ASIO - A FVEY Pawn
ASIO: Meet Bob with D Branch Attorney General's Department, "wink-wink" 27 December 2012, 23:19 http://www.jar2.com/Topics/ASIO.html
It has
been revealed that over 200
current and former intelligence officers,
operatives and specialists have posted detailed personal and operational
information on employment and social networking sites. Could it be that
personnel at the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) are so
inept or so desperate for work that they are willing to advertise potential
damaging information openly on the web. Perhaps I am overly confident in
their "intelligence", but I don't buy it. Read on.
Among the
standard operating procedures and the accepted practices for intelligences
officers, agents and almost all associated personnel, other than directors
and spokes-people, of the world’s intelligence agencies, is one that bans
said personnel from maintaining and possessing personal pages on social
media sites, dating sites, employment sites and the like.
The
security concerns and opportunities for compromising agents, operations,
unknowingly providing hostile counter-intelligence organizations and agents
with valuable data (among major concerns), are so many and so wide-ranging,
that if any trained intelligence officer, agent, operative or support
personnel were to do something like posting their special training on the
web, they would be stepping so far out of the bounds of accepted practice
that they would be instantly disciplined, and perhaps have their heads
examined.
The above
is true for almost any country in the world, except of course if you work
for the intrepid ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.
Currently the word “intelligence” in their name may be a matter for debate,
but regardless, let us not get off the point.
Recently
the Sydney
Morning Herald broke a story that
has many intelligence watchers worldwide scratching their heads and
wondering as to the “intelligence” behind Australia’s ASIO.
According
to the Herald hundreds, that’s right “hundreds” more than 200 to be exact,
of former and present “spies” have placed information regarding their
employment on-line on sites such as: “LinkedIn, other professional
networking sites and social media including Facebook and Twitter”.
The
information they have disclosed is so far ranging and potentially damaging
for the ASIO and so potentially valuable for “foreign intelligence” that I
am cautious as to taking it all at face value. As with all intelligence
operations and activities, nothing happens by accident and there is always a
huge level of duplicity in any activity they engage in, leading me to
believe the whole “data display” may be a carefully planned operation by
Australian Counter Intelligence Operations.
According
to the Herald some of the information that was disclosed includes the
following: fact of employment in top secret bodies such as the Defense
Signals Directorate and the Defense Intelligence Organization, location of
employment in specific “secret” facilities, overseas operational theater
postings, intelligence liaison with other country’s agencies, linguistic
skills, specific areas of work, expertise in specific information technology
systems, special counter-terrorism training, telecommunications experience,
aerospace ties, access to 'special compartmented intelligence' programs and
much more.
According
to computer forensics experts and information security professionals the
information is a gold-mine that can be used by foreign intelligence,
particular those engaged in social engineering, the practice of manipulating
people into revealing targeted and “secret” information.
For the
layman the fact that Raytheon may have secret departments operating in
Australia, that the Defense Signals Directorate, RAAF's No. 3
Telecommunications Unit, the Royal Australian Navy's Shoal Bay Receiving
Station, Britain's Communications Headquarters in Gloucestershire, GCHQ's
Composite Signals Station, the US National Security Agency, and an
Australian Defense Satellite Communications Station, cooperate closely and
employ each other’s personnel, may seem like something worth knowing but for
the “real” intelligence officer, these facts are already open knowledge.
What is
dangerous is that if the posting are in fact genuine, and I for one am
extremely skeptical, they open up personnel, their friends, present
employers, families and all acquaintances, for targeting by every kind of
group imaginable, from those involved in industrial espionage, to foreign
counter-intelligence operatives and even terrorist groups.
If we
undertake to analyze the “surprising” release of the information under the
premise that nothing occurs accidentally, then we can look at what is
actually being thrown out there like chum in shark infected waters, and more
importantly what is not, and attempt to reach an “intelligent” conclusion as
to the motivations and the real reasons for the release of the information.
We could
start by attempting to determine if these “over 200 individuals” are
actually real. Can we prove they are? Or are they cleverly engineered “bots”
that will attract “targets” interested in “secrets”. In this case could
Australian counter intelligence be so desperate to actually find some work
that they are attempting to create it themselves?
If these
200 are in fact real, is it possible they are involved in disinformation or
in actually culling their own contacts and targets. For example I might tell
the world I can program a nuclear war-head and then wait to see who bites
and reel in anyone who is interested in actually doing that. An intelligence
victory is had, or another example I could say I work for the NSA in
Department “M” and wait to see who shows an interest. Using such reactions
and more importantly “non-reactions” to such intelligence is part of what
counter intelligence is all about.
If we
assume this is a counter-intelligence operation then we can take the whole
game to the next level and engage in “counter-counter-intelligence”. For
example analyze the information that is “not” being revealed such as: after
a causal look at some of the “information” there was no reference to
“Russia” or “Russian”.
Are we
then to assume that the entire ASIO has no Russia Department? Of course not!
But we can ascertain that they have no interest in widening their Russian
operations or attracting Russian individuals, a fact from which many
conclusions can be reached, one of which might be that they already have
someone on the inside of Russian Intelligence, for example. This is more or
less pure counter-intelligence.
Another
example might be putting out information that intelligence operatives
specialize in information technology system “A”, which might then have the
less than intrepid hostile agency, going into over-drive to try to crack
“A”. All the while ASIO is building defenses for system “B” which is
currently vulnerable.
So my
little piece of advice, if you are approached by one of these “more than
200” just ignore them, do not interact with them. Real intelligence officers
and specialists rarely need social media and web sites to find employment if
they are in good standing. And if they pretend not to be, it may be a cover
and a ruse. Don’t buy into it.
Lastly
according to the Australian Defense Department's own security directives:
''... when engaged in online forums … personnel must exercise professional
judgment to ensure no information breaches operational security'', since
there is no huge outcry and mass arrests are not taking place, we could
assume no security protocols were broken and all of the information is
either planted or of no real importance, further evidence that a foul game
is afoot.
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