggest to you that in this document here there is not one matter which you can say is exclusive to the KGB, not one matter at all. A. From your point of view, yes, and from my point of view, it's a most striking reflected -- it's the most striking -- reflecting KGB thinking and running an agent, and I said it now three times at least.

D Q. I am going to ask you that again: most striking: you said the most striking document, KGB? A. Probably, yes.

Q. Writing down South Harrow; what is the most striking KGB about that? A. I don't speak about the individual elements. It is in all, in the full context of it, and I said it already three times before. If you wish me to say it for the fourth time, I can tell you. The number of E four/five elements in a very short piece: there is geographical names; there is dates; recommendation where to go; there is future, professional future; fallback contacts; the word suggest, suggest and so on. That all gives me a very good context of a KGB dictated document. It is my opinion -- it is my expertise. You are free to believe it or not.

F Q. And I suggest to you that every bit of this I could pick out of a spy novel and write it down, every bit of it. A. Yes, the intelligence activities of the KGB and the intelligence activities of the -- of Britain and the United States have been feeding spy novels now for decades.

Q. Exactly, so everybody who wants to can pick it up and learn it. A. The books reflect the real life, not the other G way round.

Q. Let us look again at the next exhibit, exhibit 44 page 275 -- sorry exhibit 32, page 275, typed copy on the left-hand side. Please tell us which part of this here is exclusively KGB. A. I was -- in my statement yesterday I was not talking about any part of this little piece as H exclusively KGB. It was -- I really don't understand the whole -----

A
Q. Do not worry about understanding it; just answer the question, please. A. Okay, there is no element in this which is exclusive to the KGB.

Q. Would you agree that the agent of any secret service or ex-agent employed by a company could in fact have written this? A. Yes, possibly.

B

Q. Thank you. The left-hand side exhibit 33, page 276 -- left-hand side as we come down, is there anything exclusive KGB? A. Yes, it is exclusive to the KGB, because it is the area, the area Abbotsbury Road, Melbury Road and signal with the help of a disposable piece which is a coke can. It is exclusive KGB. It was the KGB's area of signals for the officers who used to live in Edith Road, in Edith Road on the way to the Kensington Palace Gardens; sometimes on the way to the trade delegations as well, they were still crossing this area, and not only the most active -- actually in the robust age, the medium ranking KGB and GRU officers used to have flats in the block in Edith Road, but also the KGB operational driver had his dwelling there, and he was asked quite often to do it on behalf of the different officers, to read signals left in that area of London.

C

D

Q. Is that not an area ----- A. Is it what?

Q. Is that not an area ----- A. Yeah.

Q. ----- which is well monitored by MI5? A. I presume it is. Well -- or in the periods of time used to be well monitored by MI5, yes.

E

Q. When I say well monitored, watching carefully for such things? A. They didn't know what for, which things to look, because they didn't know that it was -- the area was used for signals. There was no -- until I appeared there on their scene, they simply didn't know that that area was used for -----

F

Q. Can I go -- in 1985 you say they knew it? A. Yes, in 1985 -- oh, yes, they knew it, oh, yes.

Q. From then on they monitored it and surveyed it very carefully. A. I'm not sure because after 1985 they -- the British security service was more -- its resources went to terrorists and it had very few resources left to monitor spies. So many things the spies were able to do, particularly those more -- such as was so easy to hide, like making signals or reading signals -- it remained unobserved.

G

Q. Are you saying then -- let me understand this -- are you saying that, in 1985, MI5 did not have the resources to monitor? A. I'm sure that they -- the resources, the British resources of the British police forces and the

H

A British security service, are very limited. They all use the taxpayers' money, and they have to spend the money very very rationally. There are about at least ten spies living in Edith Road, and each of them in his own car, in different cars. They drive to the office. To put the surveillance behind them at half past eight, twenty minutes past eight each morning, it's absolutely impossible. Of course there is no resources for it.

B

Q. The use of their putting coke cans at bollards -----
A. Yes.

Q. ----- that sort of thing. A. Yes.

Q. That is well-known signalling, is it not? A. No, it was not well-known signalling because the well-known signalling is that one puts with the chalk -- it can be pink like you mentioned before but usually just white -- a circle, or a line, but the disposable items, they of course -- they were developed by the KGB in the seventies, but they started to be used quite frequently first here in the eighties, and the services knew quite little about it, I think.

C

DQ. So in 1990, did the MI5 know about this sort of thing, coke cans? A. In 1990, yes, it did, yes.

Q. So therefore they were well able to pick up signals and that sort of material? A. Yeah, and what; pardon me?

Q. That sort of material, the signals, this sort of material? A. They knew theoretically about it but it didn't help at all because, when you drive along, you will see a lot of rubbish on the streets, in the streets. You will not know what is a signal and what is just a piece of litter.

E

Q. This form of ----- A. That is why they were invented actually.

F

Q. This form of signalling is well documented in novels, is it not? A. It's possible. I haven't seen it but it is quite possible probably now.

Q. Nothing unique about this to the KGB; well-known to many intelligence organisations the use of coke cans, 7-Ups, orange peel, all that sort of thing? A. Oh, yes.

GQ.

Well documented in novels. A. Piece of an apple -- and yet each intelligence organisation has got its own pattern of graphical signals, disposable items, short wave radio communication and numerous other things. Each service has got its own pattern and it is the for the expert to find and make a conclusion what party it represents.

Q. Was the KGB using radios, wave band ----- A. In some cases, yes, of course.

H

AQ. In England? You know because you were in charge. A. No, I don't. I don't want to speak about other cases which can have some operational significance still now.

Q. Are you not aware of it being used over here? A. No, the radio communication I mentioned to you, that of course within the KGB stations, a lot of radio equipment, electronic equipment was used, and two kinds of it because, when I spoke about two stations in the Kensington Palace Gardens and two stations in Highgate, they had two kinds of tasks: one to monitor the communications of the police and surveillance services, and another task to intercept fax and teletype communications between important agencies or companies.

C Q. Did agents have radio transmitters in the eighties?

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think Mr. Gordievsky is saying that he is somewhat reluctant -- it may have implications with other matters. I am not certain it is relevant directly.

MR. TANSEY: It is relevant to one matter, if I may just put the question.

D MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Well

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, we are in camera.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Me may be in camera but, if there may still be public interest, just like something which is written down, even though we may be in camera there may be aspects one wants to be extremely careful about.

E MR. TANSEY: Well

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: It is ten to one. Let us go on to something else at the moment. You can address me at five past two in the absence of the jury if you want to continue.

F MR. TANSEY: May I put this question?

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes. Do not answer this, Mr. Gordievsky, until I have considered it. A. Thank you.

MR. TANSEY: Were radio transmitters used by the KGB in the U.K. in the eighties?

G MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Well, he has already said they were, as I understand it, but your question was a different one, which I think you wanted to pursue, which is were radio transmissions used to be in contact with their agents, not generally to get information. That is the area that at the moment I am not certain is actually relevant to anything in this case.

H

AMR. TANSEY: My Lord, in my submission it is relevant.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Or may be relevant. I will hear you at five past two.

MR. TANSEY: Yes. -- (To the witness) Now moving over to the second side of exhibit 70 -- do you have the original there, sorry? A. Yes I have got the photocopy of it.

B

Q. Can I have the original.

MR. TANSEY: Sorry can I have it please not the witness (Handed).

MR. TANSEY: I want to ask you about what it has here: biosensors micro-machining, micron valve, HTSC. A. Yes.

C

Q. Are you aware that much of this is modern complex technology; is that right? I am sure you are but I put the question. A. I am aware that it is part of the modern technology, yes.

D

Q. And do you accept that many of GEC's opponent companies would like to know how well-developed GEC is in its research and development? A. It is not for me to answer because I have no idea about it, but what I know for sure is that those components were mentioned several times in numerous KGB requirements arriving from the directorate T of the chief directorate to the KGB station in London in my time. I have seen it so many times, and I saw it before as well.

EQ. What I am asking you about here is that this here could well be a request from a competing company. A. Or it could be anything, but what I know for sure: that it has -- those names have been mentioned on the KGB requirements many times.

Q. But it is hi-tech -- well, I put the point: highly complex modern technology costs a vast amount of money and many other companies would like to get their hands on HRC's material, documents, research and plans? A. Yes.

F

Q. It is a prime target for opposing companies, is it not? A. Yes, but the difference is that for the companies it was always a problem, a problem of profit and competition. At that time Soviet Union -- it was -- as they thought, the armed forces and the political leadership of the Soviet Union, it was the survival of the political system, because they thought their military capability depended on it.

G

Q. Mr. Gordievsky, what I suggest to you is that what you have seen here in these exhibits has nothing in them which is unique to the KGB at all. I think I have made that point to you already -- this is just summarising the position, that all the techniques mentioned there are common to every intelligence agency in the West and used by them, including

H

A the CIA; do you agree? A. No, I don't agree with you, because I have seen elements, a few elements of that tradecraft used by different agencies, but I have seen a tremendous difference in the combination of the elements of the tradecraft by the services like the British, the American CIA, the French, which I mentioned before, and then the KGB; and here I see a very firm pattern of the KGB.

B
Q. Tell us, please. Go back to 275, exhibit JS/43. In what way do any of those lines there differ from that of the CIA? A. I can't -- I see your point very well because

Q. Do not bother about seeing my point. I am asking you -----
A. Yes, and this is my answer. My answer is that -- you
C quoted from my statement and the statements on your desk -- in the statement it is very clear that this piece, just this piece occupied the most modest place in my statement, because this piece is very difficult to decode and to interpret and to transcribe. That is why it is a difficult example to -- it is only can be seen(sic) in the context of all other different, other four pieces.

D
Q. This one here, this exhibit 32, JS/43, that could well be written by anybody of any company throughout the world?
A. Yes, I agree.

Q. Nothing in itself to do with the KGB at all? A. No.

Q. You agree. A. I agree about exhibit number 32,
E translation or transcript exhibit 44.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Right, members of the jury, ten past two for you, five past two for the rest of us, please.

(Luncheon Adjournment)

OLEG GORDIEVSKY, continued

F Further cross-examined by Mr. Tansey

Q. May it please your Lordship, Mr. Gordievsky, you said that the person who wrote these notes was a well-disciplined person; is that right? A. Yes.

Q. Who listens, follows and takes instructions from the KGB officer? A. It seems so, yes.
G

Q. One of the most important things -- so the sort of person who listens carefully and follows what he is told?
A. Yes.

Q. The one thing that a KGB officer would tell the agent would be: "Get rid of these notes." A. Yeah.

H

- AQ. "Don't keep them." A. Yes, he was supposed to say so, but we actually -- I'm not in a position to claim or to state whether he has done so, because even those excellent KGB officers whom I mentioned, members of that branch responsible for technology and science, they hesitate sometimes telling such things to the gentlemen, either not wanting to frighten them or not wanting to risk that the agent forgets everything and will not turn up to the next meeting. So it is one possibility. The second possibility of course that he said so, but the agent, who was well-disciplined and -- well-disciplined and well-organised -- in small things and short-term things, was not well-disciplined in long term thinking somehow, where the hope prevailed over the common sense and caution.
- B
- C Q. So let us follow that through slowly. Firstly, it is elementary that a KGB officer would say to the person: "Get rid of the notes." That is, you would agree, elementary basic KGB attitude? A. The elementary basic KGB attitude is, yes, that of caution: "Please don't keep anything incriminating at home."
- Q. Yes, "Get rid of it." A. "Get rid of it", yes, it's true, but it is only half of the question.
- D
- Q. Yes. You say, "Get rid of it; memorise it first." A. Yeah.
- Q. "And then get rid of it." A. Yeah.
- Q. And that is pretty basic and elementary. A. Yes.
- E
- Q. You would expect, would you not, therefore a well-disciplined agent -- on that basis you would expect a well-disciplined agent on your account ----- A. Yeah.
- Q. ----- to get rid of the notes. A. Yes, I would expect that the well-disciplined agent, any agent, particularly a well-disciplined one, would get rid of the notes and other incriminating material, but in the real life it was different. Why was it different? Because the same KGB officer who was instructing the agent to get rid of the incriminating material, particularly the notes, he probably at the same meeting was persuading the agent to accept secret writing material, short-wave communication radio, to send signals instead of making graphic signals or maybe a camera, a little tiny camera, to use to make -- so the officer would realise how contradictory his instructions are. On one hand he is telling "Destroy all of the incriminating material"; on the other hand, according to his instructions from the centre, he's persuading the agent to acquire from him a lot of other incriminating material. In the same way the officer, as well listening to the instructions to destroy all notes, he's also being persuaded to accept the secret writing material in order to send some of the notes to him directly by post, and the
- F
- G
- H

- A agents often said, "All right, I better do something else. I will not accept the secret writing and the secret cameras, and those notes -- they are so insignificant, so inconspicuous, nobody would be able to ever read my handwriting. I will rather keep them because it will be my guide for the next month." It is what happens quite a lot in real life.
- BQ. The KGB officer says, "Don't be silly; get rid of them so nothing wrong can take place." A. He's supposed to say so but there are officers who are cowardly, who don't -- who hate to frighten the agent. Maybe they say it and the agent does not destroy it.
- Q. You are not suggesting he would be frightened to say to him, "Memorise it and get rid of it; it's the best thing to do; solves all problems." A. Yeah, maybe he said it, maybe not. People, humans do commit human errors.
- C
- Q. Yes, to actually keep together a series of these here; that is not someone following KGB officers is it? A. Yes, yes, but you just recently -- only a few weeks ago you saw on television how the Crowders kept in their walls, in their house in the suburban area of London, a lot of espionage paraphernalia, things to read the microdots and radio communications and so on. They were well-trained, illegal agents of the KGB, the famous Crowders. They kept it. Also when the much lower grade agent keeps small notes about the next meeting, it is probably regarded -- was regarded by the agent and by the KGB as a kind of a minor drawback.
- D
- E
- Q. Minor? A. Yeah, mistakenly, I agree with you -- great mistake, I agree with you. It was a mistake by both of them, and the history of the intelligence service is full of those mistakes.
- Q. If they wanted him to continue to be an agent -----
A. Yeah.
- F
- Q. It was important that he was not discovered. A. Yes.
- Q. Therefore it was elementary ----- A. Yeah.
- Q. ----- to remind the person, "Don't keep anything."
A. Yeah.
- G
- Q. That is what a KGB officer would say. A. Yes, yes, in the KGB external branch -- the KGB external branch, before they started partial deduction a year ago, they had 16,000 officers, 2,000 of them rotating, were staying aboard. You can't expect that all those officers are well-organised, well-disciplined and very methodical and teutonic, instructing, doing everything properly and instructing contacts properly.
- H

AQ. It is the first instruction you give: "Get rid; don't keep" -- nothing to do with experience -- first elementary instruction from a KGB officer, if it was a KGB officer.
A. Yes, we do not know about other instructions. Maybe hundreds of them have been destroyed properly and maybe a few, four, the least significant ones happen to remain there. How many instructions have been destroyed we do not know. This is an interesting question.

B

Q. So the position is then, if he had been following KGB instructions, he would have got rid of them. A. Yes, if everything is taking(sic) according to the books, to the text books, yes, the agent is supposed to destroy them, and that is why -- the fact that many people, many agents, both those agents of the western -- in the Soviet Union and even more KGB agents in the West have been able -- the prosecution was able to achieve a sentence, a punishment because they were not very thorough in destroying all the evidence, because it is very difficult in the real life.

C

Q. I am going to move onto exhibit 29, 272 at the bottom.
A. Is that -- which book?

DQ.

Sorry, it is in the blue folder, 272.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Just before the ----- A. 272, yes.

MR. TANSEY: That letter could have been written by anyone, any organisation, any intelligence security organisation or any ex-agent employed by a company. A. Yes, it's possible.

EQ. Thank you. A. But there is a lot of -- something which tells me that it is a KGB one.

Q. Well, I suggest you are quite wrong and I am into moving on. Have you spoken to anybody about the evidence in the case before you came to court this morning, about the evidence that had been given yesterday? A. No.

FQ. Think carefully: has anybody told you about the evidence that was given in this court yesterday in your absence?
A. No, nobody told me anything. What, who is -----

Q. Has any person told you about any of the evidence given in court yesterday? A. No, no, no. I am not supposed to talk about such things.

GQ.

You are not. What was the number of the bus stop you gave this morning? A. Number bus stop? I can't remember because it was -- I mentioned a bus stop at random, at random. I can't remember what number it was.

Q. Let me just put this to you: bus number 6 stop on the Square da Liberdade. Who told you that, Mr. Gordievsky?

H

A. I don't know. It was at random, entirely at random.

AQ. You are not telling the truth. A. No, I'm sure I'm telling the truth.

Q. You are saying that, out of all the numbers available in buses you happened to choose bus number 6? You are not telling the truth. A. No, it is -- I use bus number 6 where I live several times a week. It's probably what I -- why I did it.

B

Q. It is just coincidence, is it, that you got bus number 6 that we have been talking about in court yesterday, just coincidence? A. I have got no idea what has been said in the court yesterday in my absence.

C

Q. I suggest someone has been talking to you and told you about number 6. A. No, no, it's -- it's probably against the rules but also it was not -----

Q. It is against the rules. Do you care about them? A. And it is important for me not to know anything else because I'm immensely pre-occupied with my own task, with my own statement, with my own exhibits, which I had to study, and what would have been said else by another person it was entirely irrelevant for me.

D

Q. Number 6 was the number given to you by somebody and you are not telling us the truth. A. It's not true.

E

F

G

H

Witness Statement

Statement of Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKYAge if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 10th date of December 1992Signature O. Gordievsky

From 1962 until 1985 I was an officer in the KGB, The Committee of State Security for the USSR. This is a security and intelligence organisation, since December 1991 renamed the SVR, the Service of External Intelligence and MB, the Ministry of Security. For the first nine years, until 1972, I was a member of Directorate 'S' of the First Chief Directorate which was responsible for the training and organisation of KGB officers who operated abroad under false foreign identities, these people are known as "illegals". As a result I became thoroughly familiar with, and indeed was involved in the development of, tradecraft and secret communications including the use of clandestine meetings, visual signals and dead letter boxes. I finished my KGB career in 1985 as head of KGB operations in London. From 1976 I had been working secretly for the British Intelligence Services. In 1985 my role was discovered by the KGB but I managed to escape from Moscow to Britain. Since 1985 I have maintained my expertise in intelligence matters, studied large quantities of material from the former Soviet Union relating to intelligence matters and been the co-author of three books on intelligence matters. I would say that I have a good current knowledge of the SVR and MB organisations because I keep myself well informed through the information which is now leaking from the former Soviet Union, and since the individuals in the two organisations are very much the same as in the KGB and use the same tradecraft techniques. To-day Detective Inspector MORRISSEY has shown me some photocopies of an envelope and five pieces of paper.

First, I have looked at the envelope RH/22 and it immediately strikes me that this was written by a Russian. The unsteadiness of the writing is a familiar sign .../...

Signature O. GordievskySignature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI

Continuation of Statement of... Mr. Oleg GORDIEVSKY.....

when they acquire the ability to write in latin script usually in their late twenties.

Also I notice that the letters 'n' and 'r', but particularly 'n' are written in capital letters where the rest is in small letters this results from the method they are taught where they copy the letters from examples in different books and so on, coupled with the difficulty in changing from cryllic to latin script. They often get confused between capital and small letters.

Reported

Now to the letter marked JS/40. This type of letter is familiar to me. It is typical of a summons to an agent for a clandestine meeting, usually after an accidental break in communications with an agent. It is deprived of any specific details like a date, time and place of the meeting because the agent and KGB officer know from previous agreement what they are. Secondly, tradecraft doesn't permit one to reveal vital details in case the note was intercepted or lost. Also the writing and the wording reminds me very much of the way Russian officers would do it.

The note JS/41. I find this very interesting and striking. It looks very much like a note made by an agent listening to the instructions of his case officer. On the fourth line down he makes a note about the signalisation, as it is called in the KGB, to be used in the course of clandestine meetings. A vertical line is a signal of danger, which means the agent must take special measures because either he or the officer may be under hostile observation. The horizontal line with the words "come next day" means that to-day's clandestine meeting for some reason cannot take place and for some reason is being postponed to the next day, usually the same time and the same place. Those two visual signals are the most usual ones used by the KGB in the communication both with the agents and the above mentioned "illegals". Practically speaking to-day only the SVR and the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence Service) would use these signals in intelligence operations. These signals are put by chalk or marker pen on a lamp post or gate post or telephone wiring box or something like that, so that they can easily be seen by the agent, even while driving in a car past the site. The last two lines are very typical for the KGB clandestine communication agreements. For me, the first words mean the date and place of the next meeting and the following words mean if it will not be possible to carry out the meeting, then to carry it out at the same place and time the next week.

Signature. O. Gordievsky..... Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey. DI.....

Continuation of Statement of.....Mr. Oleg GORDIEVSKY.....

I have never visited Horsenden Hill, but I know where it is and it is a typically suitable place for KGB clandestine meetings. It is within the 25 mile limit and also not in the centre of London. There are no Police stations or similar that would make for a difficult climate for such a meeting. The last line on this note is a very important one, it is a typically traditional KGB arrangement where if the contact between the agent and the case officer is broken, the agent will have to turn up at a previously appointed time and place until contact is re-established. In this case, according to the note, every second and third Wednesday of each month.

The note JS/42 is full of messages for me as a former KGB officer. It looks for me like a note made by a well disciplined agent, listening carefully to the instructions of his case officer, in order not to miss or forget anything. By disciplined, I mean an agent who uncritically receives the instructions of the officer and follows them precisely. From the point of view of the KGB only it's best agents are disciplined. The first half of the note is the officer explaining the best route to the meeting place. The agent has underlined the word "suggest" twice which means that the officer emphasised these words so that in effect they are orders and that is why the agent underlines them. The officer gives these orders with an objective in mind and this is usually to control the route taken to the meeting by the agent so that counter-surveillance can be used by the officer and his colleagues from the Russian residency. To see if the agent is being followed by the British security authorities. A second reason for arranging a route to the meeting for the agent in advance is so visual signals can be left for him. On the next lines is the ritual reminder of what to do if contact is broken as I have previously explained on the note JS/41. At each meeting the case officer discusses the agent's professional future with him because the KGB is interested in continuing to enjoy the agent's access or, better, to improve it or expand it. So, the last two lines may be about the future of the agent, or about the work that the agent has access to, and what will happen to that in the future.

With regard to note marked JS/43 there is a difference between this note and the others, JS41, JS42 and JS44. The signalisation is different, in that colours are indicated. /..

Signature.....O. Gordievsky..... Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI

Continuation of Statement of..... Mr. Oleg GORDIEVSKY.....

and the use of a magazine or newspaper probably as an indicator or a sign of identity. While I feel that the note indicates communication in the intelligence field, qualitatively the difference indicates that this note refers to a different stage in the case officer/agent relationship either before or after the period represented by the other notes.

The note JS/44 I regard as the most interesting, because it looks like a memo where the agent has recorded the most important elements of his conversation with the case officer. On the left side it states "1. get Karl's Address and telephone number" which is an instruction from the case officer. The KGB uses its agents for "talent spotting", that is in order to recruit more agents, they ask for people's details to be obtained by the established agent so that they may be approached by KGB officers. After this at number 2., the agent is trying to draw the object where the case officer is telling him that the signals will be put but it is not clear what the object is. The signals are the same as on JS/41 which are typical elements of KGB signalisation. On the next line is the location Abbotsbury Road/Melbury Road and a coke can at bollard. Since the 1970's the KGB slowly introduced disposable items, such as empty cigarette boxes, empty cans, orange and banana skins, as signals. They would be left in places where they would be unlikely to be removed too soon. The system of graphic signals and disposable items are often used together. The location Abbotsbury Road/Melbury Road like the rest of the area between Holland Park and Holland Road has been regularly by the KGB for signal sites, because it was conveniently on the route of KGB officers living in the block of flats in Edith Road on the way to their Embassy in Kensington Palace Gardens. I myself was responsible for reading signals from different "illegals" which they left in this area in the 1980's. The last two lines are instructions to follow a route and as I have explained before this allows for example counter-surveillance by the case officer, and for signals to be left on the route. On the right hand side is the tasks to be done for the next meeting. I recognise the words biosensors, micron valve and HTSC which I have been told by D.I.MORRISSEY represents high temperature super conductivity, as frequently on the requirements .../..

Signature..... O.Gordievsky.....

Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey D.I.....

Continuation of Statement of Mr. Oleg GORDIEVSKY

lists of the line-X of the KGB work. Line-X is concerned with illicit acquisition of high technological industrial and scientific secrets, usually important or relevant to the military production. About a third of all KGB officers belong to this line-X branch and their job is the acquisition, usually through agents, of that information. On note JS/44 under the requirements list I see the discussion of the delivery of something substantial, like a bundle of documents or a bulky item. Finally a reminder of the standing arrangements if contact is lost.

I have been asked why an agent would keep such notes, well according to the tradecraft an agent is not supposed to keep incriminating notes but the case officer's interest is that the agent complies with the instructions he is given and turns up at the meetings and remembers what to do before the next meeting. This interest overrides the consideration of the agent's security. The case officer is interested in short term success for his own career, allowing the agent to make notes thus jeopardising the long term future of the agent. Throughout this statement 'case officer' refers to an officer of the KGB or SVR, which are effectively the same thing, who is responsible for all aspects of the control of the agent which would include meeting him and receiving information from him. The GRU is very similar to the line-X KGB and uses similar tradecraft.

From my experience of 23 years in the KGB I can confidently state that these notes JS/41 to JS/44, were made in response to the instructions of a KGB case officer, or possibly GRU. It was impossible for the person making the notes not to realise he was dealing with an intelligence service, because of the numerous elements of the paraphernalia of espionage which are the signalisation, the directions to follow a specific route, the contact and fall back arrangements, the sophisticated requirements list and the possible evidence of talent spotting. O.Gordievsky

Martin Morrissey DI

Signature O.Gordievsky Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI

Witness Statement

Statement of Oleg GORDIEVSKY

Age if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 5th date of May 1993

Signature O Gordievsky

Further to my statement of the 10th December 1992 I have been asked by Detective Inspector Morrissey to provide some documentary evidence of my previous employment in the KGB, the Committee of State Security of the USSR. I produce my KGB identity card, which is the main and the only document identifying me as a member of the KGB and as a member of the Soviet Union's armed forces. It was issued to me in the year 1978 in Moscow after my return from my assignment in Denmark. It was issued because in my time in Denmark I had been promoted from the rank of Major to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, thus needing a new identity card. Because the officers of the KGB wear plain clothes I had to visit the photo studio of the KGB in Moscow to be photographed in the uniform of a Lieutenant-Colonel for the card. In February 1985 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel but because I was posted at that time in London I was not in a position to get a new identity card before I finished my KGB career in May 1985. The photograph is not on this identity card because when my book "KGB: The Inside Story" was to be published, the publisher wanted to use my identity card as an illustration in the book, and in fact it appears on the dust jacket. At that time, 1990, for reasons of personal security I did not allow my photograph to be seen in public and so the photograph of me in my Lieutenant-Colonel's uniform was removed from the card. On the inside left hand of the identity card it says: on the ink stamp is the national emblem and the words "Committee of State Security of the USSR", on the printed KGB emblem the words "KGB of USSR". In ink my personal number as member of the armed forces: D-895525. In the upper right

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Continuation of Statement of Oleg GORDIEVSKY

corner the series of the identity card NK-4. A line on the right hand side says "valid until 31st December 1985". On the right hand side of the card the text says "Committee of State Security of USSR. Identity card NK No. 3406 Lieutenant-Colonel GORDIEVSKY Oleg Antonovich. Holding the office of Senior Assistant of Department Head. The owner of this card is permitted to store and to carry arms. Deputy Chairman of State Security" (signed). On the right side is the same emblem as on the left of the card. I produce this card as exhibit OG/1. When I was escaping from Russia in July 1985 I had it with me as a precaution in case I was arrested in the border area. I have also been shown exhibits marked JS/45, JS/46, JS/47 and a series of photographs exhibit PA/2. In the light of my previous statement I have been asked for my opinion on these maps. The marks on the map of Oporto marked JS/45 look to me as if they could have an intelligence purpose. They could have been marks of dead letter boxes, signal sites or agent meeting places. Most likely these places, three of which have a well protected and transparent bus shelter, are perfect meeting places or visual contact places, while the fourth place looks like a cosy and convenient meeting place. Another possibility is that the crosses on the map are marks of the route which a KGB contact is supposed to follow probably stopping for a short period of time at bus-stops before his meeting with a case officer in order to be checked as to whether he is being followed by hostile surveillance. It is the bus-stops that are marked in this small area that lead me to this conclusion. Having said this, that the marks could have an intelligence purpose, I have not sufficient information to be certain that they are.

O Gordievsky

Signature O Gordievsky

Signature witnessed by Martin Morrisse

Witness Statement

Statement of Oleg GORDIEVSKY

Age if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 26th date of May 19 93

Signature O Gordievsky

I have been asked to expand upon my career in the KGB. On 1st August 1962 I joined, at the age of 23, as a Lieutenant. I was trained at the special KGB training facility just outside Moscow then known as School Number 101. I was trained as an Intelligence Officer and the training lasted 10 months. In August 1963 I joined the Headquarters Department, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, responsible for all aspects of intelligence abroad. I started in the department called Second Department of the Directorate 'S' of the First Chief Directorate, responsible for the training and running of so called "illegals". Because "illegals" need to have a very good grasp of tradecraft, through this work I became more familiar with such elements of tradecraft as dead letter boxes, signal sites, meeting places and secret communication than other officers of the KGB. In practice, Directorate 'S' led the KGB in the development of these aspects of tradecraft which were used throughout the rest of the KGB. In January 1966 I had been promoted to Senior Lieutenant and I went to Denmark under the cover of Attache to the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen responsible for consular affairs. As to the KGB my real task was to look for Scandinavian and other Western identities for illegals and clandestinely to meet the KGB illegals in Denmark. During this time I spent many many days looking for signal sites, dead letter boxes and meeting places to report back to Headquarters in Moscow. I was promoted to 3rd Secretary at the Embassy, while for the KGB I became a Captain in about 1968. I returned to Moscow in the last days of December 1969. I returned to the same department still dealing with illegals and their tradecraft for 2½ years. In the summer of 1972 I was

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Continuation of Statement of Oleg GORDIEVSKY

transferred to the 3rd Department of the First Chief Directorate, responsible for the organisation of political espionage and all administrative matters at the KGB stations in Great Britain, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia and Finland. Political espionage involves penetrating the Government and seeking information on foreign, military and domestic policy. In October 1972 I was posted again to Copenhagen with the entirely different function of engaging in political espionage, again using tradecraft with KGB Agents and other contacts. In 1974 I was appointed Head of the Political Section of the KGB station in Copenhagen. I was appointed Deputy Resident or Deputy Head of Station, and during this time I was promoted Major and then Lieutenant Colonel. In 1974 I got in touch with British Intelligence and started regular clandestine co-operation with them in 1975. As Head of Section and Deputy Head of Station I was responsible for using tradecraft myself and also training and supervising the use of tradecraft by my subordinates, of whom there were five. I returned to Moscow and spent four more years in the 3rd Department doing operational and administrative work. I was also seconded to School Number 101, then the Andropov Institute, helping in the writing of some of the manuals of tradecraft. In 1981 I was transferred from the Scandinavian side of the 3rd Department to the British side. I was then able to read a number of files which gave me information about the traditions and experience of the KGB in Britain. In June 1982 I was posted to London under the cover position of Counsellor of the Embassy, responsible for contact with political parties. My real work was political espionage along the same lines as in Copenhagen. After some time I became Deputy Resident, Head of Political Section as in Copenhagen. In 1984 and 1985 for periods of time I was acting Resident. In February 1985 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel. On Sunday 19th May 1985 I returned to Moscow and effectively my KGB career was over. I have been asked about the photograph of the Ballot Box Public House which appears in my book KGB: Instructions from the Centre. I specifically remember this matter because it was an operation I was personally involved in on Saturday 18th May 1985. I had to deliver money in a clandestine manner to an "illegal" and as part of the signalisation he had to place

Signature..... O Gordievsky

Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey

Continuation of Statement of Oleg GORDIEVSKY

chewing gum on a bollard in Horsenden Lane near this Public House. During my time in Britain I often met with Line-X KGB officers at the Russian Trade delegation in Highgate Hill and they would discuss how operations had gone and the planning of future operations. I often heard them refer to the areas West of Wembley, Harrow, Sudbury and Perivale. I recall one specific occasion as acting Resident where I had long discussions with the acting Head of Line-X about an operation to be conducted in that very area. As I have said Line-X were responsible for collecting intelligence about science and technology. O Gordievsky

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Signature O Gordievsky

Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey